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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
This investigation examines how the uneasy relationship between death and 
representation plays out across three overlaping modalities – text, body, and image. 
Drawing from Freud’s formulations, I trace out the paroxysmal movements of the death 
drive in concurrence with narcissism, masochism, and the uncanny, arguing that the 
theoretical indeterminacy of these concepts might be ascribed to the manner in which 
they interrogate, exceed, and destabilize the prevailing perception of the self as an 
integrated whole. As a situation of subjective/symbolic rupture, perhaps it is not 
“possible” to think beyond the limit that death poses for psychoanalytic theory. However, 
I propose that reconsidering Freudian metapsychology in light of Georges Bataille’s work 
on trangression and excess allows us to think across said limit. In deploying this highly 
dynamic approach, I elaborate on the role of death in the drive economy and, 
subsequently, its potential association with the ‘oceanic’ feeling that Freud acknowledges 
(but quickly dismisses) as a motivation for religious belief. Considering death and its 
corresponding drive through the ontological oscillations they provoke, I argue, expands 
the field that constitutes their manifestations and opens up new avenues of inquiry via 
potential applications in religion and aesthetics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Misery of living men, disputing to the death the possibilities of  
the world of etcetera. Joy of the dying man, wave among waves.  
— Georges Bataille, Inner Experience  
 
 
Georges Bataille’s corpus reflects an aesthetic of harrowing ecstasy and wounded 
subjectivity among which one image stands out among the rest, a source of tragic 
inspiration and self-confessed obsession. The image is one of a series of photographs 
depicting the public dismemberment of a young Chinese man in late-Imperial China, the 
progression of a form of capital punishment known as lingchi – the torture of a hundred 
pieces, death by a thousand cuts.1 If we follow the gaze of the spectators in the photograph, 
we see a body in pieces: chest flayed open, arms and legs cut off below the elbows and 
knees, a form only with great difficulty or discomfort recognizable. But the dying man 
looks elsewhere, and his is the gaze that Bataille follows. Indeed, much of Bataille's 
theoretical work comes down to the extrapolation of this gaze beyond the existing frame: 
 
1 “The torture of a hundred pieces” is a translation of the French construction, le supplice de cent 
morceaux. See Georges Bataille, Tears of Eros, Trans. Peter Connor, (San Francisco: City Light Books, 
1989). 
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the (im)possible extension of transgressive and excessive experience into the unchartable 
territory of the erotic and the mystical; a violent, paroxysmal speculation at the limit 
beyond which the self as perceived unity unravels into incoherence.   
Yet, when this image is revisited in the interest of contextualizing Bataille’s work, 
it is largely reduced to anecdote. In what we could interpret as display (or denial) of 
narcissistic vulnerability, we wish to know, name, and identify – to interpellate a subject 
in the most fragmented of bodies. Though persistently identified as Fou Tchou Li, a young 
Chinese man condemned to death by “slow slicing” for the murder of Mongolian prince 
Ao-Han-Ouan, historians Timothy Brook, Jérome Bourgon, and Gregory Blue argue that 
this is an error attributed in large part to Bataille himself, though possibly the work of his 
editor.2 Fou Tchou Li was sentenced to execution by lingchi, the authors explain, but his 
is not the image, all too important and intimate, that is always present for Bataille, 
referenced repeatedly yet reproduced only (and problematically so) in the final pages of 
Tears of Eros, the last of Bataille's works published in his lifetime.3 As for the man whose 
death played out for decades on Bataille's desk, his identity remains unknown.  
If we wish to know the circumstances of the photograph, to assign a name and a 
crime to the man in the image, then we might criticize this misidentification as an error 
of historical inaccuracy. 4  Considered in the context of Bataille’s philosophy, however, the 
 
2 Timothy Brook, Jérome Bourgon, and Gregory Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), pp. 228-230. Brook, Bourgon, and Blue raise questions as to the authenticity of 
Tears of Eros, offering an analysis of the correspondence between Bataille and his editor Joseph Marie Lo 
Duca which suggests that Lo Duca significantly shaped Bataille’s final work, particularly through his 
selection and organization of the book’s many images and illustrations.   
3 As Brook et al explain, upon discovering the image of the real Fou Tchou Li in Jean-Jaques Matignon’s 
Dix ans au pays du dragon (1910), Bataille wrote the following to Lo Duca: “I’ve found by accident – at 
Fontenay – another photo of the Chinese torture of a hundred pieces. Completely the same so far as 
torture, but it’s someone else.” The same image also appears in Louis Carpeaux’s Pékin qui s’en va (1910), 
where it is accompanied by the story of Fou Tchou Li that Lo Duca would adopt as the explanatory caption 
of the photograph of the torture of a man who, as Bataille had expressed, was someone other than Fou 
Tchou Li. Brook et al, Death by a Thousand Cuts, p. 227.  
4 Bataille’s contemplation of this photograph is often discussed in the context of intellectual biography. 
See Denis Hollier, Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille, Trans. Betsy Wing, 
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error lies elsewhere or, rather, prior: in the frantic but futile attempt to recover a fading 
subject.5 Perhaps this effort is the symptomatic gesticulation of an underlying resistance 
or repudiation, one which suggests that there is more than one subjectivity at risk.  
Of the man he often referred to as his Dionysus chinois, Bataille writes: “he 
communicated the excessive nature of his pain, and it was precisely that which I was 
seeking, not so as to take pleasure in it, but in order to ruin in me that which was opposed 
to ruin.”6 For Bataille, then, the photograph is more than a still image of the event it 
depicts; it is an event in itself, an encounter with an unfathomable other who in the 
ecstatic loss of self moves beyond otherness. In challenging these “stable” referents, the 
photograph suggests to Bataille the radical possibility of a dissolution of self that 
translates to a dissolution of the spatial, temporal, and symbolic realities that the self 
holds together and maintains on the perceived basis of intersubjective difference. If the 
self can only be posited from a distance created and widened by the objectifying 
transformations of discursive otherness, the representation of an experience at the limit 
collapses that distance. In other words, for Bataille the truth to be found in the 
photograph is one that annihilates all others: given that discursive thought cannot escape 
its own egoism, the loss of self as a viable point of reference marks a limit beyond which 
otherwise synthesizing (but ouroboric) operations are dissolved into an experience of pre-
discursive disorder.  
But this self-ruination – be it textual, aesthetic, or lived – is a trauma not confined 
 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Michel Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, Trans. 
Krzysztof Fijalkowski and Michael Richardson, (New York: Verso, 2002); Stuart Kendall, Georges 
Bataille (London: Reaktion Books, 2007); and William Pawlett, Georges Bataille: The Sacred and 
Society, (London: Routledge, 2015).   
5 For instance, Bataille writes, “[t]he self in no way matters. For a reader, I am any individual: name, 
identity, the historical doesn’t change anything. He (the reader) is any one and I (the author) am also any 
one. . . without name. . . without name. . . without name, just as two grains of sand are for the desert, or 
rather two waves losing themselves in two adjacent waves are for a sea.” In Inner Experience, Trans. 
Leslie Anne Boldt, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 50.    
6 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 120; my emphasis.   
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to the “victim.” Indeed, it cannot be, for the victim ceases to exist as separate entity. By 
this Nietzschean “reasoning” individual sacrifice is also a sacrifice of subjective self-
certainty, the latter of which engulfs the viewer in a manner that cannot be conceptualized 
as a process of identification.7 To do so obscures the decisive and defining destruction 
that makes this image (and sacrifice in general) an obsessive reference for Bataille, 
namely the nullification of the individual subject which elicits a corresponding dislocation 
in the onlooker-participant.8 The absence or dispersal of the anchoring “I” – otherwise 
considered autonomous, stable, and durable – is that which is most intolerable to a 
thinking subject; it is an experience that Bataille equates to “being transported to the level 
of death.”9  
Bataille’s interest, as manifested in his choice of subject matter as well as his 
sustained effort to maintain his writing at the level of death, is, almost exclusively, in the 
dissolution of the subject. But the means, mechanisms, and psychic effects of this 
dissolution are closely bound to the manner in which the subject is first constituted and 
subsequently maintained. And is this understanding not the perpetual project of 
psychoanalysis? Thus, to clarify how the self arrives at “the level of death,” we turn – as 
we consistently and necessarily do – to the “I” as the contrived yet central figure of the 
drama. That is, if death is that which is most alien to thought, if it resists theorization then 
perhaps we can approach the concept asymptotically through a consideration of the “loss” 
 
7 See Jeremy Biles, Ecce Monstrum, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), p. 11. Biles writes, “not 
until Bataille has actually identified with the victim, in some sense become the victim, does he experience 
the ecstasy that may (or may not) be evident in the visage of the man in the photo.” However, as we have 
mentioned and will revisit, the notion of “identification” is uneasily applied, implying an object-cathexis 
by a “stable” subject and a “stable” object with which that subject identifies.  
8 According to Bataille, the function of the violent spectacle is “to destroy the self-contained nature of its 
participators.” See Erotism, Trans. Mary Dalwood, (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1986), p.17. In the 
dissolution of self that Bataille posits, “identification” would be both impossible and aimless. In its place, 
Bataille gives us his notion of “continuity.” 
9 Bataille, “The Practice of Joy in the Face of Death,” in The College of Sociology (1937-39), Ed. Dennis 
Hollier, Trans. Betsy Wing, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 325. 
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it entails. Doing so not only establishes a difficult dialectic between death and narcissistic 
self-positioning, but also clarifies, at least to some extent, the convulsiveness of thought 
that characterizes the momentary lived encounter with the elusive and radical otherness 
of death.  
 According to Jacques Lacan, the privileging of image over experience results in an 
“I” that exists only outside of itself as the idea or illusion of a “whole” – in Lacanian terms, 
imaginary. This paradigm emphasizes the tenuousness of the subject, allowing us to view 
the structures that animate subjective experience as indicative of both a narcissistic wish 
and a narcissistic wound: with each object cathexis, each symbolic interaction, the 
imaginary “I” rejects its fundamental incoherence in favor of the “stable” subjectivity it 
assumes,10 the “I” which in the symbolic order has a dual function as both sign and 
speaking subject. The “I”, then, does not exist in and of itself, nor is it an accurate 
representation of the individual alone and as such. Rather, as Lacan so distinctively 
suggests, the “I” is built on the fictional foundation of its own coherence and all that it is, 
all that we understand it to be, is a product of constant negotiation, deferral, and dialectic 
relation. And yet, as fictive and fragile as it may be, this imaginary anchor establishes the 
vital relation between the individual and his reality or rather, between the individual and 
the symbolic existence that structures and mediates said reality.  
Language, we know, is not a truth, but a system mediating the truth, a circular 
structure through and by which the subject is constituted and participates in his own 
construction. Entry into the signifying logic, therefore, has a two-fold effect: it makes of 
the individual a speaking, speakable entity but, in so doing, traces out his limits against 
those of the “external” world, rendering him, as Bataille would say, discontinuous or, to 
 
10 The word “assume” here is implied with a double meaning, in the sense that one takes on or comes to 
possess his image/subjectivity but also that one presumes or takes as given that such an 
image/subjectivity is indicative of any internal reality.  
 6 
use a Lacanian term, alienated. Both sense and understanding of self, then, are grounded 
in the moment in which the individual, confronted with his fragmented nature, responds 
with rejection: the first misrecognition is also the first denial of the unsettling possibility 
of the unrepresentable, and it is on the foundation of this first denial that the “I” stands. 
But what occurs when the individual is confronted with the unrepresentable truth of the 
fragmented self? What becomes of the reality that the “I” conveniently but tenuously 
holds together? These appear to be the questions that urge Bataille and draw him (in)to 
the image of the Dionysus chinois, where the perceived unity of the “I” – a composite of 
spectral images – shatters like the thin reflexive surface between the 
idealized/immortalized “I” and the fractured self. No longer intact and no longer 
representable, the “I” ceases to exist as such, its relation to the symbolic and its function 
as speaking subject suspended. The “I” is no longer a “thing” in the world and, as a result, 
its world is no longer a world of things.  
 Curiously, the photograph was given to Bataille during the course of his 
psychoanalysis with Adrien Borel.11 However, as the reflections thus far suggest, we are 
less concerned here with the image itself as a particular visual artifact and more so with 
the various threads tied together by Bataille’s lifelong contemplation of it. These include 
but are not limited to: the avowal of sacrificial violence as constitutive of the erotic, 
mystical, and anti-textual; the possibility of a de(con)structive aesthetic that doubles as a 
mode of communication; and an intractable form of speculation that decenters the self-
possessed “I” in favor of an all-consuming contingency. Refusing positivist egocentrism 
and visible or rational coherence as that which dissects and diminishes experience, 
 
11 See Benjamin Noys, Bataille: A Critical Introduction, (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 12, 25-6. For 
more on Bataille’s relationship with Adrien Borel, refer to Elizabeth Roudinesco, “Bataille entre Freud et 
Lacan: une experience cachée,” in Georges Bataille après tout, Ed. Denis Hollier, (Paris: Belin, 1995), pp. 
191-212.  
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Bataille privileges the base and unassimilable. However, he does so without elevating or 
altering its content, that is, without the aim of synthesis or (logical) comprehension. The 
result is a highly-mobile and at times deleterious rigor that emphasizes the permeability, 
insufficiency, and impossibility of any seemingly “closed” system(s) – a violence of 
thought expressed through its convulsive doublings and re-doublings.   
Initially this may seem at odds with psychoanalytic thought, which reads for the 
unconscious in its manifestations and seeks to establish a basis for legibility. However, 
there is a field of psychoanalytic concepts characterized by extreme ambivalence and/or 
a violent alternation of affects: the structure of masochism which poses an “economic 
problem,” the sinister yet strangely familiar Freudian uncanny and its semiotic 
reformulation in Kristeva’s notion of the abject, and the pleasure-pain of jouissance – to 
name but a few. Here an application of Bataille’s ‘general economy,’ arguably a precursor 
to libidinal materialism, might help to account for and indeed defend the inherence of 
paradoxical contradiction. Such an approach allows us to establish crucial links between 
these uneasy, unstable concepts, not by formal logic but rather through a close 
consideration of their shared convulsiveness. In this way, theoretical indeterminacy 
presents itself not as a conceptual problem to be neutralized or surmounted, but as an 
indicator of ontological crisis. This crisis, I argue, results from a proximity to death, that 
which is most other to individual thought or self-positing and yet resides at the core of 
being as a fundamental source of anxiety as well as desire.   
Unlike the gestalted form, Bataille’s Dionysus chinois represents a self that is not-
one, an experience of (ego-)death that anticipates the biological one. More than the 
inevitable mortality of the organism, the notion of death that appears in and is evoked by 
Bataille’s writing corresponds to a condition of or desire for the symbolic or 
representational liminality that is achieved through the destruction of the “thing” within 
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the thing, the annihilation of the self as demarcated by symbolic limits. I mention 
representation here for, though in his writings Bataille emphasizes the textual character 
of death, his nearly life-long contemplation of the Dionysus chinois and his general choice 
of (base) subject matter suggests that there is an aspect of death which resists or eludes 
discourse, an element which is fundamentally visual and visceral, and which challenges 
the signifying logic from a place of exclusion. This element demands precisely what is 
necessarily obscured or excluded in symbolic processes: overflowing excess, ambiguity, 
formlessness. It is the desire to annihilate all, including desire itself. Arguably, then this 
force is other than and prior to desire. This force must be a drive.   
Reframed in terms of symbolic function, the death-drive ceases to be an instinct or 
inclination of the organism that wishes to restore a condition of non-existence, and 
becomes the abstract and fractal desire of a speaking subject who (by fascination or 
nostalgia) is compelled to go beyond the compartmentalizing logic of the sign, to go before 
his entry into the symbolic order as a coherent but alienated “I.” The reading of death as 
a peculiar form of discursivity corresponds to Julia Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic as a 
pre- and proto-symbolic condition of undifferentiated affect and instinct. In this 
distinction, death is both the disruption of symbolic significance and its antecedent: it 
corresponds to an engulfing situation of pre-discursive anarchism, a return to the 
polymorphous fullness that precedes oedipal ambivalence.12 Thus, to view the photograph 
as Bataille does is to seek in it a deliberate destruction, acknowledging that there is one 
“stable” object that reveals the structural instability of all others: “death” as the 
 
12 Though not exclusively, I am referring here to Kristeva’s elaboration of the pre-discursive (i.e. semiotic) 
chora as a “rhythmic” and “non-expressive totality” (pp. 93-4) that both undergirds and disrupts cultural 
and linguistic structures. See Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), and Elizabeth Grosz’s critique in “The Body of Significance” in 
Abjection, Melancholia, and Love, Ed. John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin, (New York: Routledge, 
1990), pp. 80-103.  
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undifferentiated unity from which discontinuous existence is distilled and which it seeks 
to refind.  
However, what renders death as such a persistant object is precisely that which 
precludes death from being an object at all – a fundamental resistance to representation. 
Death, then, belongs to the domain of the abject. Kristeva not only describes the abject, 
but submerges us in its implications:  
The abject shatters the wall of representation and its judgements. It takes 
the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to 
be, the ego has broken away – it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, 
and death. Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the 
ego). It is an alchemy that transforms death-drive into a start of life, of new 
significance.13 
Neither of the “I” nor of the other, neither subject nor object, the abject lays bare the 
instability of the object relations that structure symbolic and intersubjective existence. 
Considered alongside Lacan’s formulation of jouissance as “the path towards death,”14 we 
might conclude that in our deep ambivalence to the abject, the death drive is at play, 
operating as the force that draws us beyond the limits of self and subjectivity, “to the place 
where meaning collapses.”15 There is something morbid, murderous, and unbearable in 
the rupture of the integrity and integrality of form. According to Bataille, it brings us face 
to face with that which cannot be known, only experienced in and as a “paradoxical 
combination of extreme affects”: a deep anguish at the loss of self and yet, a loss that 
cannot be mourned, only celebrated as the ecstatic escape from a limited existence.16 
 
13 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, Trans. Leon Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
p. 15.  
14 Jacques Lacan, Trans. Russel Grigg, Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, (New 
York/London: W. W. Norton and Co., 2008), p. 17. 
15 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2.  
16 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, p. 4. Here Biles considers the extreme emotion(s) evoked by the wounding of the 
closed form in terms of “religious sensibility,” reading the contradiction and confusion evoked by the 
sacrifice of form as a modern means of approaching the sacred.  
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Where seemingly contradictory terms – e.g. attraction/repulsion, desire/fear, 
pleasure/pain – meet and mutilate one another we might discern the “impossibility” of 
an endpoint that manifests as violent ambivalence. In approaching that which cannot be 
thought, thought itself twists itself into strange shapes.  
Here we begin to discern what might be considered the aesthetic of the death 
drive.17 Following Bataille, such an aesthetic is not necessarily or exclusively destructive. 
Instead, it affirms the insufficiency or incompleteness implied by the narcissistic wound, 
suggesting the openness of a lacerated being as that which makes possible a lived 
experience of death in the form of wordless, intimate transmission. This death is not 
abstract negativity, but a non-discursive mode of communication that occurs through the 
undifferentiated medium of pre-ambivalent fullness. “Erotism,” Bataille writes, “jerks us 
out of our tenacious obsession with the lastingness of our discontinuous being.”18 The 
same can be said of death, which furnishes eroticism with its aim and characterizes its 
pursuit. In Bataille’s understanding, death operates beyond nihilistic destruction: like 
eroticism, it presents an end to or momentary escape from the isolation of limited, self-
contained existence. That is, by challenging the self-contained, self-possessed form and 
function of the individual being, death brings about a sense of continuity with other 
ruptured beings – communication through wordless transmission. It is this death-as-
dissolution that Bataille seeks and (re)finds in his “Dionysus chinos.” In the willful 
confrontation with the excessive violence of the image, the self is engulfed in a totality 
that language, structured as it is by alterity and lack, renders unthinkable, a totality in 
 
17 See Robert Rowland Smith, Death-Drive: Freudian Hauntings in Literature and Art, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010). In a series of essays, Smith considers Freud’s metapsychology in 
relation to the philosophy, literature, and contemporary art, attempting to redefine death in an aesthetic 
(and rhetorical) sense, as “a matter of promise or persuasion in the absence of a secure referent or 
signified,”p. xiii. This is also a key facet of Leo Bersani’s work, particularly The Freudian Body (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), to be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
18 Bataille, Erotism, p. 16. 
 11 
which the self as contained and coherent unit is fundamentally untenable. 
Still, a situation without speaking subjects, without difference cannot be contained 
in logos. How then to express the impossible? According to Bataille, the only “possible” 
way is to experience how it expresses itself as a momentary extinction or loss of self-
positioning, in the ontological trembling aroused by a transgression. And this self-
canceling paradigm shift, I suggest, is particularly useful in accounting for the limits of 
(Freudian) psychoanalysis. Perhaps the Bataillian approach neither alters nor clarifies 
those limits. It does, however, substantiate the impossibilities that seem to demarcate the 
psychoanalytic subject and, through their tension with the possible, propel psychic life. 
For instance, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud quickly dismisses the 
application of the death drive in regard to aesthetics. But considering death and its 
corresponding drive through the ontological oscillations they provoke significantly 
expands the field that constitutes their manifestations, giving us cause to revisit the 
avenues of inquiry and potential applications originally abandoned by Freud. I am 
referring here to aesthetics but also to the sphere of religious belief of which Freud was 
notoriously and trenchantly suspicious.  
Interpreting death as a situation of unboundedness allows us, for instance, to 
explore its possible affinity with the ‘oceanic’ feeling that Freud identifes as the source of 
religious sentiment. Underlying both appears to be a desire to return, but Freud, ever the 
skeptic, frames the former as a biological inclination and the latter as a regressive fantasy. 
However, by drawing death out of its dichotomous positioning as the end of life, we can 
offer a reading of this drive not as the tendency towards non-existence, but as the speaking 
subject’s primordial desire to return to a condition of non-differentiation reminiscent of 
that which precedes the individuation of the ego. Doing so will allow us to explore a 
possible correlation first between the death-drive and primary narcissism, whose effects 
 12 
this reformulated death drive appears to dialectically oppose, and subsequently, between 
the death drive and the ‘oceanic’ feeling, which much like Bataille’s notion of “continuity,” 
is presented as an experience of dissolution wherein the boundary between the ego and 
the external world is lost, blurred, or distorted. Beyond this, the juxtaposition of Freudian 
metapsychology with Bataille’s theoretical trangressiveness gives us an opportunity to 
consider death (both in principle and as drive) as the precursor to erotic and sacred 
activity and, via its multifarious sublimations, the very motor of psychic life.  
A strictly secular reading of Bataille is likely to render his writing irrational or 
indigestible, a glorification of suffering interspersed with bouts of Dionysian delirium. 
And yet, as Andrew Hussey notes, only a handful of contemporary accounts of Bataille’s 
thought have engaged with those aspects of his thinking influenced by his interest in 
mysticism, a mode of speculation beyond any moderation which favors the exigencies of 
medieval Christianity to any form of philosophical dualism.19 In the mystico-eroticism20 
of his work, he attempts to translate the experience of transgression into a language that 
subverts the stable referents of philosophy, conjuring the violent and transgressive to 
destabilize, to dissolve, to create in the reader a simultaneous experience of discomfort 
and desire in the face of his own destruction, always-already immanent. It is this aspect 
of his work, I believe, that is of distinct relevance to psychoanalysis and semiotics. 
 
19 Andrew Hussey, The Inner Scar, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), p. 2. In recent decades, more work on 
this theme has been published, including Peter Connor’s Georges Bataille and the Mysticism of Sin, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), Alexander Irwin’s Saints of the Impossible 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), and Amy Hollywood’s comprehensive expositions on 
the figure of the mystic in 20th century French thought, most notably in Sensible Ecstasy, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
20 These concepts are often elided, however for Bataille, there is a crucial difference between the two. 
Eroticism, of which Bataille gives examples such as ritual sacrifice or orgy, is defined by a liminal 
experience that creates community or “continuity” between participants. Mysticism, however, is 
characterized as an inner experience, whereby “continuity” is achieved via a negation of the self and its 
stable referents. The nuances of these concepts will be explored in detail in Chapter 5, along with a 
discussion of how the body in pain in the Christian tradition suggests the possibility of interplay between 
the two.  
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Unrestrained by conceptual formalism, it allows us to think across that which marks for 
subjective thought an explicit limit. Perhaps thinking “beyond” this limit is not possible, 
but an analysis of those elements of Bataille’s thinking that reveal the limit to be 
fundamentally unstable (i.e. excess and transgression) may allow us to at least think 
across it. This exercise, I argue, has interesting implications for Freudian 
metapsychology, particularly in regard to the role of death in the drive economy, which I 
explore as the excess rendered by the general economy of the drives, and for an 
understanding of the psychological structure of faith and mysticism, which I propose 
represent a situation of ontological uncertainty that evokes an experience of death in the 
psyche. Conversely, interpreting Bataille’s mystico-eroticism in the language of 
psychoanalysis clarifies Bataille’s notion of the “discontinuous subject” and, in turn, the 
continuity that subject achieves in and beyond the willful confrontation with his own 
destruction. Through its dialectics, this paradigm suggests that an experience or aesthetic 
of the sacred/erotic is bound to death and, moreover, that death propels psychic activity 
as the aim of a drive which is most primary and yet must be perpetually deferred. 
Furthermore, staying with the impossibility or “failure” of thought in the absence of the 
subject allows us to extrapolate psychoanalytic theory beyond its egocentricity.  
Though the potential applications of this model are, to use a Batallian term, 
heterogenous, I concentrate on the body in pain and its representation, specifically in the 
tradition and aesthetic of Christian mysticism. In these practices and their visual relics, 
we can discern the convergence of agony and ecstasy but also of signification and 
corporeality, a complex positioning that lets us explore the relationship between the 
psychic demands of integrity and dissolution. Searching for the sacred outside of the 
traditional forms of religion, Bataille found it bound to horror, at the limit with death. 
However, through his affirmation of the pre-ego feeling restored in throes of a crisis of 
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self and subjectivity, Bataille’s work allows us to revisit the understanding of self-
destructiveness at its most diffuse, not as an individual pathology or perversion but as a 
means of restoring a lost, ‘oceanic’ unity.  
The aim of the work that follows is to consider the causes and implications of this 
ever-shifting structure. As such it will not reflect a neat application of Bataillian concepts 
to Freudian theory, nor vice versa. Rather, the intention here is to magnify the theoretical 
limit of psychoanalysis through the lens of Bataille’s extensive work on the matter of 
transgression. As a result, the aim is not simply to establish a basis of comparison 
(although this certainly factors into the discussion) but to consider the doubling and 
violent alternation of affects that is effected when a certain conceptual limit is crossed, to 
consider this doubling as deeply indicative of the otherness that lies beyond. If the 
blurring of lines causes philosophical intelligibility to disintegrate into a heterogeneous 
mass, the matters and motifs which do so are suspended only momentarily in the 
signification that fails to contain them.21 Thus, this work emphasizes “non-philosophical 
modes of enunciation”22 and articulations that evade discursive utility, reading for 
analogous intensities, movements, and displacements instead of the aegis of a 
homogenous “meaning.”  
In that sense, the theoretical methodology draws from Andre Green’s approach to 
the negative. 
The proponents of the negative in psychoanalysis form a family whose 
members are not united by an organic link. But they are linked by a certain 
way of thinking which they share. In fact, a familiarity exists between them 
which enables them to recognize each other from the outset, not with 
 
21 See Nick Land’s elaboration of libidinal materialism in The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille 
and Virulent Nihilism, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. xi.   
22 Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve” in Writing 
and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass, (London: Routledge, 1997 [1978]), pp. 251-277; p. 253.   
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respect to a defined doctrinal position but by a cast of mind which identifies 
them in their way of looking at problems or of seeking the most interesting 
means of resolving them. It is once again the resistance they show towards 
another group of opponents that allows us to discern more clearly what they 
stand for…23  
Each chapter thus builds upon the previous, gathering the concepts that gravitate around 
an “impossible” center in an attempt to speak not about but around it. We begin with a 
close reading of Freud’s formulation of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
examining the non-linearity of the revised theory of instincts as expressed in Freud’s 
speculative text and in its reuptake in other psychoanalytic paradigms: how can the 
concept be opened up in a way that does not abandon its original formulation and, of 
equal importance, what are the elements implicit in that formulation via which the 
instinct speaks itself? Staying with Freud’s metapsychological texts, Chapter 2 considers 
the paradoxical nature of the death drive as a function of the narcissistic entity in which 
it operates, neither tendancy being conceivable nor tenable without its dialectical 
counterpart. Death cannot be posited as the binary other of life if it burgeons in the core 
of the individual unit, and so Chapter 3 proposes how and why an application of Bataille’s 
“anti-philosophy” both elucidates and affirms the difficult dynamic between the 
inherently wounded ego and a radical otherness, nuancing the conception of death as the 
“zero principle” opposed to the perpetuation of the ego-as-One. In deconstructing the 
economy of the drives as a tension between finite and infinite, this chapter serves as a 
meridian beyond which death can be put in play (en jeu) as a situation of deep ontological 
uncertainty.  
 This, I argue, suggests a version of the death drive that might be oriented towards a 
 
23 André Green, The Work of the Negative, Trans. Andrew Weller, (London: Free Association Books, 
1999), p. 14.  
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self-negating otherness in the form of non-differentiation, which we find both in Freud 
and Bataille as the ‘oceanic’ feeling associated with religiosity and the “continuity” 
achieved through the transgressive expenditure of self, respectively. The chapters that 
follow consider the possible applications of this model in uncontainable modes of 
experience and, in turn, their representation in violent aesthetic practices. Mysticism, 
masochism, and traumatic/erotic visual depictions of the body in extremis are offered as 
specific examples of this more “excessive” interpretation of the death drive whereby the 
loss or laceration of self represents a destruction not in the service of negation but of the 
affirmation, radical communication, and sovereignty that traverse one another in the 
domain of the impossible.  
Returning then to the contentious photograph that so influenced Bataille, his 
writing helps to understand the stakes of transgression, be it in thought, lived experience, 
or representation: a continuity or community in the sacred and/or erotic that comes at 
the greatest expense of the self and its stable referents. Given where one arrives in this 
way, the how loses a great deal of significance, such that the self-effacing practices of 
masochism and religious contemplation cannot be ascribed to a repressed sexuality. 
Rather, they would appear to be analogous expressions of the same primordial 
inclination, a view that has implications not only for our understanding of the practices 
themselves but also of the drive to unbind by which they seem governed. Perhaps then it 
is Susan Sontag who best discerns the “identity” of the man in the photograph. In 
Regarding the Pain of Others, she does not invoke a name. Rather, she artfully describes 
the man in the image as “a real Marsyas, not a mythic one—and still alive in the picture, 
with a look on his upturned face as ecstatic as that of any Italian Renaissance Saint 
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Sebastian.”24 The “ecstatic (?)”25 loss of self renders him nothing more or less than saint-
like. The unnamed man in the image then, is not Fou Tchou Li, nor is he not Fou Tchou 
Li. He is unknown and unknowable, the fragmented body that challenges and supplants 
the coherent image. To say, then, that Bataille was captivated by the young man in the 
photograph, is an understatement. The two are continuous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 77.  
25 Bataille writes that he “never stopped being obsessed by this image of pain, at once ecstatic (?) and 
intolerable,” (Bataille, 1989, p. 206) and the expression on the face of the tortured man has been the cause 
of much speculation and debate. However, as Amy Hollywood points out, the very deliberate question 
mark here suggests that the assumption of the tortured man’s inner state is “only reluctantly taken up by 
Bataille” (Sensible Ecstasy, p. 303). I would press this further, arguing that because of the ambiguity and 
contradiction that such extreme suffering materializes, such conjecture seems futile, absurd, or violent – 
if not all three.  
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1. 
IN DEFENSE OF THE DEATH DRIVE  
 
 
 
But something other dearer still than life  
the darkness hides and mist encompasses  
we are proved luckless lovers of this thing  
that glitters in the underworld:  
no man can tell us of the stuff of it,  
expounding what is, and what is not  
we know nothing of it.  
Idle we drift, on idle stories carried.  
— Euripedes, Hippolytus  
 
 
  
Death, Heidegger writes, “stands before us – something impending,”1 and this 
teleological understanding of death certainly seems to resonate with the theory of 
Todestrieb presented by Freud only seven years prior. With Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud too argues that life strives towards the fullness acheived in its own 
 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1962), p. 249.  
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extinguishment, but the Freudian text includes a defining complication: the presumably 
linear nature of teleological thinking is bent back on itself such that the aim is also the 
origin. This circuitous logic, compounded by Freud’s insistence on the unrepresentabilty 
of death in the unconscious, might account for some of the resistance to the concept 
introduced by Freud in 1920 and known since as the death drive. If aim and origin are 
one and the same, overlapping precisely in that domain which is unknowable and 
unsayable, then the entire endeavor of life could appear to be reduced to a prolonged 
frustration.  
For scholars such as Jonathan Lear and Martin Hägglund this seems to be the 
dominant source of contention. Working at the intersections of psychoanalysis and 
philosophy, their respective arguments against the legitimacy or primacy of the death 
drive reflect a broader critical approach which emphasizes the ethical implications of 
subordinating life to its endpoint.2 Life, they argue, attains value in relation to and against 
its passing and always potential loss, and our affective attachments, libidinal investments, 
and death anxieties suggest that we do in fact care deeply about the mortal life which will 
inevitably be lost, too much so for the death drive to be as primary as Freud suggested. 
Lear in particular takes issue with the elision of trauma, pain, aggressivity, and 
breakdown under the label of death. As he intervenes in Happiness, Death, and the 
Remainder of Life, a “breakdown” can also be a “breakthrough” but a terminology that 
gravitates around death obscures or overshadows this possibility. Meanwhile, others such 
as Harold Searles (1961), Louis Breger (1981) and, most recently, Liran Razinsky (2013), 
have all raised the complementary objection that the death drive does not actually refer 
 
2 Jonathan Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000); Martin Hägglund, Dying for Time, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). See also: 
Duncan Barford, “In Defense of Death” in The Death Drive: New life for a dead subject?, Ed. Robert 
Weatherhill, (London: Rebus Press, 1999), pp. 12-39.   
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to “death” at all – that the transformation of death into the object of a wish or a drive 
binds it with finite life in a way that undermines its singularity and significance.3   
I mention these perspectives here to clarify that the defense of the death drive 
promised by this chapter is not intended to be against such criticisms. They operate under 
a logic that I do not share and the rejection of which is the point of departure for the 
theoretical questioning of this investigation. Instead, this chapter is intended to defend 
the death drive against its own internal contradictions – to defend those very 
contradictions as inherent and necessary to any genuine understanding of this concept. 
These contradictions, I believe, are not indicative of theoretical failure. Rather, they signal 
the intrinsic complexity, anti-reductionism, and non-linearity of this theory, and this 
nebulousness, akin to the aim of the drive itself, opens an entire field of questioning as to 
what is meant by “death” if not the end of life, and more specifically, what is the function 
of death in psychic reality.  
It is my impression that the aforementioned criticisms of the death drive hinge on 
a narrow understanding of death as a physical end-state or the termination of life, an 
understanding indicative of or culminating in a binary logic that forecloses the theoretical 
possibilities opened up by the Freudian concept and flattens the very concept itself. In 
treating life and death as mutually exclusive, these perspectives frame death as a function 
of linear time – an endpoint – neglecting death as an issue of representation. Given 
Freud’s assessment that the organizing principles of time and linear logic do not operate 
in the unconscious, such an understanding of death as a temporal function only serves to 
render it more inaccessible. However, if we take death’s irrepresentability to be its 
 
3 Louis Breger, Freud’s Unfinished Journey, (London: Routledge, 1981). In Freud, Psychoanalysis and 
Death, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) Liran Razinsky offers a comprehensive overview of 
the psychoanalytic attitude towards death as well as the responses of extistential psychology to “death 
anxiety.”  
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defining feature, a starting point instead of a theoretical limit, we can engage the concept 
through its relation to the symbolic life whose tenuousness it reveals. The question then 
is not how can we think of and through death if it is unrepresentable, but how does that 
which cannot be contained in logocentric closure evoke an experience of death for the 
speaking subject.  
Freud himself believed that his ideas concerning the death drive would need to be 
“left to future investigation.”4 Perhaps this “future investigation” that Freud envisioned 
was never intended to assimilate or abandon the concept, but rather to show that we are 
drawn to it, that we return to it as if by the very compulsion that characterizes it. What I 
propose, therefore, is yet another return to Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a (re-)reading 
of this text in which life and death are treated not as mutually exclusive biological states 
but rather as forces of mind which are ontologically inseparable.  
Yes, Freud writes rather unequivocally that “the aim of all life is death,”5 but I 
maintain that the conceptual use-value of the death drive lies less in the predisposition of 
life to extinguish itself entirely, and more so in the dialectical tension between this instinct 
and a life principle under the command of Eros – a tension between the psychic demands 
of binding and unbinding as exemplified in the game of disappearance and return that 
Freud observed in his grandson Ernst. In other words, death may be, as Freud states, the 
first and final goal of life, but by my reading, the death drive refers to something other 
than the tendency of life to seek its apogee in its own definitive annhilation; it refers 
instead to death as it is memorialized in the psyche, as a force or principle of return 
exerting its pressure on all the goals that fall in between the “first” and “final,” and to a 
great extent relying on its juxtaposition to the life principle to achieve expression.  
 
4 Sigmund Freud (1933), New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis, SE XXII, pp. 1-182; p. 107.  
5 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, pp. 3-64; p. 38.  
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I would argue that this interpretation is largely obscured by Freud’s grounding of 
the concept in biological principles. As we will see, Freud’s conclusions are actually at 
odds with the discourse of evolutionary biology in which they are framed. But this is not 
the only difficulty with his contextualization. In an effort to clarify his ideas by carrying 
them over to the cellular level, Freud calcifies them instead, prompting a 
conceptualization of life and death as states rather than as principles. What this chapter 
suggests is that although death cannot be represented as such, it is nevertheless present 
in the psyche in a way that informs the trajectory of psychic activity – much like the 
“unplumbable” navel of the dream.  
To defend this position, however, it is necessary that we shift the axis across which 
the life and death drives are positioned – not within a biological field of reference, but a 
symbolic one. In doing so, I believe we can better approximate the function of death in 
psychic life. From a symbolic standpoint, we can interpret death as a function of internal 
(but not absolute) negation, as the experience of anguish at the limits of signification. And 
yet, given the negative and/or non-representable nature of this concept, it cannot be 
understood without its dialectical counterpart. Precisely therein lies the theoretical use-
value of the death drive. By considering death as it operates in juxtaposition to a life 
principle, the concept of the death drive offers a means of understanding how the negative 
and/or unrepresentable infiltrates unconscious semiotics and subjective experience 
without destroying completely the binding structures of Eros on which it relies for its 
perpetuation. By this reading, death stands neither in front of us nor behind us. It is not 
a vanishing point in the distance. It is an element that resides within us like a trace. Aim 
and origin are indeed bound together as Freud supposed, but within the individual, at all 
times and inextricably so.  
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FORT/DA 
At the outset, the aim of Beyond the Pleasure Principle appears relatively 
straightforward: to explore the psychic mechanisms at work in cases that did not seem to 
be adequately explained by the existing drive theory. In his examples of traumatic 
neurosis, child play, and transference, Freud isolates the compulsion to repeat, a tendency 
to return to the source of trauma or distress in spite of the unpleasure that such repetition 
necessarily brings about within the individual. Freud explains that, unlike the effort to 
avoid unpleasure that characterizes repression, the compulsion to repeat represents an 
inclination within the individual to return to the very source of unpleasure despite the 
impossibility of deriving satisfaction from it, an inclination which upon initial 
interpretation seems oriented neither towards pleasure or its temporary postponement 
and as such, does not operate according to either of the drives that Freud had previously 
outlined – the pleasure principle and reality principle. There must be then, as Freud 
explains, a psychical/physical force at play that is not derived from the libidinal impulses, 
something “more primitive, more elementary, more driven than the pleasure principle 
which it overrides.”6 
Upon closer consideration of the psychical processes beyond the scope of the 
pleasure principle, Freud notes that the compulsion to repeat is quite difficult to isolate, 
that “only in rare instances can we observe [its] pure effects, unsupported by other 
motives.”7 Indeed, in his examples of repetition compulsion there appears to be more at 
work than the desire or drive to return to previous stages of development. But what are 
these “other motives” to which Freud refers?  
The archetypal example of the game of disappearance and return that he observed 
 
6 ibid, p. 23.  
7 ibid.  
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in his grandson Ernst offers some suggestions. By Freud’s interpretation, the child revisits 
the trauma of his mother's departure by throwing a wooden reel attached to a piece of 
string ('fort') but then proceeds to take an active role in response to the distressing 
experience by pulling the reel by the string and making it reappear ('da'). Whereas the 
first part of the child's game may be interpreted as a manifestation of the repetition 
compulsion, the second and more decisive part suggests an effort on behalf of the child to 
master the distressing experience of his mother’s absence by becoming the active center 
of that experience. Within the logic of the game he can defiantly send her away ('fort') and 
with a pull of the string, he can bring about her return ('da').  
The inherent aggression in throwing away the toy coupled with the satisfaction of 
its reappearance points toward how this game is in the service of recapitulating loss 
through return. The game then does yield some form of pleasure, suggesting that (1) the 
function of the repetition compulsion is not simply to return to a trauma, but to return in 
the interest of mastery, and subsequently (2) the compulsion to repeat that characterizes 
the death drive is best observed as it operates in dialectic with the life drives and its 
corresponding principles.  
Curiously enough, the very phenomena which might best have demonstrated the 
tendencies that do in fact surpass the pleasure principle are those which Freud dismisses 
rather quickly, namely “artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which, 
unlike those of children, are aimed at an audience, do not spare the spectators (for 
instance, in tragedy) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly 
enjoyable.”8 According to Freud, these cases fall under the domain of aesthetics and, 
being dominated by the pleasure principle, are “of no use for our purposes.”9 However, 
 
8 ibid, p. 17.  
9 ibid. The role of aesthetics in relation to the repetition compulsion will, however, reappear in Freud’s 
writing, most notably with his 1919 paper “The Uncanny,” SE XVII, pp. 217-256.  
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seeing as it is difficult to uncouple or isolate pleasure and death as motives, I would like 
to argue the contrary. Given how intimately the two operate, each relying on the other to 
derive satisfaction, it is possible that the drives that Freud locates “beyond” the pleasure 
principle are perhaps best observed in this very domain where they manifest alongside 
the pleasure principle instead of as prior or posterior. In that case, we turn to Lacan, who 
in his notion of jouissance encapsulates (insofar as jouissance can be encapsulated or 
enclosed) the pleasurable pain derived from excessive experience, suggesting that 
precisely therein lies “the possibility of the conjunction between Eros and Thanatos.”10  
Considered as the satisfaction or enjoyment deriving from the death drive, 
jouissance is necessarily in relation to the categories or structures which this drive seeks 
to exceed. As a symbolic or aesthetic tendency, this enjoyment would correspond to a 
manipulation or distortion of the representable that radically alters the relation to the 
“object” being seen/signified and, in turn, to subjectivity itself. This idea will be 
elaborated throughout the subsequent chapters, but I mention it here to draw back into 
our discussion of the death drive those aesthetic experiences which Freud dismissed, a 
necessity if we are to work with the death drive as a function in relation to representation.  
As Freud points out, certain aesthetic experiences can be both painful and 
enjoyable. But whereas this leads him to relegate these experiences to the realm of the 
pleasure principle, we could also argue that such experiences may be 
enjoyable because painful, painful because they are “excessively” enjoyable. From a 
symbolic standpoint, the “pleasure” derived here would be the result of a challenging of 
 
10 Lacan, Seminar XIV: The Logic of Fantasy, Trans. Cormac Gallagher from unedited French 
manuscripts. May 24, 1967. Of jouissance, Lacan writes: “it is on this plane and on this plane alone that 
Thanatos can be found to be in any way connected to Eros. It is in the measure that the jouissance of the 
body – I am saying of one’s own body, beyond the pleasure principle – is evoked, and is not evoked 
elsewhere than in the act, precisely in the act which puts a hole, a void, a gap, in its center, around what is 
localized in hedonistic detumescence, it is from that moment on that there is posed a possibility of the 
conjunction of Eros and Thanatos” (p. 138).  
 26 
the subject’s stable referents and of the devastation experienced by the subject as a result. 
Describing this “pleasurable unpleasurable tension” as it relates to sexual excitement, Leo 
Bersani quantifies this condition as an excess of the body’s “normal” range of sensations, 
an experience in which “the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed by 
sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ those compatible with psychic 
organization.”11 But this experience, as rooted as it is in the experience of the body, is not 
limited to its capacity as a function of sexuality or corporeality: grounded in the processes 
of signification (i.e. the “I” as sign projected onto the surface of the body) and the 
individual’s psychic investment therein, it extends to any event that fractures the subject’s 
self-perception, including the devastation that can be evoked aesthetically through the 
visual sublime. The aim of this investigation is to explore the contradictory affects that 
converge ‘beyond’ the limits of psychic organization and to consider their coincidence as 
indicative of the uncompromising paradox that the un/pleasurable fracturing of the self 
(re)presents for subjectivity and theories thereof. As support, I will trace out a textual and 
visual aesthetic of woundedness and uncertainty, arguing that the uneasiness evoked by 
bodies (or texts) in extremis incarnates, in a sense, what is unavailable to forthright 
contemplation. In order to make that claim, however, it is necessary to establish the 
uneasy relationship between death and representation and how this relationship plays 
out through the body as the locus of these competing desires. 
In that case, it is not pleasure per se that we are discussing, but jouissance as an 
excessive or transgressive pleasure that is “intolerable to the structured self”12 and is thus 
experienced as pain. Drawing from Lacanian theory, we might consider the devastation 
to the structured self a momentary satisfaction of the death drive. In fact, Lacan borrows 
 
11 Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 38.  
12 ibid.  
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Freud’s language, explicitly positioning jouissance “beyond the pleasure principle.”13 
Perhaps then the “enjoyment” Freud attributes to the spectators of tragedy (or other pain-
evoking imitations) is less outlet for the pleasure principle, and more akin to its French 
translation as described and developed by Lacan throughout the course of his seminars.14  
And yet, while we can, following Lacan, align this excessive “enjoyment” with death 
and its corresponding drive, we nevertheless see how a life principle is at work here as 
well, providing and protecting the signifying structures beyond and through which the 
death drive finds an outlet. In other words, much as the reality principle safeguards the 
pleasure principle, so do the life instincts sustain the death instincts.15 Like the child 
engaged in the game of disappearance and return, we recreate the painful or traumatic 
situation in which the self and its attachments come undone. We do so to become the 
active center of that experience, to attempt to assimilate the unassimilable or (re)signify 
that which the trauma renders unsignifiable. It would appear then that only the first half 
of the game (‘fort’) represents the death-drive, whereas the da, by which order is restored 
through the child’s feeling of omnipotence, would indicate that the self-preservative 
instinct of narcissism is also involved and is, in fact, the element that affords the child the 
“conventional” satisfaction derived from the game.  
If we wish to isolate the death-drive, we might say that it is the urge that seeks the 
fort without the da. In fact, Freud observed the first half of the game far more frequently 
than the episode in its entirety. “As a rule,” he writes, “one only witnessed its first act, 
 
13 Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, Trans. Alan Sheridan, Ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, (New York/London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 184. 
14 References to jouissance appear in Lacan’s earliest seminars in the context of the master-slave dialectic, 
where jouissance is conceptualized as enjoyment or rights over the other. It is not until Seminar VII 
(1959-1960) that Lacan begins to discuss jouissance as it is more commonly understood: as the pleasure-
pain of excessive experience. It is this notion of jouissance that he continues to develop throughout his 
later seminars (particulary Seminars VII, XIX, XVII, and XX), elaborating on its relation to the body and 
its multiple instantiations (i.e. surplus, phallic, and ‘feminine’ jouissance and jouis-sens).  
15 Paraphrased from Freud (1920): “The pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death instincts” (SE 
XVIII, p. 63).    
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which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the greater 
pleasure was attached to the second act.”16 Still, Freud argues, even when the first part of 
the game is repeated without the second, there is still an element of mastery involved, 
namely the child’s enactment of an impulse to revenge himself against his mother. “In 
that case,” Freud explains, “it would have a defiant meaning: ‘All right then, go away. I 
don’t need you. I am sending you away myself.’”17 The child enjoys the fantasy of inflicting 
on the mother the pain of separation that she originally caused him, but in order to do so 
he must revisit the source of his own suffering. In other words, the child returns to the 
site of trauma not simply to re-experience the event, but to re-signify it. And yet, his 
mastery of the situation is inseparable from the repetition of his pain, thereby 
accentuating the association between pleasure and harm to the ego suggested by the game 
in its entirety.  
To summarize, it would appear that the “competing” instincts of life and death are 
not competing at all. Rather, they are bound together in a difficult dialectic of presence 
and absence, being and nothingness, lack and (over)abundance in which the subject and 
his coherence is at stake. It is my impression that this dialectic sustains the individual’s 
relation to his own being, a relation which vacillates between unreality and necessity. 
 
THE OLD STATE OF THINGS 
It would seem that Freud’s examples of the repetition compulsion are not entirely 
adequate for demonstrating his revised theory of the drives as a dynamic. If however we 
momentarily set aside this criticism, perhaps we can see more clearly what Freud does in 
fact accomplish in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which is to show that the analysis of 
painful or traumatic experiences does, in fact, fall outside of the scope of the libidinal 
 
16 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 15.  
17 ibid, p.16.  
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drives and that such experiences require a revised theory, or rather a new drive altogether, 
to explain their resistance to analysis. Freud calls attention to a drive beyond the drives, 
a force existing prior to the primary processes but relying, to a certain degree, on those 
very processes for its manifestation. Does he put forth a complete or decisive theory of 
this drive? Not exactly, but he does acknowledge and draw into the domain of 
psychoanalysis what appears to be a seemingly counterintuitive force at play in the 
individual, a force oriented elsewhere, beyond the dichotomy of pleasure and unpleasure 
where these sensations coexist. “But where?” the reader asks, and Freud’s boldest move 
is in his answer to this pressing question.   
He opens Section IV with a forewarning. “What follows,” he writes, “is speculation, 
often far-fetched speculation,” and it would appear that one cannot adequately discuss 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle without borrowing this same disclaimer.18  
It would be a contradiction to the conservative nature of the instincts if the 
goal of life were a state of things which had never been attained. On the 
contrary, it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the 
living entity has at one time or another departed from and to which it is 
striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its development 
leads.19 
The “old state of things” to which Freud refers is the inanimate state that preceded life. In 
this view, life, with all of its increasing complexity (i.e. Eros), evolved in spite of and 
contrary to the most basic desire of the organism – inertia. As an instinct to restore a 
previous restful state, Freud treats this tendency as something of an evolutionary 
adaptation, “the very first instinct”20 developed by organic life as a means of resolving the 
 
18 ibid, p. 24. The function of speculation as a particular intellectual operation is revisited in Chapter 3 in a 
discussion of Derrida’s essay “To Speculate – On Freud.”   
19 ibid, p. 38.  
20 ibid, p. 41. 
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pressures of external forces and excitations that threaten the organism’s stasis. The entire 
living organism, Freud proposes, much like its constituent elements, possesses a natural 
inclination to maintain the equilibrium of an original condition: non-existence, which in 
the course of the individual’s development would equate both practically and theoretically 
to “death.”  
Ulrike May clearly and concisely summarizes this in “The Third Step in Drive 
Theory,” an essay on the genesis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “[w]ith the origin of 
life there came into existence the first ‘drive,’ which wished to return to the inanimate 
state; life was only a detour towards death; the entire life of the drives served to bring 
about death.”21 Higher forms of existence, therefore, reflect not a desire on the part of the 
individual, but rather a consequence of external circumstances, a detour on the way to 
that inevitable destination. It is on these grounds that Freud revises his earlier theory of 
instincts, positing that in addition to the libido, there exists another drive which more so 
than opposes or competes with the libidinal urges, precedes them, and manifests in the 
individual as an inclination to return to his most primordial condition. For Freud, this 
condition is non-existence – death – and so he designates the drive accordingly. 
By aligning non-existence and death, Freud locates the genesis of organic life in 
death, which in turn becomes both its aim and origin. This seems straightforward enough: 
life springs from its own absence and to that initial condition inevitably returns. But is it 
the inevitability of death that prompts the death drive? If so, it would appear to be less of 
a drive and more of a resignation. To consider the death drive as an internal, purely 
biological tendency is to eclipse its role in the psyche, rendering it passive in a way that 
undermines the element of wish or desire that is also bound therein. Death is not just the 
 
21 Ulrike May, “The Third Step in Drive Theory,” Psychoanalysis and History. Vol. 17, No. 2 (2015): 205-
280; p. 231. 
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condition that awaits all life; we do not gravitate towards it simply because we have no 
other choice. Although his bio-analytic justifications obscure this, by folding the aim of 
life back onto its origins in non-existence, Freud does make a powerful suggestion. Yes, 
we are destined to die, but the death drive is neither the acceptance of this fact nor the 
desire to hasten its occurrence. Rather, it is the persistent sensation of having departed, 
the nostalgic desire to return to a pre-existing state.  
By my understanding, the reading of the death drive as a desire to return has a 
number of implications, three of which figure most prominently in the present discussion:  
(1) The death drive manifests in the inclination to reduce the tension of life 
in order to re-create, in some capacity, the original condition from which 
life differentiated.  
(2) Death as the condition which the drive seeks to restore is somehow 
present in the psyche, memorialized in its own absence like a memory, a 
wish, or a trace. 
(3) The death drive as the first drive comes into being as a tension introduced 
by an extrinsic force that stimulates the impulse to cancel itself out.  
As self-evident as it seems, it warrants mentioning that the desire to reduce tension can 
only be expressed when a tension is introduced in the first place. The death drive, 
therefore, comes on the scene as the shadow of life, acting as a reminder of its origins in 
non-existence. And yet, without the self – this composite of desires, memories, and 
fantasies – there can be no contemplation of this non-existence, just as there can be no 
shadow without a body to cast it. Like the ego that is constituted by its objects, the vague 
and formless pulsion existing prior to desire takes shape in those desires in the form of a 
wish or a trace, “present” but in need of synthesis or symbolization in order to find its 
expression, in need of the very composite that the drive aims to destroy.  
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The body as sign and signifier figures prominently in this dynamic. In other words, 
it is as if through desire, fantasy, and above all jouissance, the drive were seeking the 
liberation of the element of death that always-already resides in the individual, relying on 
these psychical functions to express the urge that precedes them: the inclination to undo 
the “I” that arises as soon as it identifies with a perceived unity and declares “I am.” 
Perhaps therein lies the difficulty in isolating the death drive – it precedes the other drives 
and is intimately bound to them.  
 
CRITIQUES AND CONTRADICTIONS 
It is necessary to clarify that, despite what its name may imply, the death drive in Freud’s 
understanding is not quite a destructive drive, but rather a conservative one. Supremely 
conservative in fact, seeing as what it seeks to conserve is a bare minimum, a less-than-
being. Unlike the pleasure principle, which seeks a release of tensions or an energetic 
discharge in the form of pleasure or satisfaction, the death drive as formulated by Freud 
seeks complete satisfaction in the total reduction of tensions in the organism. For Freud, 
the first and “final goal of all organic striving”22 is the return to zero excitation. 
 Here we see that Freud's theorizing of the death drive is governed by a radical 
economic principle – the tendency to zero23 – and as Laplanche explains in Life and Death 
in Psychoanalysis, it is this principle that accounts for a number of paradoxes within the 
 
22 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 38.  
23 Freud borrows this notion from Barbara Low. In her 1920 work Psycho-Analysis: A Brief Account of 
the Freudian Theory, Low introduces the “Nirvana principle” (Nirwanaprinzip) as the tendency of the 
mental apparatus to reduce its quantity of energy to zero, or at least to maintain its levels constant. It is 
mentioned by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (SE XVIII, p. 56) and in the 1924 paper “The 
Economic Problem of Masochism, where he describes the aim of the Nirvana principle as the 
“extinguishing, or at least of maintaining as low as possible, the quantities of excitation flowing into [the 
mental apparatus]” (SE XIX, pp. 159-60). Thus, “Nirvana” operates here as it does in the eastern 
philosophies of Buddhism and Hinduism – as the removal of internal tensions attained through the 
extinction of desire.  
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Freudian concept. The tendency to zero appears only to find its justification in 
psychoanalysis, and yet pursuing his speculations to their “logical” conclusion, Freud 
relies largely on biological phenomena and economic principles to give his theory shape. 
By investigating the sliding of concepts and the blurring of reference points necessary to 
identify the death drive outside of the domain of psychoanalysis, Laplanche traces the 
internal complications within Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  
 For instance, Freud couches his formulation of the death drive in biological 
principles, attempting to carry death back to the very level of biology as an instinct even 
though the priority of zero over constancy is not congruent with biological fact. If we take 
into consideration homeostasis, we see that the organism, depending on its circumstances 
and on its internal energy level, can just as well be in search of excitation as desirous of 
avoiding or evacuating it. Perhaps to obscure this incongruence or to press on in spite of 
it, Freud’s formulation of the economic principle governing the death drive oscillates 
between the tendency to reduce or remove internal excitation (i.e. zero) and the tendency 
to maintain the quantity of excitation low and stable (i.e. constancy). However, the two 
are neither equivalent nor reducible to one another. Laplanche clarifies as follows:      
[t]hus the terms “zero” and “constancy,” which we would separate, are often 
presented by Freud as situated on a continuum, either by establishing 
between them a vague synonymy, with “psycho-physiology” receiving the 
task of distinguishing between them more clearly, or else by presenting the 
tendency towards constancy as a “makeshift” replacement for an absolute 
reduction of tensions.24  
Biologically speaking, the tendency for constancy is not a drive of the organism, but an 
adaptation, the process of storing as much energy as needed to meet the demands for a 
 
24 Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 113.  
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specific action in order to maintain the stores of energy stable. As such, this principle does 
not appear to support the conceptualization of the death drive that Freud puts forth. And 
yet, to rely exclusively on the notion of the zero principle is equally problematic, for if the 
death drive is the most “primitive” drive – preceding both the reality principle and the 
pleasure principle and regulating the course of psychical processes before these two even 
come into effect – if it operates according to a zero tendency, we arrive at the paradoxical 
conclusion that the drives are driven not to be drives at all.   
 The difficulty in clarifying the principles governing the death drive, especially 
when those principles are borrowed from biological and economic points of view, stems 
from the fact that there is no one clear definition of the death drive. Rather, as Daniel 
Lagache explains in “Aggressivity,” the death drive is “the formal unity of several ideas 
that are related but not identical,” those ideas being (1) the tendency towards a transition 
from organic to inorganic; (2) the tendency toward a reduction of tensions; and (3) 
primary masochism.25 Whereas the first and most speculative of these interpretations 
reflects the zero principle carried out to its most extreme, the second offers a slightly 
clearer approximation of what might lie “beyond the pleasure principle” if, that is, we 
define pleasure as the sensation of discharge as the organism moves towards zero 
excitation. Primary masochism, however, is that aspect of the death drive that best lends 
itself to psychoanalytic observation and analysis, the “most radical form of the pleasure 
principle”26 in which the tendency towards zero manifests itself as a primal 
destructiveness directed against the ego itself.  
 In attempting to overlay these three ideas, we begin to see what Laplanche terms 
“the economic paradox” of the death drive: how can we attribute to a single drive the 
 
25 Daniel Lagache, “Aggressivity” (1960) in The Work of Daniel Lagache: Selected Papers (1938-1964), 
Trans. Elisabeth Holder, (London: Karnac Books, 1993), pp. 207-236; p. 236. 
26 Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, p. 108.  
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tendency towards zero as well as the most radical form of the pleasure principle, both the 
desire to return to a condition prior to existence (i.e. the Nirvana principle) and the 
frantic masochistic search for pleasure in unpleasure? This could only be the case if this 
masochism (as primary as the drive it manifests) functions by increasing tension to a 
tipping point beyond which energetic stores overflow and are emptied entirely, if the 
quintessential aim of the drive were undoing the ties that bind those tensions together, 
the foremost being the ego and the body on and through which the ego projects its 
imagined unity. Essentially then, an attack on the symbolic waged at the point of entry – 
the ego and the body as its signifier. Still, are the two reducible to one another? Though I 
will address the other ideas associated with the death drive, the work to follow focuses on 
primary masochism and, more specifically, how the pleasurable unpleasure of symbolic 
collapse might be read as a manifestation of the death drive as a psychic principle that 
operates through and in relation to the life principles rather than in strict opposition to 
them.  
Here we distinguish between secondary masochism as a libidinal pleasure in which 
sexual satisfaction is achieved through pain, humiliation, and/or surrender, and primary 
masochism as the non-libidinal expression of the death drive that directs destructiveness 
towards the ego as unity.27 The former, presumably derived from the latter, seeks a 
distressing increase in tension in the name of pleasure, sexual excitement or gratification 
in the experience of the woundedness or susceptibility of the body. Primary masochism, 
however, is not directed explicitly against the body, but against the fantasy of the unitary 
self projected onto this surface – a symptom of the dysfunctional relation of language to 
the body.28 Indeed, it is this uneasy contiguity that Bersani identifies as the source of 
 
27 This will be elaborated in Chapter 4 through a close reading of Freud’s 1924 paper “The Economic 
Proplem of Masochism” (SE XIX, pp. 155-170).  
28 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 64.  
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difficulties in the later Freudian texts.  
I would suggest, therefore, that it may be useful here to set aside Freud's more 
biological suppositions and juxtapose Beyond the Pleasure Principle with work on 
narcissism instead, a juxtaposition which Freud gestures toward at near the end of this 
text. In this way we can draw the death drive out of the realm biological function where it 
does not find its justification and reframe it within psychoanalysis as a primary function 
of the ego that works in the interest of its own destruction. Only then can we begin to form 
an idea of where this drive might find its self-negating satisfaction, and how we can 
conceptualize this satisfaction which cancels out the subject who experiences it.  
 
A NECESSARY LINK  
With the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud puts forth his revised and 
final theory of the drives, suggesting that there exists a primal destructiveness that 
opposes the life instincts, an inclination towards non-existence that the libidinal drives 
are tasked with mediating. The latter, which encompass the tendencies toward survival, 
propagation, sex, and other creative or preservative behaviors, Freud aligns with “the 
Eros of the poets and philosophers which holds all living things together.”29 The former, 
on the other hand, eventually came to be identified as Thanatos, although Freud did not 
employ this terminology in his elaboration of the death drive.   
This opposition supplanted the diverging demands of the sexual instincts and ego-
instincts as the main source of psychic conflict.30 Freud no longer perceived psychic 
struggle as the result of a clash between sexuality and the drives of self-preservation as 
expressed, for instance, in narcissism. Rather, in the revised drive theory Freud identifies 
 
29 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 50.  
30 See Freud (1915a), “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” SE XIV, pp. 117-140.  
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these two as sharing an organizing principle – life and its perpetuation through forms of 
increasing complexity. The competing aims responsible for the conflictuality in psychic 
life, as Freud suggests in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, are far more primal: synthesis 
and destruction, life and death. The result is a classification of the drives31 into two 
categories: “those which lead what is living to death, and others, the sexual instincts, 
which are perpetually attempting and achieving a renewal of life.”32 This broad 
classification, compounded and complicated by the difficulty of identifying the death 
drive in observable phenomena, envelops the Freudian concept with a psycho-
mythological quality.  
In Kleinian theory, however, this opposition acquires a clinical application. The life 
and death drives correspond respectively to the depressive and paranoid-schizoid 
positions, the former of which designates the mastery of the feelings of ambivalence that 
in the latter are managed by splitting the object (i.e. the mother's breast) into “good” and 
“bad” part-objects. In the depressive position, which Klein considers a prerequisite for 
interpersonal relationships and social life, the child begins to reconcile a series of 
polarized relations, beginning with his relation to the maternal breast, subsequently 
comprehending the object (e.g. the mother) as an integrated but complex whole. Fantasies 
of omnipotent control over the object carried out through projection and introjection give 
way to a perception of the object as cohesive and separate. In so far as the transition from 
the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position is linked to development, 
maturation would appear to be closely linked to loss and mourning. However, according 
to Klein, paranoid-schizoid ways of relating are never given up completely and her writing 
 
31 Freud refers to the “death drive” in the plural. Strachey’s translation is “death instincts” but this has 
been much criticized as being unfaithful to the language of the Freudian text, which makes a distinction 
between instinkt and trieb. I will exclusively be using “drive” (and generally in the singular) unless 
referring to a text which uses alternative forms.   
32 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 46.  
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frames these positions as transient states of mind: the paranoid-schizoid position can be 
thought of as the phase of development preceding the depressive position as a defense 
against it and also as a regression from it. Klein’s model favors oscillations between these 
positions rather than a linear progression through stages, thus rejecting the Freudian 
representation of the ego as developed unity. Although Klein posits these ways of relating 
to the object in the place of primary narcissism, this view highlights meaning as a 
relational function that relies on the assimilation of separation in order to consolidate 
otherwise scattered perceptions and affects.33  
Extending this oscillation outside of the Kleinian framework and consider Eros – 
the principle which unites and sustains life in forms of increasing complexity – alongside 
primary narcissism. This concept, along with the problems and paradoxes it too presents, 
will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter. The current discussion is 
primarily concerned with establishing narcissism as the procedural and theoretical 
complement to the death drive. For those purposes, we can rely on a working definition 
of narcissism as the process by which the ego is constituted and maintained through 
psychical investments in its perceived unity. The perspectives considered thus far 
associate the death drive with a tendency to zero. Following that logic, if we are to frame 
narcissism in terms of the numerical value it seeks, we might say that it reflects the 
tendency to One. However, interpreting this difference as a binary forecloses the 
productive ambiguities of both concepts. Perhaps their variance is better conceived of as 
operating like a binary code – a generative system of alternating zeros and ones which 
 
33 See Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.  
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sustains the necessary tension between illusions of integrity and self-sufficiency and the 
desire to diminish these conscious representations.  
In a collection of case studies titled A Child is Being Killed, Serge Leclaire offers 
some suggestions as to how we might envision this dynamic. According to Leclaire, the 
life instincts, to which we can ascribe the narcissistic tendency for example, dominate the 
organization of conscious representations. He writes,  
[t]he instinctual forces said to be on the side of life… tend to valorize the 
positive terms of the opposition and to produce systems of representation 
and bodies of inscription whose primordial function is always to contain, to 
keep repressed, and to deny the ‘negativity’ of the other terms in the 
opposition, as well as heterogeneity itself.34  
The death instincts, however, appear to resist such concrete notions, privileging instead 
what is “non-figurative” or non-representable. And yet, nothing can be said, written, or 
represented about the death drive without relying on the structuring references of 
signification and the ego that operates within it. The death drive, then, can only be 
represented as the “not-one,” the dialectical counterpart of language, law, and primary 
narcissism, without which the death drive cannot be conceived or envisioned. Psychic 
reality, therefore, is the result of this interminable struggle between the life drives, 
without which there can be no speaking/desiring “I” and the death drives, which favor the 
non-figurative and thus work against the “I” as the narcissistic representative of One. By 
this reading, for the “I” to exist as such, it must cut itself off from the unrepresentable of 
fullness from which it originated. The death drive, in turn, corresponds to the “instinct” 
in the subject to reject that constitutive loss as a stable truth. In this case, what Freud 
describes as the most primary desire is also the most terrifying one – to give over to the 
 
34 Serge Leclaire, A Child is Being Killed. Trans. Marie-Claude Hays, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), p. 40.  
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unnamable condition of non-differentiation in which the perceived boundaries of self are 
dissolved into infinite openness or immanent nothingness. But in the absence of any and 
all points of reference, how can these two conditions be distinguished?  
Freud’s revised drive theory suggests a peculiar opposition between the life and 
death drives in which the former both mediate and sustain the latter. Life as we know 
cannot escape death, but the desire for death concentrated in the death drive suggests 
that this condition is not entirely contrary to life. Rather, the death drive refers to that 
element of death which is inseparable from life, which requires life as a precondition and 
emerges as the result or remainder of life. Death dissolves, but the death drive, bound as 
it is to the condition of life, takes the shape of a shadow – the projection of a presence as 
its own absence, a negative that retains to some extent its shape but is emptied of contents 
or, as we will consider at the end of this chapter, vice versa. By transforming death into 
the object of an aim, wish, or desire the Freudian notion of the death drive allows us to 
examine how the principles of life and death influence and inform one another, which is 
not distinguishable from how they each operate “independently.” The trouble, it appears, 
arises if we attempt to isolate life and death, to conceive of them as mutually exclusive. 
Without reference to death, we cannot conceptualize life as a situation of tension seeking 
release, the sum of the conflicts and contradictions held together under the 
uncomfortable fiction of coherence and its unstable representations. If we abandon life, 
however, death is reduced to a limit of theorization, a concept that will not allow itself to 
be thought for it forecloses the possibility of the subject that does the thinking.  
 Regarding his revised theory Freud writes, “our views have from the very first been 
dualistic, and today they are even more dualistic than before – now that we describe the 
opposition as being, not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts, but between life 
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instincts and death instincts.”35 How to reconcile this dualism? It is my impression that 
Freud offers a suggestion in his analysis of the game of disappearance and return, wherein 
the “opposing” drives appear inextricably linked. Not a dualism then, but a difficult 
dialectic that, as these initial chapters will attempt to show, is comprised entirely of 
paradoxical elements. However, as we might expect, there are many ways of 
conceptualizing this contradictory, self-negating dynamic. André Green, for instance, 
reads the death drive into the life drives, sustaining Freud’s assertion that the death drive 
is the most primary drive through the suggestion that even in the arguably self-
preservative instinct of narcissism there persists a trace of primal destructiveness. In Life 
Narcissism/Death Narcissism, Green explores the relation between narcissism and the 
death drive in a state he terms negative narcissism. 
According to Green, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and the final drive theory 
contained therein marked a significant revision of the concept of narcissism presented 
only seven years earlier. In his 1914 paper on the subject, Freud defines narcissism as the 
libidinal investment in an always-developing ego. But “On Narcissism” is not at all the 
straightforward analysis of self-love that one might expect given the title. Rather, it is the 
preliminary consideration of an unsettling possibility: that the “unity” referred to as ego 
does not, in fact, designate a complete contained unit where drives, wishes, or desires 
originate and play out. Instead, this perceived unity is a process governed by a libidinal 
economy and sustained by an instinct of self-preservation. This concept of narcissism, 
Green explains, was for psychoanalysis an epistemological expression of what the process 
of narcissism is for the libido: the creation of unity where there is none.36   
 
35 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 53.  
36 Paraphrased from Green: “In short, narcissism was particularly enticing because it subjected 
psychoanalytic theory to the same seduction which it itself was an expression of, that is, the illusion of 
unity; this time with regard to the libido” (Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, p. x).   
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Yet, as Green notes, while this process would seem of great interest and importance 
to the project of psychoanalysis, narcissism is scarcely mentioned by Freud following 
1920, surviving only under the auspices of the ego-ideal:37 without the “I” as established 
by narcissism, the death drive was unthinkable, but the introduction of this conflictual 
“zero” principle revealed internal contradictions in  the narcissistic tendency to One, the 
most significant of which being its fundamentally illusory nature. With Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud revisits his formulation of narcissism only to abandon it almost 
definitively as a highly tenuous accomplishment of the life drives tasked with mediating 
a primal destructiveness. That is, in positing the death drive, Freud challenges his own 
theory of narcissism, making a case against the pertinence or use-value of the concept 
given that the unified view of the ego established both by primary narcissism (as a psychic 
function) and by his initial theoretical formulation of it (as a libidinal investment in an 
autonomous ego) is not congruent with the notion of an underlying current of psychical 
fragmentation.  
 Paradoxically, it is precisely because of its illusory but necessary nature that 
narcissism occupies a central position in the dynamic of the drives: if the death drive seeks 
the release of tensions bound up in a fictive unity, the life drives must protect this unity 
all the more. And where is the latter better expressed than in the psychic investment of 
narcissism? Positioned in this way, alongside the death drive, narcissism emerges as a 
function that conceptually reveals the absence of an origin while psychically concealing 
it. This central absence, in turn, might explain both the insistence of the self-preservative 
instincts on a unified libidinal economy and the resistance of the death drives against this 
monadic model.   
 
37 André Green, Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, Trans. Andrew Weller, (London: Free Association 
Books, 2001), p. 15.  
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 Green insinuates that Freud abandons the concept of narcissism because of the 
difficulty of the absent origin, a difficulty which he in turn attempts to reconcile by 
identifying within primary narcissism two different narcissistic tendencies: positive 
primary narcissism and negative primary narcissism. Both, Green explains, aim at 
overcoming a prevailing feeling of fragmentation however the two are organized around 
distinct polarities. What he distinguishes as positive primary narcissism is essentially the 
dominant interpretation of primary narcissism. Negative primary narcissism, on the 
other hand, is narcissism as withdrawal from the external world. As an expression of the 
tendency of the ego to proceed towards zero, Green’s negative narcissism juxtaposes 
primary narcissism and the death drive to conceptualize an experience of ego-as-
emptiness.  
With this concept of negative narcissism, Green calls into question the Freudian 
formulation of narcissism as situated entirely on the side of the life drives, proposing that 
positive narcissism has an “inverted double” which seeks its immortality in the non-
desire, non-existence, and non-being. He describes this negative double as follows:  
[…] Narcissus is also Janus. Instead of sustaining the aim of unifying the 
ego through the activity of the sexual drives, negative narcissism, under the 
influence of the Nirvana principle, representing the death drives, tends 
towards lowering all libido to the level zero, aspiring for psychical death. I 
think this is what may be logically inferred with regard to the fate of 
narcissism after the final theory of the drives…38  
What Green proposes – and elaborates under the notion of “The Dead Mother” – is that 
the negative narcissist experiences the object as absent even when it is present. As a 
means of maintaining libidinal tension low, especially in the face of loss or abandonment, 
 
38 ibid, p.222.  
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this form of narcissism posits the ego as an emptiness such that absence can be 
internalized: instead of resulting in acute but localized psychic pain to the narcissistic ego, 
loss directly contributes to the sensation of the ego as an expanding vacuity. That is, 
mourning for the lost object becomes the organizing principle of the ego, and the ego itself 
becomes one such lost object. 
Green’s writings on the negative are extensive, and I do not pretend to summarize 
them here. We will revisit his work on the concept in the following chapter. For now, 
however, we are primarily concerned with how his theory of negative narcissism 
incorporates the two categories of drives under the pursuit of an immanent nothingness 
– life seeking its own renunciation.  
For Green, the aim of narcissism is the reduction of tensions to the level zero, 
“either death or immortality, which is the same thing.”39 Green clarifies that primary 
narcissism is “the organization of the ego’s component drives into a unitary ego-
cathexis”40 whereas absolute primary narcissism is an expression of the principle of 
inertia identified as the Nirvana principle, a term borrowed from Barbara Low and used 
by Freud to describe the effort to remove internal tensions associated with both the 
pleasure principle and the death drive.41 The narcissistic endeavor then is to do away with 
the object that is the object of a loss or a lack and as such the indicator that one is limited 
and incomplete. In positive narcissism the aim would be a self-enclosed and self-sufficient 
ego, autonomous and omnipotent. In the case of negative narcissism, however, the 
individual finds his “unity” not in the experience of self as One, but as Zero – in place of 
desire, the disavowal of desire; in place of omnipotence, profound indifference.  
Nevertheless, these two narcissisms appear to share a common aim: the abolition 
 
39 ibid, p. 149.  
40 ibid, p. 7. 
41 See Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 56.  
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of the primary difference between one and other. Following Freud, Green describes 
absolute primary narcissism as a state of zero excitation that can be likened to the 
experience of the fetus in the womb. Characterized by the absence of need or tension 
arising from the demands of the external world, this state calls to mind Freud’s 
formulation of the aim of the death drive as the return to inorganic life. In fact, this is the 
reading of the death drive that propels Green’s work: “[t]he metaphor of returning to 
inanimate life is more powerful that it seems,” he writes, “since the goal of this 
petrification of the ego is anaesthesia and inertia in psychical death.”42 Returning to 
Lagache’s description of the death drive as a formal unity of ideas, Green’s reading of the 
Nirvana principle into absolute primary narcissism suggests that narcissism, in its 
ultimate configuration, overlaps with the extreme interpretation of the death drive as the 
zero principle which carries the individual toward or back to a condition of non-existence. 
Then are the aims of these “opposing” demands actually one in the same? And if so, what 
does this mean for our dialectic?  
 
ONE VS. ONENESS  
It seems that as Green points out, “there is therefore a necessary link to be found between 
narcissism and the death drive, a task Freud scarcely concerned himself with, leaving for 
us to discover.”43 However, in place of Freud’s “dualistic view,” Green emphasizes the 
dialectical nature of this relation. He clarifies that we cannot think usefully about 
narcissism if we attempt to isolate the concept, as if the problem of thinking about 
narcissism were the same as the problem of narcissism itself, in which the ego, in all of 
its desire for self-sufficiency, only reveals itself in opposition to an external object. As he 
 
42 Green, Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, p. xxi.  
43 ibid, p. xi.  
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explains, narcissism is desire for the One.44 But One does not exist from the outset. The 
narcissistic ego cannot be the self-referential entity it desires to be. He writes,  
[w]hile it is useful, at certain times in our thinking if we wish to understand 
the nature of narcissism as closely as possible, to shut ourselves away with 
it, deeply within ourselves – for it is the very core of our ego – the centripetal 
movement in which the sole object of knowledge is oneself, only reveals its 
meaning by opposing the object and the ego.”45  
And still, his interpretation does not help us to move past the limit death presents in the 
Freudian framework as a negative concept, unrepresentable in the unconscious because 
it entails the elimination of the individual as center of thought. For Green, it seems that 
the difficulty of narcissism lies in the element of death it contains. He positions the ego 
between One and Zero, but as he writes, “while the One can be grasped immediately by 
phenomenological apperception, the Zero for its part, can never be conceived of when it 
is oneself that is involved, in the same way that death is unrepresentable for the 
unconscious.”46 But I would like to argue the possibility that there exists something on 
the other side of the One – not only a regressive slipping back into Zero, but the possibility 
of expansion through dissolution.  
We might think of this as Oneness, an idea Freud gestures towards in Civilization 
and its Discontents with his notion of the ‘oceanic’ feeling. If it exists, Freud explains, the 
oceanic feeling is the preserved “primitive ego-feeling” from infancy, when the child is 
regularly breastfed and does not distinguish his self from the mother’s breast. Or, as 
Freud himself explains in a rather uncharacteristic way,  
[o]riginally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external 
 
44 ibid, p. 25.  
45 ibid, pp. xvi-xvii.  
46 ibid, p. xxiii. 
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world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken 
residue of a much more inclusive – indeed, an all-embracing – feeling which 
corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about 
it.47  
Thus, unlike the unifying force associated with Eros, the ‘oceanic’ feeling described by 
Freud connotes a dissolution where the boundary between ego and object is lost, blurred, 
or distorted – a regression to an earlier state of consciousness, before the ego had 
differentiated itself from the world of objects. Despite associating the ‘oceanic’ feeling 
with a condition prior to the creation of the ego, Freud at no point draws out the possible 
correlation between this feeling of limitless non-differentiation and the death drive. 
Rather, he analyzes the ‘oceanic’ feeling as a regressive fantasy, a surviving fragment of 
infantile consciousness, seized upon by religion to exploit the “weak-willed.”  
 But what if the “ancient goal” that we attempt to reach “by paths old and new”48 is 
not singular, but plural? In addition to the condition of non-existence or Zero that Freud 
suggests in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, might we imagine a situation of radical unity 
that also fulfils the death drive? Though Freud does not explicity make this association, 
he does gesture towards the possibility of unboundedness under the heading of the 
‘oceanic’ feeling, a notion which makes its appearance nearly ten years after Freud's 
theory of the death drive and which he would identify (but also repudiate) as a source of 
religious sentiment. If this is the case, then the death drive, that force that compels the 
individual towards the most primary state in his development and towards the 
paradoxical, self-shattering jouissance that lies beyond the pleasure principle, does not 
belong confined to the domain of biolanalytics. Rather, it extends to the domain of 
 
47 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents. SE XXI, p. 68.  
48 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 38.  
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culture, or more specifically of aesthetics and, as we see in Civilization and Discontents, 
of religious feeling. 
 By considering a condition of Oneness in addition to the negativity of Zero, we can 
conceptualize the One as suspended in a state of tension, not only with the objects and 
others which constitute it as One, but also between the self-negating conditions before 
and beyond intersubjectivity. Or, as Green writes, “it will not be enough to introduce its 
antagonist, the Other. With the One it is necessary to think not only about the Double, but 
particularly about the Infinity of chaos and the Zero of nothingness.”49 Green’s concept of 
negative narcissism enables us to conceptualize psychic death though the withdrawal 
from the external world in which the psyche find the objects and others that give it shape. 
In this interpretation of the death drive as manifestation of the Nirvana principle, the ego 
attempts to satisfy the aim of the drive through a dissociative fugue into the kernel 
emptiness of the ego. In other words, Zero. But what about Infinity? “The ego,” Green 
writes, “is never more immortal than when it claims that it no longer has any organs or 
body.”50 What do we make then of the fragmented body, the body-in-pieces (or “without 
organs”) that resists the unifying effects of Eros and the sign? Here I propose that we 
consider psychic death that is brought about symbolically, not a retreat from the symbolic 
and its imaginary foundations, but an encounter with its limits, where the necessary 
fiction of identity begins to disintegrate. As we have and will continue to see, it was not a 
very stable structure to begin with. 
 If we consider the One as the aim of narcissism, we might formulate the aim of the 
death drive as Oneness. Whereas in the former the ego draws into itself, withdrawing its 
libidinal investments in the external world in an effort to become a sealed-off unit, the 
 
49 Green, Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, p. xxiii.   
50 ibid, p. 222.  
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latter connotes a dissolution of self, a state of unity or limitlessness with the external 
world in which neither the ego nor its objects are discernable because they have ceased to 
be separate, quantifiable entities. This interpretation assumes that if death is a limit of 
representation, the relation could theoretically be bidirectional, symbolic rupture 
bringing about in the psyche an experience of the proximity of death. This would imply a 
satisfaction of the death drive without the abandonment of the external world – the 
abandonment of self as held together symbolically, but through a function of expansion 
rather than negation.  
For Green, the situation of withdrawal is comparable to that of dissolution, though 
not equivalent:  
Whether the ego achieves a unitary cathexis emerging from fragmentation 
or whether it appears to attain absolute zero, the effect attained is similar 
(which does not mean identical). In both cases the ego finds satisfaction in 
itself; it has the illusion of self-sufficiency and frees itself of vicissitudes and 
dependence on an object…51 
Green’s work reveals the connections between the death drive and narcissism in a way 
that avoids a critique of Freud in favor of an approach that opens up the possibilities in 
the Freudian text. The work that follows would not be possible without a consideration of 
the role and function of the negative in the psyche, his work being quintessential in this 
regard. However, this investigation departs from Green’s in that its emphasis is on the 
function of dissolution and, more precisely, the role that primary masochism plays in this 
phenomenon.  
The manifestation of the death drive as self-destructive tendency, I believe, is quite 
different from the negative narcissism that Green proposes. In my interpretation, Green’s 
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concept represents the death drive as a centripetal force – a retreat into the narcissistic 
wound. However, by my interpretation, the death drive can also manifest as a centrifugal 
force, directed not towards the negativity in the center, but the (symbolic) chaos in the 
periphery. And yet neither of these readings disqualifies the other, revealing that there 
does indeed exist a complex dynamic between narcissism and the death-drive, one that 
can neither be reduced to a comprisal nor a straightforward dialectic, seeing as neither 
can find full expression without eliminating the very subject in whom the drives operate 
and originate. The work of these initial chapters is to explore this dynamic. If death cannot 
be represented in the mind, let us at least attempt to understand it asymptotically by 
examining how it sought out, approached, and experienced. To do so, I propose that we 
consider the relationship between such encounters and the signifying structures which 
death evades, and though their effects on the subject who in the face of death loses the 
words “I am.”
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2. 
NARCISSISM IN CRISIS 
 
 
 
The dead little girl says, ‘I am the one who guffaws in horror inside 
the lungs of the live one. Get me out of there at once!’ 
— Antonin Artaud, Suppôts et supplications 
 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, we might reconsider the death drive as the internal 
force or pressure whose aim is contrary to that of primary narcissism. And yet, the 
dialectical relation between these two categories of instincts cannot simply be reduced to 
a polarity between construction and dissolution, isolation and merger. Rather, each is 
oriented, in its own way, towards the foreclosure of intersubjective relationality. Perhaps 
we expect as much from the death drive, which seeks to restore a primal unity or Oneness 
through the shattering or suspension of subjective difference. However, a closer 
consideration of the conflicts and contradictions inherent in narcissism reveal that this 
“self-preservative” instinct, when pushed to its theoretical culmination, may actually pose 
an equal yet inverse threat to the “I” turned speaking subject. Thus, before examining 
what is generated by the difficult dialectic between the death drive and primary 
narcissism, I propose a closer consideration of the “second term” and the structural 
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instabilities that reveal its product – the ego or “I” – as inherently vacuous and/or 
wounded. If psychic life is the interplay of the death drive, which aims towards a release 
of the tensions held together by subjectivity, and the process of narcissism, which works 
to conceal a fundamental fragmentation or lack, we are left with a subject ceaselessly 
caught between disappearances. By this reading, the death drive figures as a principle of 
return in that it empties out a subject that was always-already hollow. What follows in 
this chapter is a case for that underlying emptiness.  
In its absolute configuration, narcissism marks a retreat from meaning as both 
byproduct and function of intersubjectivity, a fugue into the negativity at the heart of 
being. The death-drive, on the other hand, may seek discharge through meaning or 
rather, in the confrontation with the chaos concealed in the imaginary and the symbolic 
that results in a catastrophic release of the tensions within the subject that hold his 
subjectivity together. If we posit the relation between the two as a polarity, at one end we 
have denial and negation and at the other, unbounded and unsignifiable totality. In either 
case, the subject – as both theoretical construct and as mode of experience – disappears. 
In the narcissistic state, the ego as a closed self-sufficient unit forecloses the possibility of 
subjectivity, for if both the ego and the subject come into existence through the external 
world, then the narcissistic denial of the external world negates the self that is in every 
capacity a function of this relation. In its most extreme configuration, then, narcissism 
marks a retreat into the vacant center of the “I”. Contrarily, in the return to “stasis” sought 
by the death drive, subjectivity is suspended through the renunciation of the attachment 
to the ego, and the unitary self ceases to be such, dissolving into a world without objects 
or others. In place of the denial of the external world characteristic of the narcissistic 
mode, here we find a denial of the “I” as center of being and experience. In either of these 
scenarios, we lose the subject as our point of reference.     
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This presents a serious complication for the supposed dialectic between primary 
narcissism and the death drive, suggesting to us that a third, intermediate term is 
necessary. It is my impression that we find traces of this intermediate term in a number 
of psychoanalytic concepts, namely all of those characterized by ambivalence and deeply 
resistant to any form of stabilization. These will be explored in later chapters, but for the 
time being we can take as an example Kristeva’s theory of the abject as a representation 
and/or revelation of the formless ambiguity that is occluded in the image and the symbol, 
an encounter with the death that lies on either side of subjectivity. According to the 
formulation put forth in Powers of Horrors, the abject eludes and disturbs the dichotomy 
between subject and object, laying bare the instability of the object relations that structure 
symbolic and intersubjective existence and thereby presenting what Kristeva describes as 
a “narcissistic crisis.” However, I would propose that we adjust this slightly, considering 
the abject and its allied concepts not as posing a crisis in and of themselves, but rather as 
that revealing the state of crisis the subject is always-already in, confronting the subject 
with the reality of his interdependence and incoherence from a place within subjectivity. 
In this way, these highly-mobile concepts – all of which signal a theoretical third – allow 
us to understand the implications of narcissism and the death-drive without entirely 
foreclosing/dissolving the subject whose experience is the object of our inquiry. 
 
EGO WITHOUT ORIGIN 
In his 1914 paper “On Narcissism,” Freud’s first maneuver is to supplant the assumption 
of narcissism as perversion with the formulation of narcissism as “the libidinal 
complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure which may 
justifiably be attributed to every living creature.”1 This original and, to a certain extent, 
 
1 Freud (1914), “On Narcissism,” SE XIV, pp. 73-4.   
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necessary investment of psychic energy in the self, Freud designates primary narcissism, 
which he differentiates from a secondary narcissism that withdraws libido from external 
objects in the interest of re-directing it inward. Whereas primary narcissism designates 
the preliminary investment in the ego that grounds the instincts of self-preservation and 
initiates a process of “self-construction” (or vice versa),2 secondary narcissism connotes 
an excessive or pathological investment in the self that comes at the cost of the external 
world. For our purposes, we will be working mainly with primary narcissism as the 
necessary ego-libido that, as we will see, relies on the object-libido and comes into 
existence through the external world rather than at its expense. However, we will touch 
on secondary narcissism, in particular the dynamics involved, in order to conceptualize 
the untenable isolation of “self-sufficiency” and, consequently, the structural 
impossibility of an unmitigated narcissistic state.  
Freud writes, “we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot 
exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed.”3  While this is not the 
focus of Freud’s exposition on narcissism, these lines signal the profound shift from the 
topographical psychology of the unconscious to the ego-psychology characteristic of his 
later work, encapsulating the peculiar property of the ego that would eventually develop 
into structuralist and post-structuralist theories of the intersubjectively-constituted 
 
2 If the ego does not exist at the start, it would seem that primary narcissism is necessary in order to put in 
place a mental representation of the ego which the self-preservative instincts seek to protect. Certainly 
subsequent libininal investment in the ego in the form of narcissism stems from an instinct or need to 
preserve the supposed unity designated as “ego.” However, given the ego’s confounding lack of origin – its 
emergence and negotation being an effect of its engagement with the external world – it is difficult to 
disentangle the functions of preservation and construction. The ego, it would appear, is always in 
formation and the complementary effects of these dual processes maintain it, each re-negotiation of the 
ego faciliating its perpetuation and each investment of psychic energy in the ego-as-unit affirming the 
product of this negotiation or construction while obscuring that any such processes have taken place. In 
other words, what narcissism seeks to preserve is an ego which must first and forever be constructed or 
constituted and yet, the entire enterprise of narcissistic self-preservation hinges on obscuring this fact, on 
supplanting the psychic reality of ego-as-process with a formal unity which is taken to be an ontological 
fact.  
3 ibid, pp. 76-77.   
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subject. In that regard, this observation also highlights the element of the narcissistic 
tendency most relevant for our present discussion, namely the absence of an origin or, 
more accurately, the origin as absence. And yet, we can only grasp this absence through 
the present elements that obscure it, by backtracking through the processes by which the 
ego not only preserves itself but also passes itself off as primal despite inconsistencies 
inherent therein. In other words, the means to conceptualize the ego’s lack of origin is 
through its desperate want of origin – narcissism.  
In the Freudian account, this want of origin takes the form of ego-libido. Unlike 
the object-libido that sends out and binds psychic energy in the form of object-cathexes, 
the ego-libido re-directs psychic energy inward. But if as Freud points out, the ego does 
not exist from the start, if there is not yet a discernable ego to be preserved, what prompts 
the initial interior investment of libido and where, if not at the “true ego,” is that psychic 
energy directed?  
Accentuating this theoretical complication, Freud writes, “we form an idea of there 
being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, 
but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body 
of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out.”4 However, he goes on to 
explain this “original” allocation of libido “remained hidden from us at the outset, and 
only the emanations of this libido – the object-cathexes – could be discerned.”5  
Returning to Freud’s metaphor, it is as if the body of the amoeba can only be discerned 
when it sends out its pseudopodia, through this temporary protrusion into the external 
world. It would appear then that the question that regards the ego then, is not “who?” or 
“what?” but rather “how?” – what are the psychic and symbolic mechanisms by which it 
 
4 ibid, p. 75.  
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comes into being and to what end? In attempting to answer this question, we find that 
only in this space of development, between illusion and the external world, does the ego 
exists as such and even then, as a function of loss.  
As Freud explains, we can only distinguish the ego-instincts from the sexual 
instincts following an initial object-cathexis.6 Prior to this original object-cathexis, the 
infant exists in a monadic state, unable to discern neither objects nor others and therefore 
unable to discern himself – his self – as an independent unit. This inability to distinguish 
between self and other is exemplified in the infant’s relation to the mother’s breast. As if 
a vestige of the intrauterine stages of development in which the needs of the foetus are 
met by the mother before they arise, the nursing infant takes the breast which nourishes 
him to be an extension of himself.7 Therefore, at this stage, object-libido and ego-libido 
(as well as the types of love which correspond to them – anaclitic and narcissistic, 
respectively) are not differentiated. Furthermore, with ego and object being an extension 
of each other, the result is a compound love in which the anaclitic and narcissistic types 
fold into one another, any love or libido directed at the (not-yet) object amounting to an 
investment in the (not-yet) ego and vice versa.  
The traumatic separation experienced at birth is not sufficient to establish 
individuation: another separation must take place, this time between the ego-to-be and 
its object. Through this separation, by which the object becomes external and the mother 
becomes other, the object-libido becomes differentiated from the ego-libido. This 
differentiation allows the infant to form an idea of the person to whom the object of 
satisfaction belongs and, via this identification of object/other, an idea of its own 
autonomy as well. This implies the following:  
 
6 ibid, p. 78.  
7 See Freud (1905), “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” SE VII, pp. 123-246.   
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(1) The ego comes into being through a loss – the loss of the object that was 
once an extension of the self and, in turn, the loss of the psychic energy 
invested in the object in the form of object-libido. 
(2) The ego’s recognition of its autonomy coincides with recognition of the 
limits of that autonomy as suggested by the existence of objects and 
others external to it and not under the influence of its “omnipotence of 
thought.”  
According to Freud, the sending out of psychic energy in the form of object-libido 
“impoverishes” the ego. And yet, as we have seen, he also implies that prior to the 
recognition of the object as external and the subsequent investment of libido in that 
object, neither ego nor ego-libido are discernable as such. The ego, then, emerges as a 
result of its own impoverishment, its very existence both a function and concession of 
incompleteness. Narcissism, in turn, could be interpreted as the ego’s instinct to obscure 
the fact of its absent origin, a means of establishing and subsequently investing in the 
mental representations of ego-as-whole to mediate the fact that through the relation with 
the external world the ego is depleted and constituted, or rather, constituted as a function 
of its depletion. By this formulation, narcissism appears to be a defense mechanism, a 
means of bypassing the problem of the origin, overcompensating for the foundational lack 
or incompleteness of the ego as established by the fact that it is only made discernable by 
an object, an other, a separation. As Stephen Frosh suggests, “narcissistic libido is not 
just love for the self, but love that covers up a loss.”8  
The narcissistic fantasy of self-sufficiency, then, will remain precisely that – a 
fantasy – any perception of self-containment or self-contentment being in itself a product 
 
8 Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self. (Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 70. 
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of an experience of absence or loss and the subsequent mental representation of this 
absence as incorporated by the ego through its identifications. Despite this, or perhaps to 
conceal the fact of loss and fragmentation that is the kernel truth of the ego, the 
narcissistic mode works to re-inscribe the ego and its illusion of self-sufficiency, unifying 
absence and disparity into a coherent mental representation of self that is then reinforced 
through the interplay of body-ego and ego ideal. In a display of the tendency towards 
greater complexity associated with Eros, the ego synthesizes and organizes psychic 
contents into a unified concept of the self that the body-ego holds together: the many 
comprised in the ego are integrated in the mental representation of One as suggested by 
the unit of the body. We will explore the significance of this process and the difficulties 
therein shortly but first, an alternate reading of the ego via its relation to the I-function 
that considers narcissism from a more Lacanian perspective, not only as a defense 
mechanism but also as the initial and sustained investment in a formative illusion.  
 
EGO-AS-OBJECT 
How do the psychic energies become differentiated? Freud arrives at the conclusion that 
in the state of narcissism, they exist together. To explain why this might be, we could 
suggest that the ego-libido is object-libido, that although ego-libido is directed toward the 
self, it too is actually oriented outward as an investment in the idea of the ego. Freud 
himself poses a similar question, asking if these two types of psychic energy cannot be 
consolidated. However, he dismisses this possibility given that the ego is not present from 
the start and thus cannot be cathected as an object.9 And yet, if only through an initial 
libidinal investment in an object do we begin to discern the ego-libido and the unity in 
which this libido circulates, perhaps the relation to the object provides the psychic 
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framework for the ego’s relation to itself, the result being an ego which is also in effect an 
object. If this is the case, then we find in Lacan’s theory of the mirror-stage a suggestion 
as to what may be the “new psychical action” that is added to the auto-erotic drives in 
order to bring about narcissism,10 namely the capture by the image.  
Whereas Freud posits an ego ideal projected by the adult individual as “the 
substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal,”11 in 
Lacan’s formulation the process of idealization is compounded by identification. As 
discussed, in infancy the individual lacks in any concept of himself as such. By the 
Freudian account, this is observed in the relation of not-yet ego to not-yet object, and a 
decisive shift occurs when narcissistic love and attachment love become differentiated 
and the latter, folding into the former, is experienced as a formative effect on the ego that 
operates through the ego ideal. But if this ego ideal is a precipitate of attachments and 
object-cathexes – if it leans on its objects and attachments as the name “anaclisis” 
suggests – it would mean that this unified representation of the self as it should be is 
actually a composite, a patchwork. The standard by which the ego measures itself is the 
sum of its parts, the caveat being that its component parts are actually others.  
The formation of the ego ideal, then, implies an idealization in two parts, the first 
being an idealization of the other or object that the ego ideal incorporates and the second 
being the narcissistic idealization of the ego-as-unit to be submitted to comparison to this 
composite ideal. However, as Freud explains, “idealization is a process that concerns an 
object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature is aggrandized and exalted in 
the subject’s mind.”12 By this account, it is not the ego itself that is idealized (and 
objectified) but rather a mental representation of the ego in an ideal unified form that 
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subsumes the heterogeneity of its composition. Turning to the Lacanian framework, it is 
only through this mental representation of ego-as-object that the individual establishes a 
point of reference for his selfhood.  
For Lacan, this representation is the ego, the imaginary fixity identified as “I” that 
is contrasted to the shifting entity known as the subject. Whereas the subject is mobile, 
constituted and defined in (symbolic) relations, the ego is inert, not an entity in itself, but 
a function – an imaginary function – that establishes the self as unit, a stable object that 
can then be submitted to symbolization. Like the Freudian ego and ego ideal, the Lacanian 
ego and the subject are irreducibly distinct and yet, it is only through the ego represented 
under the sign of the “I” that the subject speaks: the individual can only assume his 
position as subject via the imaginary “I,” which does not connote the “true ego,” if such a 
thing can even be posited, but rather the ego-as-object that is animated and assumes 
meaning through the symbolic.13 In other words, it is precisely from the “failure” to 
approximate the “true ego” that the “I” derives its function. Or, as Lacan explains:  
…the ego isn’t the I, isn’t a mistake, in the sense in which classical doctrine 
makes of it a partial truth. It is something else – a particular object within 
the experience of the subject. Literally, the ego is an object – an object which 
fills a certain function which we here call the imaginary function. 14  
The ego ideal set out by Freud provides a prototype. If we apply the Lacanian perspective, 
the unification of that prototype with or under the image of the body-ego produces an 
object. Although, as Lacan explains, Freud’s metapsychological texts aim at establishing 
the excentricity of the subject in relation to the ego,15 because he considers this from the 
perspective of unconscious fantasy and cannot yet take into account the “stabilizing” 
 
13 Lacan, Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, Ed. Jacques 
Alain Miller, Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 38-41.  
14 ibid. p. 44  
15 ibid.  
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effects of the image, he does not formulate the individual’s relation to his own ego as one 
of subject to object. In the Lacanian framework, however, this prototype is submitted to 
the capture by the image in a process that fixes the ego to the illusion of wholeness in the 
form of an imaginary “I” that the subject, choosing alienation over the fragmentary real, 
henceforth identifies with. The issue of the excentricity of the subject vis-à-vis the ego, 
therefore, is inextricable from the role played by the image, namely the spectral image, in 
the precipitation of the ego as an object that is integral to the experience of the subject 
and yet simultaneously at variance with him.   
To recapitulate Lacan’s paper on “The Mirror-Stage as Formative of the Function 
of the ‘I’”: the child sees in the mirror a coherent visual counterpoint that counteracts his 
primordial feeling of fragmentation. Despite the fact that the coordinated image does not 
correspond to his uncoordinated experience, he identifies himself in that image – he 
identifies as that image – situating the otherwise discordant ego in a gestalt that doubles 
as a promise of the unattainable “wholeness” which the child subsequently anticipates. 
However, this privileging of image over experience results in an “I” that corresponds to 
the ego but functions externally as the idea that holds it together. We might say, then, that 
the capture by the image that takes place in the mirror-stage brings together the two 
(imaginary) processes of idealization and identification, idealization being the process 
which posits the illusion of wholeness or fixity as applied both to the identifying “I” and 
the object identified with, and identification being the process that establishes affinity 
based on this perceived but illusory unity.  
Do we find in these dual processes the “new psychical action” that must be added 
to the auto-erotic drives to produce narcissism? If so, then the action which enables the 
ego to discern itself from objects paradoxically does so by fixing the ego as one such object 
with the help of an image that provides the basis for a gestalt. The mirror-stage, therefore, 
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is defined by its alienating function, producing an ego as object and an “I” that is, in effect, 
an other. And yet, as Lacan explains, this constitutive (mis)identification with the spectral 
“I” is but the first in a long series of alienating misrecognitions:  “the imaginary is the 
matrix where the “I” is precipitated in a primordial form before it is objectified in the 
dialectic of identification with the other and language restores it to its universal function 
as subject.”16 In other words, the identification with the image is the first of an endless 
chain of misrecognitions that will inscribe the subject, the product of constant 
negotiation, deferral, and dialectic relation that under the sign of the “I” is represented as 
stable and coherent.  
However, the imaginary nature of the “I” does not undermine its necessity. 
Through the association with the body, this imaginary entity assumes a tangible nature 
on which symbolic meaning is then inscribed. In other words, the “I” in its bodily envelope 
functions much like paper money, which despite lacking any intrinsic material worth, acts 
as “stable” currency (though corresponding to fluctuating values) and in that capacity 
serves as an instrument of exchange. The “I” then is an imagined “object” projected onto 
the surface of the body whose integrity sustains the illusion, but precisely because it 
operates in and through this multiplicity of displacements, it serves as the basis for 
symbolic interaction. Following Lacan, we might say that the speaking subject does not 
use language, but rather is constituted by language by virtue of sharing its defining 
principle: the replacement of the thing-in-itself for its (partial) recognition.  
As Lacan discusses in Seminar II, the function of language is not to represent 
reality – an impossibility because no “true” correlation exists – but to provide a means of 
recognition. And yet, this recognition cannot be of the thing as such because language 
 
16 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function” in Ecrits, Trans. Bruce Fink, (New 
York/London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999), pp. 75-81; p. 76.  
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functions through difference and deferral, what Derrida refers to as différance. Thus, the 
imaginary register stabilizes the fixity to be submitted to and mobilized by the symbolic. 
In so doing however, it also introduces an inevitable element of instability in the form of 
misidentification. But this interplay of stability and instability, or rather of instability 
disguised as stability, is the essence of the subject’s discursive life. In this seminar, in 
which Lacan most explicitly takes up Freud’s concept of the ego and explores its relevance 
following Levi-Strauss and Saussure, we find the ego operating not as a self-conscious 
entity, but as the function which makes consciousness of self and other possible: 
The ego, the imaginary function, intervenes in life only as symbol. One 
makes use of the ego in the same way the Bororo make use of the parrot. 
The Bororo says I am a parrot. We say I am me [moi]. None of that has the 
slightest importance. The important thing is the function it has.17  
By assuming a place in the symbolic, the “I” turned subject acquires a capacity for 
meaningful action. However, this agency comes at the cost of self-sufficiency: he is 
constituted as the Other’s other and by identifying himself in this way, by recognizing 
himself on these terms, he is also other to himself. The symbolic then is the detour 
whereby the individual arrives back at himself as a speaking subject. And the différence 
that characterizes the experience of the subject not only mimics symbolic thought, but 
also reveals how it functions as the chain of movements between the not-yet and the 
perpetually deferred. Meaning exists precisely because the word and the thing are not 
identical; the subject exists precisely because the “I” and the individual are not identical. 
Like a dictionary in which the “meanings” of words are always other words, both occupy 
the space of possibilities created by incongruence.  
The ego then is both a symptom and denial of insufficiency, of the impossibility of 
 
17 Lacan, Seminar II, p. 38.  
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capturing under the sign of the “I” the fragmentation and instability of the individual in 
his function as subject. The ego will never converge with the subject. Each time the subject 
attempts to affirm himself – his self as the “stable” ego represented by the imaginary “I” 
– he essentially proclaims “I am me” because “me” is not the stable fixed entity I believe 
it to be and yet this illusion, this fixing of the ego so it may be submitted to a sign (albeit 
a barred one) is necessary for intersubjective relation as structured by the symbolic. 
Indeed this process marks the entry into the symbolic, which operates according to this 
very principle: not only is the word not the thing, but the word is precisely where the thing 
is not. Therefore, as fictive and fragile as it may be, the “I” establishes both the vital 
relation between the individual and his ego and, contingently, between the individual and 
the symbolic existence that structures and mediates his existence as subject.  
 
THE CASTRATED SUBJECT  
Comparing these frameworks, we find that the Freudian concept of narcissism privileges 
autonomy or self-sufficiency while the Lacanian reading of the ego privileges coherence, 
autonomy being an impossibility given one’s dependence on the image and the signifier.18 
In the following chapter, we will see how autonomy and impossibility are unified under 
Bataille’s notion of sovereignty, wherein the illusion of coherence is displaced by an 
incoherence so total that it becomes an alternative, albeit incomprehensible, form of 
wholeness. For now, however, I wish to stay with the paradoxical positioning of the ego 
or “I” within psychoanalytic inquiry itself, as the variable which consistently appears as 
either composite or incomplete and, despite its self-perception, appears only on those 
conditions. What is inaccessible (or inexpressible) under the sign of “I” recalls the 
inaccessibility of death as considered in the previous chapter: a state of either absence or 
 
18 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” p. 80.  
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fragmentation. We cannot approach its so-called “signified” without effectively 
abandoning the “I” as point of (self-)perceptive reference and symbolic entry, otherwise 
by resorting to a fetishization of the lack innate to subjectivity (as in melancholia) or a 
view of identity itself as a perversion of said lack. These considerations will be taken up 
again in the following pages, but first it is necessary to establish why insufficiency is 
inherent to subjectivity.  
Unlike the subject, who is always in question, it appears that the ego is never in 
question, or at least it cannot ask the question of itself. Doing so, it seems, would 
undermine the narcissistic enterprise by revealing its construction on an ever-shifting 
foundation. For instance, narcissism plays into the desire for the other in the form of the 
desire for recognition. But how can the “I” be recognized when its own relation to itself is 
one of meconnaissance? This formulation suggests that the “I” is an other from the start, 
the object of the self’s own othering gaze. Above we reflected on how this lack of self-
identical origin relates to the desire for coherence as “satisfied” by the image. In relation 
to logos, we encounter yet another well-disguised threat to this desired integrity: only the 
castrated subject is representable.  
The main textual reference here is Lacan’s 1960 paper “The Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” wherein he deconstructs the imaginary and symbolic 
processes by which we give into an identity which is not one and in so doing assume a 
place in the monolithic structure of the Law – simultaneously the source of desire in the 
form of lack and the failure of desire in the form of its deferral or postponement. As Lacan 
concludes, “[c]astration means that jouissance has to be refused in order to be attained 
on the inverse scale of the Law of desire.”19 Here desire is the movement by which the 
 
19 Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” in Ecrits, Trans. Bruce Fink, (New 
York/London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999), pp. 671-702; p. 700.  
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subject is de-centered, separated from the object (objet a) which he then seeks, always to 
a degree of disappointment, in order to reconstitute his unity in the pursuit of satisfaction. 
That is, his desire is to reunite with the jouissance that has been given up in order to enter 
into this dialectic, and its articulation as desire also operates as a defense against that 
jouissance and the limit it designates for the speaking subject.20 Thus, the function of the 
subject disqualifies from the outset a “complete” recognition of the individual, except 
under the condition of a nihilating subversion which we might equate with death.  
Following Freud, Lacan suggests that the criteria for recognition is integration. 
However, given that any act of (self-)perception or recognition is contingent on a doubling 
or splitting of the organism in to seeing and seen,21 any such unity or coherence is an 
impossibility as soon as it is posited. And yet this impossibility is readily dissembled by 
the capture and submission to the image by which “the ego masks its duplicity.”22 That is, 
the functions by which the ego assures itself of an “indisputable existence” are contingent 
upon alienation and amputation.  
This is what the subject is missing in thinking he is exhaustively accounted 
for by his cogito – he is missing what is unthinkable about him…  
We cannot ask this question of the subject qua I. He is missing everything 
he needs in order to know the answer, since if this subject, I, was dead, he 
would not know it.23  
Lacan alludes here to the Freud’s dream of the father who “didn’t know he was dead” and, 
despite his deteriorated appearance, behaved as though he were still alive.24 To briefly 
 
20 ibid, p. 699.  
21 ibid, p. 673.  
22 ibid, p. 685.  
23 ibid, p. 694.  
24 Freud (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams (Part II), SE V, pp. 429-31. Freud writes, “[i]t very 
commonly happens that in dreams of this kind the dead person is treated to begin with as though he were 
alive, that he then suddenly turns out to be dead and that in a subsequent part of the dream he is alive 
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interpret the reference in this context, we might say that in order to instantiate the 
distance/difference needed for self-perception, the individual relates to himself as dead. 
But paradoxically, it is on the condition of this death and, even more crucially, its 
disavowal that he assumes discursive life.  
In Lacan, however, the scope of this reading is dilated as the dead father becomes 
the phantom of omnipotence – the Name-of-the-Father – whose Law gives the subject 
the possibility of desire through the instantiation of prohibition. Whereas the prior 
interpretation focuses more strictly on the relation between language and negativity, the 
dialectics of which will be explored in greater detail shortly, the Lacanian formulation 
evokes the castration complex: the (dead) Father-turned-Name demands a phallic 
sacrifice in exchange for the possibility of desire and its double in the form of speech. The 
castrated subject, in turn, only has access to the lost phallus via the Other, who does not 
necessarily possess the phallus but is experienced as that which denies or deprives the 
subject of phallic authority. It is this deviation of demand (or jouissance) through the 
Other that makes it articulable by transforming it into its alienated form – desire. Thus, 
castration is the function which seals desire, with the phallic signifier suggesting not a 
self-identical possession but rather the persistent threat of not-having. Turned symbol, it 
can be “had” in its absence, a strategy that has the dual function of protecting the 
endangered phallus while masking that it has always-already been lost. As Lacan writes 
elsewhere, the phallus “is the signifier of the very loss the subject suffers due to 
fragmentation brought on by the signifier,”25 and the ego is the concealment of that loss, 
 
once more. This has a confusing effect. It eventually occurred to me that this alternation 
between death and life is intended to represent indifference on the part of the dreamer. (‘It's all the same 
to me whether he's alive or dead.’) This indifference is, of course, not real but merely desired; it is 
intended to help the dreamer to repudiate his very intense and often contradictory emotional attitudes 
and it thus becomes a dream-representation of his ambivalence” (p. 431).   
25 Lacan, “In memory of Ernest Jones: On His Theory of Symbolism” in Ecrits, Trans. Bruce Fink, (New 
York/London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999), pp. 585-601; p. 599.  
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the function behind which “the neurotic hides the castration that he denies.”26 In this way, 
the phallus designates meaning effects as a whole, which it initiates by its 
disappearance,27 and the ego in turn assumes its activity as the denial of that 
disappearance.  
The phallus is given up – the price paid for desiring – and this transaction is excised 
such that no judgement can be properly made about its existence, but it always-already 
as if it never existed nor belonged to the subject: “[s]uch is the inaugural affirmation, 
which can no longer recur except through the veiled forms of unconscious speech, for it 
is only by the negation of the negation that human discourse allows us to return to it.”28 
In other words, in the symbol of the phallus, renunciation and disavowal of that 
renunciation are bound together, a double negative which allows for the “positivism” of 
psychic life which works to conceal or deny this lack, first and foremost to itself. But is 
there another way to interpret this double negative, this negation of negation?  
Unable to find its certainty, subjectivity thus relies on the anticipation of certainty 
as conferred by a signifier, which is in itself meaningless, or rather whose “meaning” 
equates to none other than the discursive detours which veil that meaninglessness. This 
situation is described by Lacan as “the ambiguity of a misrecognizing that is essential to 
knowing myself [un méconnaître essential au me connaître].”29 Symbolic life then reveals 
a significant unity in intention that is, counter-intuitively perhaps, sustained by 
constitutive ambiguity. It is this very ambiguity whereby thought can be used to contradict 
or lie to itself. Indeed these appear to be the functions which instantiate language in the 
 
26 Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” p. 700. See also “On a Question Prior 
to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” in Ecrits, pp. 445-489; pp.463-4. 
27 Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus” in Ecrits, pp. 575-584.   
28 Lacan, “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’” in Ecrits, pp. 318-333; pp. 
322-323.  
29 Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” p. 684.  
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first place and establish its primary aim: to deny or defend against a castration that has 
already occurred. Thus, insofar as the phallus is concerned, the truth is not in the place 
where it never left, like some purloined letter. Rather, it is in the place where it never was. 
The consequence? “This moment of cutting is haunted in the form of a bloody scrap: the 
pound of flesh that life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of signifiers, which it is 
impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body…”30 
Diane Jonte-Pace offers an alternative to all this phallic anxiety. In Speaking the 
Unspeakable, she argues that the emphasis on castration as the decisive turning point 
stems from the Oedipal masterplot. But perhaps we can follow another, less explicit 
current in Freud: the “counterthesis” suggested by the desire of the mother and, in his 
later work, the unspoken link between death and religion. According to Jonte-Pace, these 
themes destabilize the masculine reactivity of the Oedipal paradigm in absentia, 
unsettling the family romance as the psychoanalytic catch-all. In place of the death wish 
that polarizes around the father and the stress upon parricidal phantasies as the basis for 
culture and religion, she invites us to consider the devouring body which is denied or, as 
per Kristeva, abjected so that desire can both reveal and hide itself.  
In developing the themes that bring us back to pre-oedipal considerations, Jonte-
Pace follows lines of inquiry that avoid psychoanalytic androcentrism, suggesting that 
castration anxiety is secondary to anxieties surrounding the original loss that instantiates 
an even more elemental repression. By this reading, the ego is an internalization of 
absence or incompleteness that proceeds from the differentiation from the mother and 
the maternal body, such that the organizing principle of the ego is one of melancholic 
mourning. “The ego, in other words, acts as a memorial or monument for the losses that 
created its structures… We become, in this paradigm, what we have lost. The shadow of 
 
30 Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power” in Ecrits, pp. 489-542; p. 526.  
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the lost object becomes the ego.”31 By this reading, the narcissistic tendency (which 
encompasses melancholia) is both byproduct of and defense against a foundational loss 
– the loss of a state of fusion without difference, a situation which can never be fully 
mourned for mourning itself only makes the separation more acute. And yet, the 
experience of separation is necessary for the becoming and continuity of self; fusion or 
(re)union equates to symbolic disintegration, to death.  
In fact, as Jonte-Pace points out, even the fort-da game (and the compulsion that 
it enacts) arises in response to maternal absence, an attempt to “master” loss or 
separation through traumatic repetition. But this interpretation does not end with Ernst: 
though Beyond the Pleasure Principle was published shortly after his daughter Sophie’s 
death, Freud finds it important to mention that it was written when his daughter was 
“young and blooming,” denying any possible correlation.32 Death, it seems, signals a 
dispossession which goes beyond the fear of castration: the loss of the primary object or 
the loss of oneself as the object that results from this initial distinction. Thus, as Jean-
Bertrand Pontalis also suggests, the experience of negation, absence, or death 
corresponds to an unconscious component that is as vital and more primary than 
sexuality, the latter operating as a means to divert from the former, shaping the ego that 
fantasizes integrity and immortality by negating castration and death as its unyielding 
bookends. 33  
Jonte-Pace also draws religion into this framework, exploring the connection 
between death, maternity, and spirituality in relation to Freud’s 1928 paper “A Religious 
 
31 Diane Jonte-Pace, Speaking the Unspeakable: Religion, Misogyny, and the Uncanny Mother in 
Freud’s Cultural Texts, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 136.  
32 ibid, pp. 47-49.  
33 Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, “On death-work in Freud, in the self, in culture” in Psychoanalysis, Creativity, 
and Literature, Ed. Alan Roland, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 86.  
See also Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Trans. Leon Roudiez, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 26.  
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Experience” and suggesting that, like the dead mother, the notion of an absent God also 
represents “a heavenly home in the uncanny.”34 I set aside this element of religiosity in 
the present context as it will be revisited in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note how these evasive threads – death, maternal absence, the uncanny, 
and religiosity – already appear intertwined in Freud’s texts under a promise of fusion 
experienced by the ever-emergent ego as aim of a drive and as well as a threat, both 
likewise unthinkable. All appear to signal a sinister but all-too-familiar terror of 
engulfment that threatens the boundaries of self as it comes into being out of an 
undifferentiated state.  
Kristeva, who picks up many of Freud’s deferred speculations, argues that these 
uneasy objects and the archaic instinct they evoke suggest a wound deeper than that of 
castration. Together they mark a “rage against the symbolic,”35 against the father and his 
law. The Oedipal framework however conceals this complex dynamic of fear and 
fascination under the ambivalence towards the father or rival; the paternal injunction 
(paired with the objectification of the mother) reconditions a desire for death into the 
deadliness of desire. But the death anxiety provoked by the former cannot be contained 
or summarized in the castration anxiety of the latter. Indeed, according to Kristeva, 
castration anxiety is but one of the echoes of abjection anxiety, the fear of a localized 
amputation that minimizes the more consuming threat of the loss of bodily integrity, 
doubly-dreaded because it also recalls the subject of the constitutive splits which 
instantiated his identity in the first place.  
These accounts gravitate beyond or before the Oedipal drama, focusing on the 
earliest repression of the unthinkable that establishes one’s subjective identity and 
 
34 Jonte-Pace, Speaking the Unspeakable, p. 72.  
35 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 178.  
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suggesting the primacy of the death drive over the castration complex. A mutilation 
occurs nevertheless. The point of emphasis however is not “the pound of flesh” but the 
initial experience of differentiation which severs, dislocates, and casts the Real out of the 
subject, positioning it outside where he can then attempt to refind it. Still, these readings 
converge with the Freudian or Lacanian descriptions, all seeming to infer that subjectivity 
is contingent on the foreclosure of plenitude. As in Lacan’s formulation, in which 
jouissance is exchanged for its inverse in the form of desire, the experience of (non-
discursive) fullness is sacrificed in exchange for psychic life, which in turn is the 
(re)seeking of that fullness as conditioned by the nostalgia for a lost wholeness 
encompassed in the death drive. In other words, life and death are not in opposition. 
Rather they sustain one another through the play of their inconsistencies and 
impossibilities.   
This understanding provides a theoretical pivot for investigation which might be 
summarized as follows: life is propelled by the repression of its deathly origin, and death 
is the condition that first makes life possible and then restores to that life the fullness that 
it renounces in order to perpetuate itself. Still, these are speculations and “dark 
continents” which cannot be fully pursued as such, only formulated as insistent and 
interruptive questions, as riddles which “escape Oedipal solutions.”36   
 
JE ME TUE 
As Freud writes in The Interpretation of Dreams, “[h]itherto … all the paths along which 
we have traveled have led us towards the light – towards elucidation and fuller 
understanding. But as soon as we endeavor to penetrate more deeply into the mental 
processes involved … every path will end in darkness.”37 As in the unplumbable depth of 
 
36 Jonte-Pace, Speaking the Unspeakable, p. 19.   
37 Freud (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams (Part II), SE V, p. 511.  
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the dream, there is a domain where interpretation fails and bends back on itself. We may 
call it the “navel,” reminiscent of the site of umbilical connection and inexorable 
separation, or simply a “great unknown” that is beyond the thinking that leads us towards 
it. In either case, we refer to those places where interpretation begins and never finishes, 
returning always to its own blindness. In the following chapter we will consider why this 
ontological blindness or uncertainty is deeply demonstrative. Here however, I mainly 
wish to challenge the narcissistic certainty that is none other than the anticipation of that 
certainty, a “truth” that is only visible from a distance, when we are standing apart from 
it.  
 Without the instrument of modern linguistics at his disposal, there are limits to 
Freud’s theory of subject-formation and, consequently, of death as an experience of the 
speaking subject. But perhaps this makes his work all the more instructive, the psychic 
processes and interpretations inaccessible on the level of signifiers appearing as 
disruptions resistant to theoretical synthesis. Paradoxes, theoretical knots, repetitions, 
and questions that hang in suspense appear to implicitly (or instinctively?) designate the 
effects of unassimilable content without irremediably altering its unconscious quality, 
suggesting an elusive or evasive element of the unconscious that must not, cannot, will 
not be transcribed into conscious awareness and yet conditions its pathways. Of this 
unseen dimension, Lacan writes,  
instinct […] is defined as a kind of [experiential] knowledge (connaissance) 
we admire because it cannot become [articulated] knowledge (savoir). But 
in Freud’s work something quite different is at stake, which is a savoir 
certainly, but one that doesn’t involve the slightest connaissance, in that it 
is inscribed into a discourse of which the subject… knows neither the 
meaning nor the text, nor in what language it is written, nor even that it was 
 74 
tattooed on his shaven scalp while he was sleeping.38  
That is, the subject’s knowing is contingent upon a denial or expulsion of awareness 
regarding where or how that knowing originates: instinct is encrypted into subjectivity as 
refusal of the cipher.  
The theoretical interventions thus far suggest that narcissism represents a 
negotiation of symbolic life and death that cannot be accomplished without the element 
of negativity which it works to reconcile and/or conceal. But is this a characteristic of 
narcissism itself or of the imaginary and symbolic processes which it institutes and 
deploys? We know from the mechanisms of word-presentation that language operates on 
absence. Then the “I” too must have a negative component. André Green is a crucial 
referent here. In The Work of the Negative, he points out the formative association 
between language and various negating operations such as denial, disavowal, and 
foreclosure. In fact, as he suggests, the topic of negation, and particularly its complex 
positioning within psychoanalysis, is linked with linguistics even before the emergence of 
any such field. Green points out that the use of verbal negation as an integral psychic 
defense, as well as a way to free oneself from the consequences of repression, is 
theoretically developed by Freud in his 1925 article “Negation.” Therein Freud considers 
two types of negation. The first, a rejection of an unpleasant or unassimilable idea (i.e. 
Verleugnen or “disavowal”), is a defensive mechanism that allows the individual to 
successfully form a thought while distancing himself from it. By constructing it in a 
negative form, the individual (consciously) avoids responsibility for its disagreeable 
implications. Freud distinguishes this from “negation” (i.e. Verneinung), which is the 
(negative) conclusion by the psyche that external reality fails to satisfy desire. What the 
 
38 Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” p. 680.  
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individual seeks in the outside world, in other words, is judged by the psyche to be lacking. 
This type of negation, as Freud explains, amounts to an assertion of absence that, while 
disappointing, is a necessary form of reality-testing as well as the basis for hallucinatory 
satisfaction. Verneinung, thus, is the negation that establishes the distinction between 
ideational content and external reality, producing the mental representation of a wish as 
a consequence of the absence of the wished-for object. Absence, in other words, is a 
precondition of the emergence of the mental representation, and negation is the 
ideational operation that allows the individual to articulate the gap between what is 
desired and what is immediately present.  
For Green, however, the negative encompasses more than the denial of the positive 
or the imperceptibility of absence, both of which still have inverted counterparts in the 
representational domain. He suggests another mode of negation in the form of an aporia 
maintained through denial and resistance and existing only on the stipulation that it 
never exist. This “Nothing,” he explains, refers to all that is unable to be represented to 
the extent that is not even subject to repression, nor to association with other 
representations – that which cannot be accounted for by the psyche and which is expelled 
in order that other psychic content may exist. Unlike repression, which still maintains an 
unconscious representation, the categorically inaccessible negativity which Green 
proposes can be traced only in the defensive mechanisms it evokes. And narcissism – in 
both its primary and negative forms – appears to operate as one such defense. Or, as 
Green writes, “[t]he negative appears to be a precondition of access to the concept of the 
subject.”39 The negative then is all that works against recognition, interpretation, and the 
regulation of forms, and yet it cannot be extricated from these processes. For instance, 
the very notion of a primal object or unsignifiable Thing exists because of a discourse that 
 
39 Green, The Work of the Negative, p. 19.  
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negates and overwrites such an object, such that it can only exist for and through 
discourse and the constituted subject who reconstructs it mythically to explain some 
intrinsic nostalgia or dissatisfaction. Thus, following Green, we might say that there is no 
language without the work of negation and no negation without the preliminary 
construction of a notional domain.40  
What the aporia signals therefore is not quite an absence, but rather the non-verbal 
substratum of psychic life. It presents itself and persists as an epistemological problem, 
and according to Green it is precisely this problem that conditions Freud’s theory of 
narcissism and that “raise[s] its head again with the final theory of the drives.”41 Thus, 
perhaps more is said by the implicit than the explicit, particularly concerning the intuition 
of a psychoanalytic process that begins to disintegrate as it approaches the unsayable. 
Furthermore, given that discourse cannot illuminate this blind spot, the only 
epistemological recourse – other than abandoning the attempt on the basis of inevitable 
failure – is to consider the relation between forms of negativity instead of staring into a 
singular abyss. Indeed, this is Green’s methodology:  
It looks as if the conceptual fringes work secretly on the central concepts, 
clarifying them in a way which makes them appear in a new light. They 
would thus reveal, through their potential for reversal, the measure of the 
negativity which they enclose.42 
I wish to carry out a similar approach here, extending it also to the undifferentiated, which 
despite its patent but indiscernible fullness also seems to function as a mode of negation: 
one which negates all other forms of negation, and thus the entirety of the notional 
domain.  
 
40 ibid, p. 20.  
41 ibid, p. 24.  
42 ibid, p. 3.  
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Lacan tells us that “the ego is never but half of the subject; moreover, it is the half 
that he loses in finding that image.”43 In this interpretation, the passage into the 
representational domain marks a mortal splitting, and for all its promised wholeness, the 
image always-already signals a self-divided being. For Maurice Blanchot, this manifests 
as the problem of language and of writing, a problem that might be encapsulated in the 
sentence “je me tue.”44 A straightforward translation renders this sentence as “I kill 
myself,” but according to Blanchot, what the statement reveals is that “I” and “myself” are 
not the same entity, that the utterance is possible only because of the very doubling that 
it seeks to remedy.  
“I” is a self in the plenitude of its action and resolution, capable of acting 
sovereignly upon itself, always strong enough to reach itself with its blow. 
And yet the one who is thus struck is no longer I, but another, so that when 
I kill myself, perhaps it is “I” who does the killing, but it is not done to me. 
Nor is it my death – the one I dealt – that I have now to die, but rather the 
death which I refused, which I neglected, and which is this very negligence 
– perpetual flight and inertia.45  
The enunciation supplants, putting the “I” in place of being and the double in the place of 
the victim who in turn becomes unidentifiable or unrecognizable. To utter the phrase is 
an affirmation of the self-as-speaking subject that comes at the expense of the self that 
seeks to affirm its existence, or to end it. In this way, “je me tue” is not so different from 
“je suis” – both involve the confession of a murder of a “me” by the self-splitting “I” for, 
as Lacan expresses, “I” is “an enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that 
renounces itself, an ignorance that sweeps itself away, an opportunity that self-destructs 
 
43 Lacan, “Variations on the Standard Treatment,” in Ecrits, pp. 269-302; p. 287. 
44 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, Trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1989), p. 107.  
45 ibid.  
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– what remains here if not the trace of what really must be in order to fall away from 
being?”46  
We see also in the myth of Narcissus that the only release from the capture by the 
image is a reunion with it, a fatal fusion. We could read this as cautionary, but maybe 
there is more at stake, namely the confrontation with the fact of non-existence (i.e. death) 
that the image conceals and, through its processes of concealment, expresses. Or, as 
Lacan writes:  
death brings in the question of what negates discourse, but also the question 
whether or not it is death that introduces negation into discourse. For the 
negativity of discourse, insofar as it brings into being that which is not, 
refers us to the question of what nonbeing, which manifests itself in the 
symbolic order, owes to the reality of death.47  
By this reading, “knowing oneself” involves plunging into that enigmatic aporia which 
sustains subjectivity on the grounds of its exclusion and inaccessibility. But the two 
cannot coexist: they can only be juxtaposed as a subjective dispersal that reconfigures 
knowledge as a total situation of unknowing.  
 In Black Sun, Kristeva considers melancholia as a psychic (dis)organization in 
which this situation is experienced not as tragic, but inescapable. Her exposition of 
melancholia bears a resemblance to Green’s formulation of negative narcissism as 
discussed in the previous chapter: the experience of the self as an expanding emptiness 
or as the mere trace of its own non-existence. This expression of being as the 
disappearance of being, she suggests, is both a consequence and a negation of primary 
separation: an acute awareness of language as the sedimentation of loss leads the 
 
46 Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject in the Dialectic of Desire,” p. 678.  
47 Lacan, “Introduction to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’” in Ecrits, pp. 308-317; 
p. 316. 
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melancholic to mourn meaning itself as the death of the Thing, and through the refusal of 
symbolic separation, the melancholic remains riveted to both signification (as failure) and 
the dead Thing. 
According to Kristeva, narcissistic identification has a dual purpose: to serve as a 
compensation for the lost Thing while “at the same time secur[ing] the subject to another 
dimension, that of imaginary adherence.”48 The Thing then is the ambivalent core of the 
symbolic which does not lend itself to signification, that which must be renounced or 
excised from being in order to render it speakable. We find here a similarity with the de 
facto negative form elaborated by Green. Beyond denial or disavowal, Kristeva and Green 
seem to speak to a more elemental operation that wards off the lack of reality that 
representation both engenders and suffers from, a negation of the negative as the grounds 
for symbolic processes “designed to make the object ‘emerge’ from its absence.”49 For the 
melancholic though, “utility” or “meaning” is found only in a non-representability that 
stands in as a referent for the impossible merger with the primary object. Since being is 
denied – since it has been abandoned – the melancholic (or negative narcissist) sinks into 
the lack of being instead. Rather than conceal the narcissistic wound, she tears at it until 
it is big enough to crawl into:  
I live a living death, my flesh is wounded, bleeding, cadaverized… Absent 
from other people’s meaning […] I owe a supreme, metaphysical lucidity to 
my depression. On the frontiers of life and death, occasionally I have the 
arrogant feeling of being witness to the meaninglessness of Being, of 
revealing the absurdity of bonds and being.50  
This “arrogant” “lucidity” alerts us that melancholia is also a form of intellectual 
 
48 Kristeva, Black Sun, pp. 13-14.  
49 Green, The Work of the Negative, p. 6.  
50 Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 4.  
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narcissism wherein the only “authentic” meaning is found in loss or refusal of meaning. 
The melancholic, in effect, opts for an interiorized negation of self in place of the 
imaginary or symbolic negations that would sustain a positivist view of the ego. The result 
is a (non-)positioning of self that, though affectively painful, is not experienced as 
pathological but rather as profoundly legitimate: “[t]hrough their empty speech they 
assure themselves of an inaccessible (because it is “semiotic” and not “symbolic”) 
ascendancy over an archaic object that thus remains, for themselves and all others, an 
enigma and a secret.”51 That is, in place of the linguistic armor that the symbolic offers 
against death, the melancholic experiences meaning without signification, in all of its 
arbitrariness.52 Because of this, Kristeva writes, “the speech of the depressed is to them 
like an alien skin; melancholy persons are foreigners in their maternal tongue… The dead 
language they speak, which foreshadows their suicide, conceals a Thing buried alive.”53  
But, as Freud too pointed out, melancholia falls in the category of narcissistic 
neurosis. Thus, in a peculiar way, this melancholic denial too functions as a shield: all 
meaning is taken from life such that it has none (i.e. is has only its non-meaning), and 
value lies only in the Thing that is forever unnameable and innaccesible. The melancholic 
hyperlucidity, in turn, stems from an awareness of the objectifying transformations of 
language, a recognition of the fact that for all the agency, possibility or “life” that 
proliferates in the symbolic register, it is undergirded by mutilation, by death. 
Melancholia therefore stems from the individual’s awareness of a non-choice: be 
mummified by signification or buried alive with the Thing. In the place of an idealized 
unity under the mutilating image and its sign, the melancholic retreats into the 
amputation and the shadow that this loss casts on the fragile ego. If desire is a function of 
 
51 ibid, p. 64.  
52 ibid, p. 49.  
53 ibid, p. 53.  
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a lost phallus, melancholic depression transforms the entire self into the phantom limb.  
We begin to see here how both narcissism and its melancholy counterpart converge 
in the desire for lethal fusion, “a chance to imagine the non-meaning, or the true meaning, 
of the Thing.”54 In the narcissistic configuration, we find a phantasy of the One without 
others or limits upheld by the spectral image, which also obstructs the fulfilment of that 
phantasy through the doubling it occasions and represents. Narcissism then equates to 
the ideational obstacles and negations that serve as a defense against both a desired death 
(i.e. fusion) and the death which has already occurred (i.e. self-splitting). In melancholia 
this phantasy of fullness is inverted as a wish to “reunit[e] with archaic non-integration.”55 
However the “oceanic void”56 that the melancholic puts in the place of meaning still 
anchors the subject to the symbolic on the basis of refusal. But perhaps we can imagine 
another alternative: a non-integration that impedes the cohesion of self through 
heterogeneity rather than strictly on the basis of negation. The chapters that follow 
consider this (im)possibility.  
Moving in that direction, let us take the following from the considerations 
presented thus far: life as it manifests in the form of narcissism or discourse is not the 
binary other of death but the defense against death in the form of deferral. And yet, only 
in that deferred demise is life restored to itself without mediation by the signifying chain. 
As Green describes, life and death are ‘against’ one another in the two senses of being 
close to and opposing, and only by formulating their relation in this way is it possible to 
conceive of their union while preserving the difference that allows us to distinguish 
between them. “However,” he continues, “we know that being in contradiction with the 
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other corresponds to our own self-contradiction.”57 The “I” then encompasses the ideated 
One and the double, as well as a the Third: both life and death are “against” the individual, 
and if we take either away, he has neither existence nor the means to speak of it.  
 
THE ONE IN NEED OF A SECOND 
As we have seen, primary narcissism is necessary for social and symbolic life, but also has 
the effect of rendering the individual inaccessible, most significantly to the individual 
himself. It requires the fixation on the ego as self-contained and self-possessed unit, a 
unit that, in the case of secondary narcissism, is to be defended and maintained at the 
cost of the external world, keeping away from the ego anything that would challenge or 
diminish it. And yet, all that we have discussed thus far suggests that very formation or 
fixation of an ego implies precisely this – separation, impoverishment, alienation. It 
would appear, then, that though the narcissistic concept of the ego is one of a closed 
psychical system, it is only through the vulnerability and inscrutability of the ego that the 
narcissistic tendency operates. And, in what presents itself as a glaring contradiction, it is 
only through the engagement with the environment that the individual produces his 
narcissistic phantasies of self-sufficiency.  
In Narcissism and its Discontents, Julie Walsh examines this contradiction from 
a psychosocial perspective, suggesting that precisely therein lies the productive potential 
of narcissism. Her work represents a close engagement with Freud’s assertion that “the 
individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and 
the other as link in a chain.”58 According to Walsh, primary narcissism is not a necessary 
yet fictive state, but rather necessary because fictive: on the basis of that causality, 
narcissism establishes the entry into the world of the imaginary and, subsequently, the 
 
57 Green, The Work of the Negative, p. 15.  
58 Freud (1914), “On Narcissism,” SE XIV, p. 78.  
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sign.  
From a Lacanian point of view, we might say that this initial privileging of image 
over experience initiates the process that establishes the primacy of the signifier. Walsh, 
however, is not explicitly concerned with the symbolic function of the “I” but rather with 
its social function and narcissism, being the process that establishes that “I,” as the 
condition necessary for sociability. Considering the role of narcissism in a range of 
contemporary social relations, Walsh argues that though the concept does not initially 
appear to lend itself to subjective fluidity, perhaps it is none other than narcissism that 
creates the conditions for thinking about fluidity in the first place. The individual comes 
to participate in the world of others/objects through an ego that is essentially other/object 
to his self, which he in turn submits to this fictive unity that then participates in the world 
as sign. “It is,” Walsh writes, “at the heart of the psychoanalytic hermeneutic that the 
social world takes place through the fantasy of the “I.”59 Primary narcissism, then, is the 
decisive (yet deceptive) operation that establishes the priority of illusion– the first and 
foremost being the illusion of the unitary self – and in this way, lays the foundation for 
the processes of differentiation and (mis)recognition that structure the relation to the 
other. Narcissism, in other words, sustains the first formative illusion that will ground all 
the rest and which reveals, as Walsh suggests, that the entire metapsychological edifice 
“relies upon a fantasy-construction for its foundation.”60 
The infant-narcissist stumbles upon his ego through the dual processes of 
differentiation and misrecognition, processes that require an other, first the spectral 
other that comes to greet the child through the mirror and then all subsequent others in 
whom the child anticipates his self despite the fact that the self is re-inscribed by the 
 
59 Julie Walsh, Narcissism and its Discontents, (Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 8.  
60 ibid.  
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encounter. Essentially, then, the narcissistic phantasy of self-sufficiency will never be 
satisfied because narcissism engenders and relies on a relationality that makes its aim 
unrealizable. The narcissist then, in his inevitable dissatisfaction, will continue to be such 
(both narcissistic and dissatisfied), for if the ego as the object of narcissistic love is a 
precipitate of the relation to an other, then the narcissistic object-choice forecloses the 
possibility of satisfying the aim. And yet, bound up in narcissism is the very renunciation 
or denial of this fact: the individual will always be in need of an other in order to discern 
himself, loving his ego much as he would another person. For Walsh therein lies the 
productive capacity of narcissism, which compels the individual to recognize others in 
order to discern the self that (in the form of ego or “I”) he will in turn submit to the 
recognition by the other.  
In what reads like a contemporary protraction of the vindication of narcissism 
begun by Freud with his 1914 paper, Walsh suggests that the narcissist is, fundamentally, 
a subject-in-formation.61 But could we suggest also that the narcissist is a subject in need, 
that his narcissism is the investment in the illusion of self-sufficiency that obscures this 
fact of dependency? In Psychoanalysis and Feminism, Juliet Mitchell clarifies this 
interpretation numerically. She writes, “[t]he infant is at first not yet One, but Zero 
(mathematically Zero is never nothing, nor is it something); for One to exist at all, two 
are needed, even if the second is in fact the reflection in the mirror.”62 The narcissist is 
the Zero that mistakes himself for One, but given that for this to occur a second must be 
present, built into narcissism must be the search for a second that permits the 
constitution of the One in the place of Zero. Or, as Mitchell explains, “[z]ero indicates the 
lack, it is a situation of non-relationship in which identity is meaningless, but because it 
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62 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 385; my italics.  
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makes the lack visible, it sets in motion the movement forward.”63 Paradoxically then, the 
narcissistic desire for identity is the product of the individual’s non-self-identical origins: 
the origin he seeks is outside of himself. 
However, returning to the dynamic of secondary narcissism in which the 
narcissistic tendency withdraws libido from the external world in order to reinvest that 
psychic energy in the self, we might conjecture that this tendency, in its absolute 
culmination, would eliminate the Second that makes the One possible, the One returned 
to his original condition of Zero at the expense of the external world and, subsequently, 
of the One himself whose existence is contingent on a decisive act of differentiation. If, in 
turn, we apply this model to our working theory of the death drive, we find that the aim 
is inverted, the drive being not to do away with the external world, but rather to do away 
with the self as the limited mode/mechanism of experiencing, to achieve a continuity or 
totality that encompasses all and which we might describe as the One without the Second 
or, as suggested in the previous chapter, Oneness.  
Here we begin to see why the dialectic relation between primary narcissism and 
the death-drive is more complicated than it initially seems. Viewed from within Freud’s 
model of libidinal economy wherein ego-libido and object-libido exist in antithesis, we 
might formulate narcissism as the instinct to invest libido in the ego and the death drive 
as the instinct to discharge or evacuate the libidinal energy that the ego binds together. 
Considered in this way, it seems clear why we might posit these instincts as opposing 
forces. However, if we revisit and extrapolate the conceptual model put forth by Mitchell, 
the ego is untenable in the narcissistic state and so it may be deduced that narcissism is 
perhaps not necessarily the “self-preservative” instinct we believe it to be. Indeed, it may 
be a drive with a negative aim.  
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As finalities, the narcissistic state or the ‘oceanic’ feeling sought by the death drive 
imply, respectively, the non-existence of the external world or of individual subjectivity: in 
both scenarios the subject vanishes as our point of reference, either through the foreclosure 
of the objects and others by which “I” posits itself as a separate entity or through a 
dissolution of the boundaries that demarcate the subject from its encompassing world. 
However, as drives, as vectors operating within the experience of subjectivity to destabilize 
the unity of the ego, we can consider the pressure they exert on the individual and how they 
operate as psychic forces seeking (temporary) satisfaction in such a way that the subject may 
experience this satisfaction without being extinguished. Still, if we position the two in binary 
opposition, we are faced with self-construction on an empty foundation on one end and 
dissolution into formless ambiguity on the other. The choice between vertigo and nausea, it 
would seem, matters little.64  
 
 
64 Still, as Lacan writes in “The Freudian Thing” (in Ecrits, pp. 334-363), “[d]oes this little, then, which 
can become everything on occasion, perhaps deserve an explanation? What is this truth without which 
there is no way of distinguishing the face from the mask, and apart from which there seems to be no other 
monster than the labyrinth itself? In other words, how are they to be distinguished, in truth, if they are all 
equally real?” (p. 338).  
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3. 
WAVE UPON WAVES 
 
 
 
…it all came down to continuing his endless journey, with an absence of organism in an 
absence of sea. The illusion did not last. He was forced to roll from one side to the other, 
like a boat adrift, in the water which gave him a body with which to swim. What escape 
was there? To struggle in order not to be carried away by the wave which was his arm? 
To go under? To drown himself bitterly in himself? 
— Maurice Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure 
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to outline the conceptual difficulties inherent 
in the Freudian formulations of the death drive and narcissism. The considerations thus 
far suggest that these difficulties are largely structural: as aims and as concepts neither 
the narcissistic One nor the zero principle of the death drive are tenable as both foreclose 
the possibility of any relational position from which we might observe, interpret, or reflect 
on their significance. In this absence of alterity, the signifying process itself collapses and 
subjectivity along with it, for even the narcissistic fantasies of autonomy and self-
sufficiency are grounded in an initial experience of separation and difference. We cannot 
therefore present these concepts as two polarities around which the individual gravitates, 
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nor can we lean exclusively on a reductive binary that frames the death drive and 
narcissism as two competing internal forces orienting the individual toward opposing 
aims. Doing so will bring us again and again to the same impasse, specifically the 
impossibility of further questioning particularly if that line of questioning is 
psychoanalytic in nature: neither aim can be isolated theoretically because doing so 
negates or disperses the subject as our point of reference.  
 Let us rephrase the question then: how can we conceptualize death relationally? 
What is the enigmatic function of death in the psyche, and how is that function in turn 
experienced by the individual? Rather than focusing on death as a situation of pure-loss, 
let us ask what is preserved when the self is not. This, I believe, reveals the question to be 
two-fold: (1) how does death (as memorialized in the psyche) operate as a motor for 
psychic activity and (2) what it is that death (as experience) bears witness to. These 
concerns reflect a move away from the structural method and the issues it presents. They 
require, I suggest, an economic approach capable of accommodating terms that overflow 
both one another and the terms of their existence. In this way, we might reformulate the 
encounter with death – in lived experience and in fantasy – as a situation of ontological 
uncertainty that doubles as nonpareil aim and source of anxiety. Here I argue that 
perhaps death can only be conveyed by that very doubling.  
 I propose therefore that we turn to Georges Bataille, in whose dissolute and 
decadent body of work this inquiry finds recurring expression.1 To begin with, Bataille 
identifies the futility of imagining transcendence, maintaining what I have thus far 
 
1 In an essay titled “Bataille, Experience, and Practice,” Kristeva suggests that Bataille’s oeuvre performs 
the fragmented body, describing his heterogeneous “literature of themes” as a transposition of his notion 
of “sovereign operation.” She maintains that his theoretical writings, anthropological studies, political 
manifestos, poetry, and erotic fiction all link and simultaneously dissolve their content, performing the 
experience of rupture, the re-doubling of semantic contradictions, and the radical heterogeneity concealed 
in logical sense – in other words, the violence of thought where it loses or denounces itself.  In On 
Bataille: Critical Essays, Ed. Leslie Bolt-Irons, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 237-264.   
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attempted to demonstrate in relation to primary narcissism and the death drive: a 
dialectic procedure, when completed, suddenly collapses. This would leave us with two 
unsettling understandings – infinite regress or a complete renunciation of meaning. Or 
as Bataille writes, “[t]he absurdity of an endless deferral only justifies the equivalent 
absurdity of a true end, which serves no purpose.”2 In other words, the transcendental 
categories that should reflect a release from subjugation actually have the opposite effect, 
requiring the justifications that render them and without which these categories are 
emptied of all content. Therefore, like Nietzsche, Bataille substitutes the search for truth 
in philosophy with a search for aesthetic phenomena that exceed the limits of dualism.3  
He directs his attention to the base matter that resists the conceptual edifice-building of 
idealism and traditional materialism, discerning therein a moment of non-logical 
difference in which two necessary but incompatible positions meet and mutilate one 
another, thereby asserting an immanent form of sovereignty that admits no possible or 
potential subordination.4 
 As a result, Bataille’s work emphasizes the lived experience of death as function of 
and in relation to the limits that enclose and constitute the individual – the irrecuperable 
negativity that simultaneously threatens and sustains subjectivity. The taboo creates the 
condition for transgression or, in more Lacanian terms, the prohibition creates the 
condition for jouissance. In violating the taboo or exceeding the prohibition, one exceeds 
the self that is essentially bound together by that prohibition. In the act of transgression, 
 
2 Bataille, Theory of Religion, Trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 28.   
 
3 For more on Nietzsche’s influence on Bataille’s thought see Lionel Abel’s “Bataille and the Repetition of 
Nietzsche” in Leslie Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995, pp. 51-60) or Bataille’s own defense of the German 
philosopher in On Nietzsche (Trans. Bruce Boone, London: Athlone Press, 1992), the final book of his 
three-part Summa Atheologica wherein he engages most closely with Nietzsche’s notion of the Death of 
God.  
4 “The Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade” (1930) in Visions of Excess. Ed. Trans. Allan Stoekl, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1985); pp. 91-102. See also Hussey, The Inner Scar, pp. 29-49.  
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which is the beating heart of his work, Bataille discerns an ecstatic release of the tensions 
held together by the perceived unity of the self – no longer fearing the castration that has 
always-already occurred, but in turn no longer a subject either. And yet, for Bataille this 
transition, if we might call it that, does not have the quality of a negation. Rather it signals 
a situation in which the individual who, aware of his constitutive lack (or insufficiency5 
as Bataille refers to it) opens to the world, expending himself entirely as an affirmation of 
the incompleteness that he is. Mourning gives way to delirium, and though both of these 
responses signal a loss Bataille does not wallow in this, emphasizing instead what persists 
in the wake of this excessive outpouring of self, namely a condition of non-differentiated 
being and, equally important, its unassimilable remainder. For Bataille the remainder is 
death, which is experienced in the transition but is as inconceivable in isolation as it is in 
dissolution.   
 This brings us to the matter of Bataille’s atypical “subject.” In place of the self, ego, 
or “I” as a unified representation, Bataille posits the fragmented ipse for whom wholeness 
or completion is not simply deferred but altogether unthinkable.6 On the side of the 
prohibition or taboo, wholeness cannot be because the subject is castrated or wounded. 
Indeed, as discussed in the preceding chapter, that woundedness is the necessary 
condition of his subjectivity. On the side of transgression, however, the subject cannot be 
because he abandons his stable referents and himself as a function of the relation to them. 
Ipse, in other words, connotes not the existence of a separate individual, but his ex-
istence, the experience of the self as an always prior exteriority or as its own 
 
5 For more on the principle of insufficiency, see “The Labyrinth” (1936) in Visions of Excess, pp. 171-177.  
6 As William Pawlett explains in Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society (London: Routledge, 2015): 
“The influence of Kojeve’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is very pronounced here. Kojeve 
presents the self as an inner nothingness constantly striving for or desiring that which is out of reach.” (p. 
117)  
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disintegration.7 
 This certainly raises the critique, as posed by Jean-Luc Nancy, that Bataille has “no 
concept of the subject”8 in the sense of a consistently fixed category. But it appears to me 
that Bataille posits “ipseity”9 not in place of subjectivity but at its core and its margin; 
encompassing both absent origin and impossible aim, ipse would appear to be the 
“subject” of the death drive. Whereas subjectivity is the individual’s relation to language 
and law, ipseity posits a before and beyond to these limits. However, that which 
distinguishes ipse also makes ipse inconsequential: ipse is absent, is scattered, is not-one. 
But again – and here lies the power and pertinence of Bataille’s work – this 
inconsequentiality is not in the least trivial: yes, the insufficiency of the individual is a 
narcissistic injury, but the deep laceration caused by the impossibility of the One is what 
creates the condition for Oneness, a situation of non-differentiation or, as Bataille refers 
to it, continuity that bears a striking resemblance to what Freud describes as the ‘oceanic’ 
feeling.  
 Bataille returns to this concept throughout his work, describing the feeling of 
continuity as a communication resulting from heightened ontological anxiety, which 
having annihilated both reason and particularity gives way to an ecstasy that not only 
mirrors the climax of religious contemplation (and eroticism) but accounts for the 
mystical or sacred element therein. Continuity, in other words, connotes “the absence of 
separate individualities”10 – a negation of the individual quality, but not a negation in and 
 
7 Bataille elaborates his concept of ipse most thoroughly in Inner Experience. Both concept and text will 
be revisited in Chapter 4.   
8 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, Trans. Peter Connor, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991), p. 24.  
9 In Latin, ipse is a reflexive pronoun that can be translated as “itself.” It may also be translated as the 
“actual,” in this case referring to the ‘ego itself’ as it actually is, rather than as its representation under the 
sign of the “I.” 
10 Bataille, Erotism, Trans. Mary Dalwood, (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1986), p. 91.  
 92 
of itself. And for Bataille, the “vertiginous loss of consciousness”11 that gives way to the 
feeling of oneness with the whole marks the decisive moment of religious feeling. He 
writes:  
In the inert beatitude of this [theopathic] state, when each object and the 
whole universe have become utterly transparent… [t]he object of 
contemplation becomes equal to nothing (Christians would say equal to 
God), and at the same time equal to the contemplating subject. There is no 
longer any difference between one thing and another in any respect; no 
distances can be located; the subject lost in the indistinct and illimitable 
presence of the universe and himself ceases to belong to the passage of 
time.12  
It is a disorder opposed to the frantic proliferation of life (i.e. Eros) that binds increasingly 
complex forms around an unstable if not vacant center – the return to the Zero concealed 
by the narcissistic fantasy of One. But by Bataille’s approximation, this renunciation 
engenders a situation in which the individual, essentially dissolved, becomes part of and 
commensurate to the totality of existence.  
 Are we getting carried away? Most likely, but it would seem that for Bataille this is 
precisely the intention of religious contemplation or mystical experience. More 
importantly, however, this form of intellectual elaboration – culminating always in the 
wordlessness of trance, orgasm, or laughter – is what allows Bataille to reconcile the 
inevitable contradiction which rational comprehension comes up against in trying to 
approach death. Perceiving something to be recovered in theology even after the “death 
of God,” Bataille searches for the radical potential in what Freud dismisses as the 
“regressive fantasy” of religion, namely the possibility of affirmation through self-
 
11 ibid, p. 121.  
12 ibid, p. 249. 
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abandonment, of a mode of communication beyond misrecognition on the basis of 
identity.13 In Bataille’s understanding, this is certainly not, as Freud suggests in 
Civilization and its Discontents, a task for the weak of will.  
 Curiously, however, Bataille often describes this confusion in aquatic metaphors, as 
an experience of being in the world “like water in water.”14 Therefore, although Bataille’s 
atheological stance situates this experience of unbounded oneness in a way that is 
profoundly different from Freud, it would seem that the ‘oceanic’ is still very much present 
in Bataille’s notion of continuity. Indeed, the resonance between these two impressions is 
compelling and has been alluded to by psychoanalysts and scholars alike. Leo Bersani 
(1986), Stephen Webb (1993), Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss (1997), André Green 
(2001), Amy Hollywood (2002), and Jeremy Biles (2007) are just a few to have suggested 
the semblance between Freud’s ‘oceanic’ feeling and the situation of continuity as 
described by Bataille. However, a close reading of these two concepts that takes into 
consideration the possibilities opened up by Bataille’s atheological approach has yet to be 
undertaken. I believe it is worth revisiting the Freudian concept through a Bataillian 
prism, as doing so might allow us to consider its potential link to the death drive, a 
possibility undeveloped in Freud’s writings.   
 There is also an economic element to Bataille’s work that is particularly relevant to 
our continuing discussion of the drives. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Laplanche identifies 
the issue with the death drive as its radical economic principle. Instead of dismissing the 
death drive on this basis or, worse, trying to resolve this paradox, I suggest that we turn 
to the notion of general economy as put forth by Bataille. Though this is one of the 
 
13 See Editor’s Introduction (pp. 1-18) and David Allison’s “Transgression in the Community of the 
Sacred”(pp. 83-98) in The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and Communication, Ed. Andrew 
Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009). 
14 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 29.  
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“organizing” principles throughout his work, The Accursed Share (1949), Erotism (1959), 
and his posthumously published Theory of Religion (1973) in particular represent 
“systemic” considerations of the limits of restricted economies.15 Respectively these texts 
consider political economy, sensuality, and (a)theology but all converge on the notion of 
a “general economy” which is always given to moments of excess that, despite being a 
product of the system cannot be accounted for, stabilized, or assimilated by the system as 
a whole. This theoretical position may allow us to account for some of the difficulties 
inherent in the Freudian formulation of the death drive, and I will attempt to pursue this 
line of questioning in the following pages.  
 Psychoanalytic theory is already permeated by Bataille’s ideas.16 I am referring here 
especially to Lacanian psychoanalysis, post-Lacanian feminist critiques of 
psychoanalysis, and the intersections of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, although 
Bataille’s influence is certainly not limited to these domains.17 The list of thinkers 
influenced by Bataille is extensive, including names such as Foucault, Derrida, 
Baudrillard, Barthes, and Agamben. The two we will engage with most closely, however, 
are Lacan and Kristeva, neither of whom renounce the power of raw religious feeling 
despite the fact that, like Bataille, both turn away from their religious upbringings in 
Catholicism.18 Yet, as I will show here, his work is rarely engaged with carefully in these 
contexts, most often reduced to a passing mention or prurient caricature, or otherwise 
 
15 Benjamin Noys, Bataille: A Critical Introduction. (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 13.  
16 For instance, in his essay “Moral Narcissism,” André Green considers the link between sexuality and 
morality and writes, “Georges Bataille, to whom tribute should be paid by psychoanalysts, has profoundly 
understood the consubstantiality of the erotic and the sacred.” (See Green, Life Narcissism, Death 
Narcissism, p. 155). There are many such references alluding to the significance of Bataille’s work without 
engaging with it as such.  
17 See Will Stronge (Ed.), George Bataille and Contemporary Thought, (EPUB: Bloomsbury Academics, 
2017). 
18 For instance: Lacan, The Triumph of Religion, Trans. Bruce Fink, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), and 
Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, Trans. Beverley Bie Brahic, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006).  
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considered altogether separately, in relation to philosophical dialectics, radical politics, 
or theology but not with regard to its relevance to metapsychology.19  
  It is my impression, however, that we find in Bataille’s (anti-)philosophy much 
more than anecdotal symmetries with psychoanalysis. Indeed, Bataille’s thought – 
hinging as it does on confounding contradictions, acknowledging impossibility without 
attempting to assimilate it, acknowledging that its importance comes precisely from being 
unassimilable – underscores the peculiar quality of metapsychology as a speculative 
project that seems to resist attempts at stabilization or completion. More specifically, 
however, Bataille’s understanding of insufficiency as a necessary condition for continuity 
would appear to illuminate the dynamic between primary narcissism and the death drive. 
It does so with a blinding brightness, tearing out the unified “I” as a limited mode of 
seeing, being, and experiencing.20  
 I would like to clarify here that I do not intend to produce a philosophical reading of 
Bataille, and in any case it would be a question of pursuing Bataille’s resistance to 
philosophy.21 Nor do I wish give an intellectual biography as there is already substantial 
literature on the subject.22 What I am attempting, however, is to suggest a synonymy 
between Freudian metapsychology, particularly the ill-defined role of death therein, and 
Bataille’s heterological thinking – two forms of intellectual elaboration that resist 
stabilization, straightforward synthesis, and homogenizing representations.  
 
19 Jeremy Biles (2015) and Liran Razinsky (2009) offer readings of Freud alongside Bataille. In “Does 
Acéphale Dream of Electric Sheep?” (Negative Ecstasies, Ed. Jeremy Biles and Kent Brintnall, New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2015; pp. 217-239) Biles examines Bataille’s references to dreams as a way of 
considering both his difficult relationship with the Surrealists and his engagement with Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Razinsky, on the other hand, considers Freud and Bataille as they overlap over the 
concept of death, and specifically what it means to observe death as a spectator; see “How to Look Death 
in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” in SubStance Issue 119, Vol. 38, 2; pp. 63-88.  
20 The recurring theme of blindness in Bataille’s work will be taken up in Chapter 5.  
21 See Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995), Stronge (2017), and Scott Wilson and Fred Botting (Ed.),  
The Bataille Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).  
22 See Noys (2000) and Michel Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, (London: Verso 
Books, 2002).   
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 As always, much nuance is lost in translation. Still, it is my hope that doing so will 
allow us to approach death as an experience of liminality rather than a limit as such. This 
conceptual shift enables us to explore affinities with other experiences and practices that 
expose subjectivity to its own precariousness. And, in turn, the convergence of these 
associations under the barred sign of death enables us to re-imagine the theoretical 
applications of this enduring philosophical paradox.  
 
FROM ATHESIS TO ATHEOLOGY  
Derrida proposes that the nature of the dynamic between the life and death drives, though 
not explicitly stated, is written into Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In “To Speculate – On 
Freud,” he considers the textual movements by which Freud expresses the 
interdependence of the drives without ever positing it as such. According to Derrida, each 
example and explanation of the death drive given by Freud confounds itself and forces the 
text to begin again, as if every step forward always-already carried within it the backward 
motion. The case for the repetition compulsion, itself caught in an interminable 
repetition.  
 In Chapter 1, I attempted to explore this conceptually, looking at the internal 
contradictions of Freud’s argument as indicative of the non-linearity of the theory – 
perhaps not consciously motivated, but certainly meaningful. Derrida focuses on the text 
itself, not what is written in or of the text but what is performed by the text, specifically 
the impossibility of arriving at a destination. He writes of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
“the very procedure of the text is diabolical. It mimes walking, does not cease walking 
without advancing, regularly sketching out one step more without gaining an inch of 
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ground… without ever permitting the conclusion of a last step.”23 However, this is not 
intended as a criticism. Quite the contrary: it is this “diabolical” movement that allows 
the text to approach the subject at all, offering a conclusion of sorts precisely by not 
offering it as such. Therefore, according to Derrida, the thesis of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is actually the absence or deferral of a thesis – its athesis – as found in the 
unsettling rhythm of the text.  
 Freud cautions the reader, qualifying what he attempts to put forth as of Section IV 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle as “speculation, often far-fetched speculation.” For 
Derrida, this is does not compromise Freud’s (a)thesis, but rather signals the fact that the 
“understanding” of the economy of drives, and specifically the role of the death drive 
therein, is contingent upon a situation of non-understanding that in turn always draws us 
back to the original question. Derrida defends speculation as a peculiar intellectual 
operation, radically different from hypothesis, theory, or observation in that it reflects a 
certain “aimlessness” of thought. Or, perhaps more accurately, we might say aim-
inhibition. The issue being not that the thought lacks an aim, but rather that the aim is an 
impossible one – one which cannot be reached by the subject as such and whose proximity 
therefore elicits a certain degree of recoil.  
 Freud touches on this mechanism briefly in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” the 
1915 paper in which he puts forth the preliminary drive theory that is radically revised 
with the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle five years later. He describes as 
aim-inhibited those “processes which are allowed to make some advance towards 
instinctual satisfaction but then are inhibited or deflected.”24 Although Freud has not yet 
introduced the death drive at this point, he has clearly considered the idea of partial 
 
23 Jacques Derrida, “To Speculate – On Freud” in The Postcard, Trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 257-387; p. 269.  
24 Freud (1915a), “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” SE XIV, pp. 111-140; p. 122.   
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satisfaction of an aim-inhibited drive perpetuated through repetition, as also suggested 
by his 1914 paper “Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through.”25 Like the libidinal and 
self-preservative drives later to be grouped under a common life principle, Freud’s theory 
itself seems to be demanding the death drive – a ‘first and final drive’ whose aim (i.e. 
ultimate satisfaction in the complete reduction of tension) is both thwarted and sustained 
by the life drives through which it seeks partial satisfaction, the drive whose deferral 
sustains the entire economy.  
 How does Freud respond to this theoretical demand? In Civilization and its 
Discontents, he writes: “I remember my own defensive attitude when the idea of a 
destructive instinct first emerged … and how long it took before I became receptive to 
it.”26 Is this resistance, aim-inhibition, or both? And yet, in light of the ideas in this 
particular text, his drift (albeit skeptical) into the ‘oceanic,’ it would appear to be as Freud 
himself admits: “it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed [in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle], but in the course of time they have gained such a hold 
upon me that I can no longer think in any other way.”27 The thought that cannot be posited 
as a fixed theory or hypothesis cannot be avoided either: what Derrida describes 
elsewhere as the “invincible necessity”28 of the death drive will only be expressed through 
an athesis in the form of theoretical departures and returns.     
 The speculation, as Derrida writes, “advances without advancing, without advancing 
itself, without ever advancing anything that it does not immediately take back.”29 Much 
like the fort-da game in its entirety, it enacts overlapping but unequal movements. In that 
 
25 Freud (1914), “Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through,” SE XII, pp. 147-56.  
26 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, SE XXI, p. 120. 
27 ibid, p. 119.  
28 In Archive Fever (Trans. Eric Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) Derrida describes 
both the death drive and Freud’s speculative formulation of it as “another name for Ananke,” that which is 
irreducible since it operates in silence as the destruction of its own archive. (pp. 9-10).  
29 Derrida, “To Speculate” in The Postcard, p. 293. 
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sense, this thought operation also has a mirror-like quality, producing a gestalt that is not 
equivalent to the composite it reflects: the alienating reflection that both satisfies and 
does not satisfy the attempt to master or reconcile feelings of fragmentation. A “specular” 
logic, in other words, requires an other. Death however is not opposable – it is the 
negation of everything including negation itself. Without the quality of difference or 
alterity, it is non-inscribable. In so far as it is thought then death is the unrepresentable 
that lies beyond the possibility of difference with life. Or, we might say that death 
“represents” none other than the impossibility of its own representation. In any case, as 
soon as we consider it, Derrida writes, “it is, already, life death.”30 Once death exceeds its 
reciprocal other, there is only silence.   
 The speculation then reflects a particular strategy, the only possible strategy, when 
the “finality cannot be clear, cannot be itself.”31 Unlike the theory, the speculation 
produces a non-positional structure based on a lack of equivalency – no advancing, but 
no resting either. We might liken this to the lack of equivalency with the reflection that 
consistently brings us back to the mirror. As far as death is concerned, however, it would 
appear that the speculation is not merely the only available approach, but also the most 
demonstrative. Like the symptom, the speculation is a response to a forbidden or 
foreclosed thought that expresses a conflict most fully precisely in the inability to express 
it verbally. Perhaps it is also the strategy of one who simultaneously desires to exceed a 
limit but also to maintain it, if only as a point of reference. In Erotism, Bataille considers 
this possibility. 
We can conceive of nothing except in terms of our own life, and beyond that, 
it seems to us everything is wiped out. Beyond death, in fact, begins the 
inconceivable which we are usually not brave enough to face. Yet the 
 
30 ibid, p. 285. 
31 ibid, p. 278.  
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inconceivable is an expression of our own impotence. We know that death 
destroys nothing, leaves the totality of existence intact, but we still cannot 
imagine the continuity of being as a whole beyond our death, or whatever it 
is that dies in us. We cannot accept that this has limits. At all costs we need 
to transcend them, but we should like to transcend them and maintain them 
simultaneously.32 
Is this ambivalence what the textual performance of Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
expresses? I would argue that it is, but Bataille’s interpretation reveals a nuance that is 
absent or at least occluded (on the level of signifiers) in Freud’s system.  
 Freud touches on the difficulty of isolating the death drive in Civilization and its 
Discontents. He writes: “[t]he phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent 
or mutually opposing action of these two instincts. It was not easy however to 
demonstrate the activities of this supposed death instinct.”33 Here we are presented again 
with two movements, one of which exceeds the other, and with a conceptualization of 
death as the unthinkable remainder that results from this lack of equivalency. It is a 
system that ends in silence, whose finality is always beyond the questioning that would 
lead us there. Or, in Freud’s words, “[i]t might be assumed that the death instinct operated 
silently within the organism towards its dissolution, but that of course, was no proof.”34 
Therefore, Freud proposes considering how the death drive “could be pressed into the 
service of Eros,” directed towards the external world as aggressiveness or destructiveness 
such that something else might be destroyed in place of the self.35 This, Freud suggests, is 
a way of thinking about the death drive that does not lead us into the field of total 
dissolution. The aim being beyond questioning, the death drive can only be thought in so 
 
32 Bataille, Erotism, p. 141; my italics.  
33 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, SE XXI, p. 119.  
34 ibid.    
35 ibid.  
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far as life as its other is still present – it can only be speculated. Indeed, revisiting the 
death drive as repetition compulsion in light of this, it would appear that built into the 
death drive is the means of its perpetuation: the death drive consistently returns to its 
other through which it both finds and postpones its paradoxical satisfaction. 
 Both Freud and Bataille discern that death operates silently, but there is a marked 
difference. Freud equates death with non-existence, imbuing the concept not only with a 
regressive quality, but also with an element of negativity. For Bataille however, death 
destroys nothing. It is not animate life that ceases to exist, but difference. The result is a 
situation of radical presence, of undifferentiated and exuberant being, which could be 
likened to the Lacanian Real. If we wish to find an equivalent in the Freudian framework, 
however, we might consider the unboundedness of the ‘oceanic’ feeling. I will explore the 
similarity between the ‘oceanic’ and Bataille’s notion of continuity in subsequent pages, 
attempting to draw these ideas into our discussion of the death drive. In order to open 
that dialogue however, it is first necessary to demonstrate why and how the conceptual 
difficulties in the final drive theory might be clarified or at least accounted for under a 
Bataillian lens.  
 The answers to those questions, I believe, lie in the fundamental asymmetry of the 
drives. For Bataille, such an asymmetry presents a complication in the form of a 
remainder, but this remainder is not meant to be assimilated or recuperated. The excess 
rendered by asymmetry reveals a threat not necessarily to a particular system (whose 
function is likely the concealment of some asymmetry) but to systemic thought in general, 
and precisely for that reason might be re-cast as radical possibility. Ironically however, 
this unassimilable excess also reaffirms the need for the system that operates as a defense 
against the threat produced as its byproduct. The result is a constant re-doubling: without 
the “operative” system there can be no excess, and without this excess the system has 
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nothing to shore itself up against, operative only in relation to the inoperative element 
that it excludes and on the basis of that exclusion. Such a system cannot be stabilized.  
 Bataille, in equating death with the confusion of non-differentiation rather than 
non-existence posits death not as finality but as an encounter with the precariousness of 
subjectivity. For Bataille the “unbearable surpassing of being”36 is death or at the very 
least is experienced by the individual as death insofar as it entails the loss of self as a point 
of reference. By this understanding, death itself cannot be known, but the feeling of 
ontological uncertainty posed by the “excessive” can be. We could reason then that death, 
being the excess rendered by the drive economy, might be interpreted in this light. Doing 
so shifts our focus from death as a categorical impossibility to the experience of death as 
a function of the individual’s relation to an asymmetrical economy of opposing but 
interdependent forces. In this way, the feeling of “paralysis” evoked by death is 
transformed into a situation of vexatious motion. This experience of an immobility that is 
neither still nor idle recalls the last lines of Beckett’s The Unnameable. The disjointed 
monologue of the motionless but wavering character “concludes” as follows: “…where I 
am? I don’t know, I’ll never know: in the silence you don’t know./ You must go on./ I can’t 
go on./ I’ll go on.” For Bataille, existence is none other than this experience of ontological 
oscillation between deleterious desire and the anxiety it produces, the “alternation of 
fascination and horror, affirmation and denial.”37  
 As we can see, Bataille’s text also oscillates. Like the athesis that Derrida identifies 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Bataille’s thinking rests neither on one position nor the 
other, moving between the awareness of insufficiency and the delirium of dissolution. For 
instance, he writes:  
 
36 See Bataille’s récit to Madame Edwarda in My Mother, Madame Edwarda, The Dead Man, Trans. 
Austryn Wainhouse, (London: Marion Boyars, 1996), pp. 137-159; p. 141.  
37 Bataille, Erotism, p. 211.  
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Two things are inevitable: we cannot avoid dying nor can we avoid bursting 
through our barriers, and they are one in the same. But as we break through 
the barriers, we strive to escape from the terror of death and the terror that 
belongs to the continuity glimpsed beyond those boundaries… As we are 
about to take the final step, we are beside ourselves with desire, impotent in 
the clutch of a force that demands our disintegration. But the object of our 
urgent desire is there in front of us and it binds us to the very life that our 
desire will not be contained by.38  
And yet, Bataille offers something beyond the deferrals of deconstruction.39 Aware that 
Absolute Knowledge has as its hostile double the loss of the individual, Bataille inverts 
the approach: instead of posing the question of Absolute Knowledge at the expense of 
subject, he considers the situations that evoke a loss of self – be they erotic or mystical – 
in order to arrive at the “knowledge” they might confer. In the case of mysticism, the result 
is what Bataille terms non-savior, an “unknowing” that reduces existing categories – 
especially moral – to collapse and disorder, dispersing meaning and consequently the 
subject into fragments. In his exposition of the role of mystical tradition in Bataille’s 
thought, Andrew Hussey describes non-savior as “a revelation, or anti-revelation, which 
undoes all categorical version of truth.”40 The result is an affirmation of silence and 
absence – of death.   
 Given that non-savoir can neither be defined in positive terms nor as a negative 
proposition, Bataille privileges experience over knowledge and positions himself against 
 
38 ibid, pp. 140-141.  
39 According to Robert Trumbull (2012), Derrida’s emphasis on endless deferral actually restricts some of 
the productive ambiguities in Freud’s text. See “Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis: A Problematic 
Proximity” in Derrida Today, Issue 5, Vol. 1: 69-91. 
40 Hussey, The Inner Scar, p. 89.  
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philosophy as a synthesizing operation.41 For instance, he writes that “[d]eath is a 
disappearance”42 and this disappearance makes it impossible to decide if death is a lived 
experience, the end of lived experience or is outside of lived experience. In his preface to 
Madame Edwarda he complicates this further:  
There seems to exist a domain where death signifies not only decease and 
disappearance, but the unbearable process by which we disappear despite 
ourselves and everything we can do, even though at, at all costs, we must 
not disappear… the insensate moment towards which we strive with all that 
is in our power and which at the same time we exert all our power to stave 
off.43 
We can agree that death is an experience at the limit, but for Bataille the limit functions 
not by dividing life from death but by drawing them together – it is a place of 
contamination, much like what we find between the death drive and primary narcissism. 
And, as Allan Stoekl explains, “it is precisely the conjoining of the two that establishes 
their identity as automutilation, their violent doubling.”44  
 This is speculation as Derrida describes it, but it is violent speculation. The 
speculation requires an other, a mirror. Bataille’s thought process does as well but it 
refuses to uphold their difference as that which sustains that relation. Rather, he seeks 
“to give death the upsurge of life, life the momentousness and vertigo of death opening 
on to the unknown.”45 His speculation shatters the mirror, and his writing in turn 
becomes an exercise in transgression that attempts to approximate the convulsions of the 
subject in his encounter with the threat of his own disappearance. The transgression 
 
41 In Erotism, Bataille writes, “[p]hilosophy is the sum of ideas in the form of a synthesis, or nothing.” (p. 
254).  
42 Bataille, Guilty, Trans. Bruce Boone, (Venice: The Lapis Press, 1988), p. 7. 
43 Bataille, Madame Edwarda, pp. 140-1.  
44 Allan Stoekl, Introduction to Visions of Excess, p. xiii.  
45 Bataille, Erotism, p. 91.  
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however can only be translated into language through a framework or vocabulary which 
it actively denies, a system in which the processes of signification and reference persists 
but only in relation to their terminal subversion.46  
 Sartre and Breton, as some of Bataille’s most virulent critics, referred to such a 
system as “excremental” and “pathological,” adjectives Bataille probably would not have 
contested. Bataille himself however designates this system heterological. Heterology, as 
Bataille describes it in early writings such as “The Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade” (1930) 
and “The Psychological Structure of Fascism” (1933), is opposed to synthesizing 
operations that produce a homogenous representation of the world. Whereas 
homogeneity signifies commensurability in the service of productivity or utility, the 
heterological concerns those elements which are impossible to assimilate and are thus 
charged with an unknown or dangerous force. They break the laws of social homogeneity 
and are rendered taboo. In the realm of religion, such elements account for the sacred. In 
the secular realm however the heterogeneous is rendered as the result of “unproductive 
expenditure” – the waste of the homogenous system that, in threatening the stability of 
that system as a functioning whole, produces as its effect an experience of violence, 
delirium, or madness.  
 In “The Psychological Structure of Fascism” Bataille positions this framework in 
relation to psychoanalysis: “The exclusion of heterogeneous elements from the 
homogenous realm of consciousness formally recalls the exclusion of the elements 
described (by psychoanalysts) as unconscious, which censorship excludes from the 
conscious ego.”47 Here he not only suggests that difficulties opposing the revelation of 
unconscious forms of existence are of the same order as those opposing the knowledge of 
 
46 Hussey, The Inner Scar, p. 19.  
47 Bataille (1933), “The Psychological Structure of Fascism” in Visions of Excess, pp. 137-60; p. 141.  
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heterological forms, but also goes as far as to assert that “the unconscious must be 
considered as one of the aspects of the heterogeneous.”48  
 Heterology then deals with that which cannot easily be kept within the field of either 
science or philosophy, that which loses its incommensurable character if objectified, 
stabilized, or incorporated. As a result, this approach focuses instead on the process of 
limitation which produces heterological elements and the violently alternating reactions 
of rejection and fascination these elements effect.49 Like the unconscious that Bataille 
designates as one such element, the heterogeneous resists, leaving us able to consider it 
only in relation to the violent re-doubling it produces. This resonates with Kristeva’s 
elaboration of the abject, however we do find something of this logic in Freud’s process as 
well. In “The Unconscious” (1915), Freud writes: “How are we to arrive at a knowledge of 
the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has 
undergone a transformation or a translation into something conscious.”50 In Bataille’s 
thinking, this does not undermine unconscious activity but rather functions as a defining 
characteristic: it can either be or be known, never both.   
 Such a logic reveals otherwise stable references – such as the perceived unity of the 
ego – as pseudostable, necessary but fragile or fictive. For Bataille this does create a 
feeling of loss, a need to create a new system. Rather in his heterological thinking this 
rising and falling becomes a system unto itself. The fall is not stabilized nor remedied 
through the elevation of another system. In fact, the fall is the critical moment.51 As we 
saw above, there is no possibility of rest in this system. And yet, while this process is 
necessarily a repetitious one, it is not without pleasure or satisfaction. However, here the 
 
48 ibid.  
49 Bataille (1930), “The Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade” in Visions of Excess, pp. 91-102; p. 97.  
50 Freud (1915b), “The Unconscious,” SE XII, pp. 159-215; p. 166.  
51 See Rodolphe Gasché, “The Heterological Almanac,” in Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995), pp. 157-208. 
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pleasure is not in the repetition itself, but its remainder – the enjoyment of excess or what 
for Lacan will become the excessive enjoyment of jouissance. By focusing on the excess 
rendered by the repetition and the pleasure-pain associated with it, Bataille might be 
positioned between psychoanalysis and deconstruction, having put forth a system in 
constant motion, in need of difference and of repetition but entangled with desire or 
pleasure.   
 Convinced that such thinking runs counter to the edifice-building of science and 
philosophy, Bataille attempts to recover from theology the primacy of experience over 
knowledge. Arguing for a discourse of transgression that would replace the Hegelian logic 
of contradiction and the law of the dialectic, Bataille discerns in mysticism a way to 
articulate a void in philosophical thinking.52 Though not entirely separate from 
philosophy, the mystical experience – as a desire to “know” God that exhausts the 
knowing self – reflects an active situation of contradiction that undermines the language 
of philosophy and the possibility of a philosophical project in the form of a synthesis: for 
Bataille, the understanding of God as impossibility overcomes the movement of the 
dialectic through the affirmation of silence or ecstasy as response. Such ecstasy is the 
result of a self-annihilation which, given the mystical tradition, he perceives as the 
quintessence of the sacred – a loss of self that can neither be entirely completed nor 
recuperated in discourse.  
 By Bataille’s interpretation, the conclusion of religious contemplation in an 
experience of God doubles as the negation of God: the mystic becomes part of and equal 
to the totality of God that in encompassing all actually produces as its double an 
experience of absolute negativity. Bataille in turn tries to conjure the sacred in a Godless 
 
52 In Sensible Ecstasy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), Amy Hollywood explores what the 
figure of the mystic does for 20th century French intellectuals. Bataille figures prominently here, as do 
Lacan, Irigaray, and Kristeva. Her project will be considered more closely in Chapter 4.  
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form, a way that affirms the death of God but not of religious feeling. Actually, Bataille 
suggests that only through the death of God can something like religious feeling be 
reawakened. The result is a theological operation without a center, without a head: 
atheology. Unlike atheism, which would by this logic be only the inverse form of 
monotheism, atheology is predicated on and has its center the abolition of its own subject 
– the collapse of meaning which abolishes the possibility of a fixed referent. It connotes 
an encounter with absence (specifically the absence of God) which, as is the case in 
traditional mysticism, alters the thinking subject. The atheological speculation then 
reflects a form of “knowledge” that is mystical in that it exceeds discourse but belongs to 
no specific tradition or mystical idiom.   
 In their respective studies of Bataille’s mysticism, Hussey (2000), Amy Hollywood 
(2002), and Peter Connor (2003) explore its similarity to religious counterparts and its 
departure from them – namely its absence of any theistic commitments and its insistence 
on the experiential power of the mystical encounter rather than the “revelation” itself. 
These considerations will factor prominently in the discussions to follow and will be 
considered more closely in the following chapter. For the time being, however, I only wish 
to establish why it is that a Bataillian perspective might shed some light on the dialectic 
of the drives and the role of death therein. Such a perspective, I believe, expands the field 
of psychoanalysis precisely because it exceeds the restrictions that enable the formation, 
codification, and formalization of knowledge. Not unlike Freud, Bataille is constantly 
driven into unfamiliar territory and unfamiliar forms of expression. However, in 
attempting to sustain the heterogeneity of his thought, in drawing from the mystical 
tradition the expressiveness needed to convey his atheological speculations, Bataille 
transforms a limit of theorization into a liminal space, similar to that of a ritual, sacrifice 
or a festival – not rendered complete or incomplete by a transcendent “beyond” but 
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continuously (or compulsively) made and unmade through the transgression of its own 
limits.  
 In other words, the athesis finds its expression as atheology. Like the athesis, 
atheology cannot be easily enunciated, only performed as a movement towards a terminal 
subversion of thought or self that doubles as its own affirmation. This mutilation would 
appear to exceed the oppositions that govern logic and, consequently, the discourse of 
philosophy, but as we have seen in Bataille’s thought, excess acquires its (non-)meaning 
from the system that it so thoroughly destabilizes.  
 
ANTI-PHILOSOPHY  
As briefly mentioned, when Bataille positions himself against “philosophy,” he is referring 
to thought as a conclusive project, motivated by a rational aim with the possibility of 
formalization or completion. According to Bataille, such a project cannot assimilate 
intense experiences that call into question the integrity of subject as the seat of rational 
thought. “Philosophy,” he writes, “can only be the sum of the possibles in the form of a 
synthesis, or nothing.”53 Significantly, especially given the argument above, Bataille finds 
this statement warrants a repetition – as if the alternative to philosophy (i.e. “nothing”) 
calls out for its other. Bataille’s “anti-philosophy” however opposes the culmination of 
thought in any discernable sum. In that regard, it is typically the discipline and efficiency 
of Hegelianism that he is responding to, and of Hegel’s “practically impenetrable system” 
he writes: “[i]t assembles ideas, but at the same time cuts them off from experience.”54 
Bataille’s response in turn is to call attention to a realm of experience, simultaneously 
necessary and impossible, that cannot be mediated by a thinking subject. Knowledge, by 
this understanding, “concludes” not in a whole but in its own disintegration, an encounter 
 
53 Bataille, Erotism, p. 254.  
54 ibid, p. 255.  
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with formlessness that calls out for its other in the form of a repetition. And yet this 
operation produces an unassimilable remainder, an unobjectifiable excess that threatens, 
dislocates, and witnesses the objectified system from a position of radical exclusion. The 
two philosophical modes would appear to be at odds, but here I would like to defend the 
position that the relation between them, far from being oppositional, is performative of 
the interdependence of their respective economies and perhaps more generally of the 
economy of drives itself.  
 As scholars and biographers of Bataille point out, it is important to first clarify which 
Hegel, or more specifically whose, Bataille is responding to.55 Like a number of French 
intellectuals at the time, he attended Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Phenomenology of 
Spirit between 1934 and 1939 at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Also attended by Lacan, 
Klossowski, Merleau-Ponty, and Breton, Kojève’s lectures might be broadly characterized 
by a Marxist leaning that transformed the master/slave dialectic into the key to the whole 
of Hegel and by a general distaste for any transcendent “beyond.”56 It is this secondary 
reading that most came to associate with Hegelian theory and which would continue to 
unfold in Bataille as a hostility towards the idea of any foreseeable end to struggle.  
 Bataille had written about Hegel prior, most notably in his 1932 essay “The Critique 
of the Foundations of the Hegelian Dialectic,” wherein he likens the dialectical method to 
blood in the body and insists on the need for reconciling its tactics and historical origins 
and with lived existence and ideology.57 During the course of Kojève’s lectures, however, 
 
55 This is mentioned in the vast majority of secondary writings on Bataille and explored in detail in Hollier 
(1992), Hussey (2000), and Stuart Kendall’s edited compilation of Bataille’s The Unfinished System of 
Nonknowledge, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).  
56 See Patrick Riley (1981), “Introduction to the reading of Alexandre Kojève” in Political Theory, Vol. 9, 
No. 1: 5-48, and Boris Belay (2011). “That Obscure Parallel to the Dialectic: Tangled Lines Between 
Bataille and Kojève” in Parallax, Vol. 3, Issue 1: 50-77.  
57 Bataille (1932), “Critique of the Foundations of the Hegelian Dialectic” in Visions of Excess, pp. 105-115. 
For more on Bataille’s prior notions of The Phenomenology see Kendall’s introduction to The Unfinished 
System of Non-Knowledge, pp. xxxi-xxxii.  
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Bataille expressed that he felt “suffocated, crushed, shattered, killed ten times over”58 by 
Hegel, and his resistance to the Hegelian Absolute would become a defining feature of his 
thought.  
 Following Kojève, he perceives the Hegelian system as one that cannot 
accommodate transgression – at least not in any truly transgressive sense – because by 
accounting for such elements a priori, the movement of the dialectic renders 
transgression operative or meaningful, thereby undercutting any possibility of violation 
or defiance.59 According to Bataille, a transgression that does not jeopardize the integrity 
of the self-possessed individual and/or of a system in its entirety is not a transgression at 
all. Furthermore, a system without the threat of collapse is one without the possibility of 
sovereignty, as he defines it. The confluence of these contratemps amounts to one 
expressed most plainly by Bataille in a correspondence to Kojève written in 1937 and 
published later as “Letter to X”: “I imagine that my life – or, better yet, its aborting, the 
open wound that is my life – constitutes all by itself the refutation of Hegel’s closed 
system.”60  
 Given this understanding, Bataille might have abandoned the operation of the 
dialectic entirely, but what he develops instead is a rather complex and deeply uneasy 
position vis-à-vis Hegel. I certainly do not pretend to do justice to this philosophical 
tradition nor to the history of its interpretation in just a few short pages: both point to a 
vast amount of literature and even vaster lines of inquiry that are well beyond the scope 
of this project. However, it is difficult (or perhaps impossible) to situate Bataille’s thought 
 
58 Bataille as quoted in Noys (2000), p. 7.  
59 These ideas are evident across Bataille’s writings, but the divergence from his previous attitude towards 
Hegel is most explicitly rendered in “Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice” (1948), to be discussed in a later 
subsection.   
60 Bataille (1937), “Letter to X” in The Bataille Reader, Ed. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 297-300; p. 269. 
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and express its rigor without at least a brief consideration of Hegel and, more specifically, 
what Bataille interprets (via Kojève) as Hegel’s “closed system.” For that we turn to 
Hegel’s well-known though not so easily read text.  
 In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel traces out a trajectory of human history as 
“the history of desired Desires”61 and the dialectical negotiating of such desires between 
two figures – the lord and bondsman which, in Kojève’s interpretation, would become the 
master and the slave. According to Hegel, an initial murderous encounter, akin to the 
parricide committed by the primal horde but in inverse form, precipitates a hierarchy of 
antagonistic desires.62 This first struggle for the recognition of desire results in the casting 
of two roles – a master whose desire is acknowledged and satisfied, and a slave who works 
to satisfy the desires of the master. One is the independent consciousness whose essential 
nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature 
is simply to live or to be for another. But master and slave do not partake equally in this 
peculiar history of desire.  
 The master/slave episode is quite familiar, but I do wish to give a brief summary 
here in order to mediate Bataille’s notion of sovereignty, which contests that these are the 
only two subjective conditions despite being the only possible ones. The slave, in a twist 
of historical contingency, becomes the focus of history despite his seemingly subordinate 
position: unlike the master for whom the struggle has concluded, the slave continues to 
work towards the recognition of his own desires. As a result, the slave’s incomplete desire 
– sustained and, to borrow a psychoanalytic term, sublimated through work – becomes 
 
61 Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Ed. Allan Bloom, Trans. James Nichols, Jr., 
(New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 6.   
62 Curiously, Bataille draws out this comparison as defense of his argument for “a dialectic of the real” in 
his 1932 essay on Hegel, identifying in the relation between father and son a demonstration of the 
psychoanalytic principle whereby goals expressed in psychical terms are given basis in the soma, thus 
reflecting an attempt to draw together nature and pure logic.  
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the motor of the dialectic. The slave, whose desire persists precisely through its deferral, 
is simultaneously for himself and for another, a situation which produces in the slave that 
profound awareness of his split condition which Hegel designates self-consciousness. In 
other words, the slave experiences a form of autonomy made possible by the 
consciousness of his condition as provisional on a material lack of autonomy. The master, 
however, having reached the “ultimate” of consciousness and subjectivity – the 
completion of his desire – is reduced to an atemporal figure unable to experience the 
unfolding of the social in time. He is trapped in a solitary or, psychoanalytically-speaking, 
narcissistic state in which the recognition by the slave becomes obsolete precisely because 
their hierarchical relationship establishes the master’s desire as “recognized” once and for 
all.   
 We can see then that intersubjectivity, though never designated as such, is vital in 
Hegel’s understanding of being and consciousness. By Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, it 
is desire that determines consciousness, that defines the subject’s being: “the (conscious) 
Desire of a being is what constitutes that being as I …”63 And yet, desire alone is not 
enough to constitute the social subject. As we have seen already in the psychoanalytic 
framework, the self cannot exist without the other: the ego is precipitated by an initial 
experience of separation and finds itself again through the recognition of and by an other. 
However, to the extent that this other is objectified, not acknowledged as possessing their 
own operative desire, we find undermined the subject’s dependency on that other whose 
being and recognition constitute the subject as such. This objectifying desire, this desire 
without need for recognition, signals a self-consciousness that is (in)complete or, rather, 
asocial.  
 Recalling the discussion of primary narcissism and its paradoxes from the previous 
 
63 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 3.  
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chapter, it would appear again that autonomy – either in the form of ego or self-
consciousness – is none other than the recognition of the limits of that autonomy as 
established by the desire of the other. The self-consciousness of each subject is mediated 
by the self-consciousness of the other, and such mediation is radically transformative as 
it challenges the unity of the pre-social subject by submitting being (that is, desiring) to a 
situation of intersubjectivity. Without object or other, the subject cannot posit himself as 
such, much less come to any awareness of how that subjectivity conditions his thought 
and existence. On an intrapsychic level, we might equate this to how the ego comes into 
being both as a function of loss or separation and in the interest of reconciling that loss 
through an engagement with the external world coupled with fantasies of self-sufficiency.  
 What then do we make of Absolute Knowledge? Relying on Kojève, we might define 
Absolute Knowledge as a homogeneous state in which there would be nothing in the 
external world that is not mediated by mind or there would occur to the mind nothing 
that does not take place in the external world. The rift between the mind and the world 
would thus dissolve and this situation of reciprocal equilibrium would mark the ultimate 
triumph of reason but also, incidentally, “the end of history.” But, without otherness to 
ground the experience of consciousness, the entire procedure theoretically collapses. 
Further on in this chapter we will consider interventions suggesting not only that this 
need not be the case, but that such a position might be a misrepresentation of Hegel by 
Kojève. Nevertheless, it is this stifled Hegelianism to which Bataille reacts so strongly.  
 Bataille’s response then represents a emancipatory struggle to preserve an 
individual quality – though not exactly the individual as such – against this homogenizing 
force. We might say that the reason for this is two-fold: (1) to emphasize the 
incommensurability of thought itself with such a state and (2) to bring to the fore the act 
and experience of transgression which reveals the deep and irreconcilable ambivalence of 
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the individual when faced with the promise/threat of dissolution. Essentially, what 
Bataille suggests is a system with neither the possibility of closure nor of realization by 
the individual as such, the two conditions being mutually dependent. The result is a 
reciprocity without equivalency that simultaneously negates and preserves the dialectic 
through the inevitable eruptions of heterogeneous elements.  
 This is of course a cursory and relatively static summary, but I hope that the 
discussion to follow will allow us to engage more closely with and, more importantly, to 
mobilize those formal elements that are of particular relevance here, namely Absolute 
Knowledge, sovereignty and negativity/death, whose function in the dialectic we have not 
yet addressed but will consider in the pages to come. Thereafter other elements in the 
Hegelian system that signal deeper affinities with Bataille’s thinking will also be 
discussed, but for now I am constraining myself to those that dominate Kojève’s reading 
and which, via that reading, came to characterize Hegelian thought for Bataille. 
 To begin, Bataille vigorously contests the idea of Absolute Knowledge. And yet he 
does so in a rather anomalous way: not by positing its inverse in the form of a negative 
dialectic, but rather by endorsing Absolute Knowledge as fact. Indeed, in a 1948 paper he 
rather presumptuously writes of Hegel: “He did not know to what extent he was right.”64 
Initially this appears contradictory to his attitude towards Hegel as espoused above. 
However, what Bataille suggests is never to abandon the dialectic, but rather to take a step 
further: to approach the dialectic in light of what Bruce Baugh describes as the 
“contingent existence of knower.”65 For Bataille, knowledge is so ontologically 
conditioned by a knower no knowledge could be complete to the degree required by the 
Absolute. Furthermore, there is a domain of “knowledge” that can only be experienced as 
 
64 Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” in The Bataille Reader, p. 289.  
65 Bruce Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism. (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 
84-85. 
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or because of a threat to the integrity of the knower. Thus, something akin to the Absolute 
may exist – Bataille certainly thinks it does – but no knower may possess it, and as a result 
it is structurally unlike what we associate with knowledge. Consequently, Bataille terms 
this experience of one’s own contingency as a situation of “non-knowledge” or 
“unknowing”: non-savoir.  
 We might say then that Bataille’s “refutation” of the Absolute circles compulsively 
around the idea of sovereignty without mastery.66 For Bataille, Hegel’s notion of 
Absolute Knowledge implies the possibility of a culmination of consciousness whereby 
knowing is equivalent to becoming. These are posited in the continuous tense because the 
equivalency is in action, made possible through a series of reversals. And yet, the 
formulation of Absolute Knowledge in Kojève’s reading seems to imply a possibility of 
completion – hence a “closed system” – in which everything is accounted for, including 
autonomy and negativity, both of which posit the self as an entirety, either as full presence 
or complete vacuity. But let us recall that the Bataillian subject – ipse – is the always 
fragmented “not-one” whose incompleteness is its greatest virtue. If wholeness or 
completion of either self or thought is absurd, serving no purpose, sovereignty that can 
be fixed as an object, or as totalizing absence, is not sovereignty at all but merely disguised 
servility or abstract negativity.  
 “Sovereignty,” Bataille writes, “is the object which eludes us all, which nobody has 
seized and which nobody can seize for this reason: we cannot possess it, like an object, 
but we are doomed to seek it.”67 In Hegel’s dialectic, the bondsman/slave is the true 
sovereign on the basis of his ascension towards Absolute Knowledge through self-
 
66 See Andrew Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree (Ed.), “Editor’s Introduction” in The Obsessions of 
Georges Bataille: Community and Communication, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), pp. 1-19; pp. 9-10.  
67 Bataille, Literature and Evil, Trans. Alastair Hamilton, (New York/London: Marion Boyars, 1985), pp. 
193-194. 
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consciousness. In Bataille’s view, however, the true sovereign would be free of the security 
of any certain knowledge. Absolute Knowledge, being a situation in which the distinction 
between subject and object dissolves, would signal such an experience but always at the 
expense of the knower who in the absolute would lose all discursive points of reference, 
the most significant being his self. Sovereignty then would be an ontological category of 
its own rather than the culmination or pinnacle of consciousness, not conferred or 
acquired on the basis of social or economic distinction but violently experienced as 
outside of these institutions – a realm of pure experience that knowledge cannot penetrate 
because it presumes the loss or dissolution of the self as the entity which knows or 
possesses. For this reason, Bataille associates sovereignty with the heterogeneous or with 
the base matter that such institutions exclude from their functioning.  
 Is this nevertheless the production of another system? It would appear so, and we 
see this in Breton’s critique that Bataille, in spite of his embrace of the heterogeneous, is 
still given to reason and thus “cannot claim, no matter what he may say, to be opposed to 
any system, like an unthinking brute.”68 However, Bataille at no point denies the dialectic 
operation or the condition of intersubjectivity that sustains it: a sovereign being, useless 
as it may be in the material sense of the word, is still constrained to the discourse of utility. 
To the extent that such a being occupies a position assigned by the symbolic space of 
society, productive or not, it cannot break with the paradigm of utility however useless it 
appears. The condition of “uselessness” itself is contingent on the paradigm that excludes 
it, and in reaffirming that paradigm it is, in a sense, not “useless” at all.  
 It is at this point, made most explicit in the third volume of The Accursed Share 
(1949), that we come to sense what is radical in Bataille’s definition of sovereignty: the 
 
68 André Breton (1930), “Second Manifesto of Surrealism” in Manifestos of Surrealism, Trans. Richard 
Seaver and Helen Lane, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), p. 184.  
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Absolute becomes the impossible, and exists precisely as that impossibility, as that which 
cannot be reached by the subject as such. Sovereignty then is not the quality of an actor 
or of a group, but of an experience – one that cannot be sustained because, for reasons we 
have seen above, it cannot free itself entirely and circles endlessly around the encoding 
system, much like Bataille’s “anti-philosophy” gravitates around the dialectic. Bataille 
however acknowledges the duplicity of his writing readily: in Literature and Evil (1957) 
he outlines that any sovereign operation is characterized by impossibility and as such will 
always be relegated to the domain of failure, and in Erotism, first published in the same 
year, he declares that he himself “feels quite free to fail.”69 Throughout and across his 
works, Bataille’s thinking on the subject of sovereignty represents in each and every sense 
a borderline phenomenon: “it is impossible yet there it is.”70  
 In Hegel contra Sociology and Dialectic of Nihilism, Gillian Rose defends the 
speculative nature of Hegel’s thought, leveling criticisms at post-structuralism for its 
tendency to “totalize” Hegel. These readings, she argues, confine Absolute Knowledge to 
the level of essence where thought is still treated as object. But for Hegel, the formulation 
of Absolute Knowledge is about fracturing the very understanding of objectivity: it signals 
an unobjectified “witness” to the objectified system in its entirety, the Third which is the 
collapse of difference between two. The choice between nihilism and dialectics, she in turn 
suggests, is artificial and misleading: without formal rules for creating categories of 
judgement or reasoning, each category is a response to the failure of previous categories. 
Following this logic, in the case of Hegel the Absolute would be the response to the failures 
of objectifying categories which in turn would be the response to what Bataille designates 
the impossibility of the Absolute. Or, as Rose writes, it is “not that comprehension 
 
69 Bataille, Literature and Evil, p. 194. Also in Erotism, p. 255.  
70 Bataille, The Accursed Share: Vol. 1, Trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 257.  
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completes or closes, but that it returns diremption to where it cannot be overcome in 
exclusive thought or partial action.”71  
 The very idea of an entity is unsustainable without contact or mediation by the 
whole, which in turn is incomplete without the particulars which comprise it. The 
Absolute then cannot represent any possible end as the duality between identity and non-
identity is not simply unsustainable, but structured upon that very unsustainability: 
neither can be maintained in isolation. By this understanding, both Hegel and Bataille are 
fundamentally engaged with the same speculation: the (im)possibility of a non-
boundaried individual.   
 Thus, while Bataille’s anti-philosophy is a forceful (others might say obsessive) 
contestation of the “closed system” that the Phenomenology performs, in a rather 
Hegelian turn of events, they are inseparable, bound together like entity and whole or lord 
and bondsman, the later arriving at a dynamic “self-consciousness” through constraint to 
the former. Bataille cannot free himself from the mechanics of the “suffocating” or 
“impenetrable” dialectic. However, by emphasizing the doubling and re-doubling as a 
function of the impossible rather than in service of the Absolute, he does add to the system 
a more unsettling degree of instability. This instability – this Hegelianism without reserve 
– marks the singularity of Bataille’s position.72  As Derrida, still very much present in this 
discussion, writes: “rarely has a relation to Hegel been so little definable.”73  
 
TOWARDS A GENERAL ECONOMY OF THE DRIVES  
The step that Bataille invites us to take is in the domain of impossibility, of failure, where 
 
71 Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 
158.  
72 Tony Corn, “Unemployed Negativity: Derrida, Bataille, Hegel” in Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995), pp. 79-91; p. 
80.  
73 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 253. 
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we as such cannot actually advance. Here I believe we might revisit Derrida’s analysis of 
the pas de thesis74 that Freud puts forward (and then backward again) regarding the death 
drive, the absence and/or steps of the thesis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle that Derrida 
discusses in “To Speculate” and which we have already considered in the previous pages. 
Freud, as Derrida maintains, advances his “thesis” precisely by not advancing it: through 
a series of back and forth motions that play out in the text much like the fort/da game 
that becomes its defining episode. To determine whether for Freud this is consciously or 
unconsciously motivated is more speculation than I am comfortable with. Bataille, on the 
other hand, has a distinct awareness of the convulsive motions that take place as one 
approaches the domain where self and subjectivity begin to disintegrate. In fact, that 
convulsiveness is precisely his (non-)object of inquiry. For this reason, I believe his 
thinking might help illuminate that particularly dark and inaccessible corner of Freudian 
theory – the death drive.  
 Despite what I perceive to be profound resonances, little work has been done to draw 
out this possible juxtaposition. And though Bataille occasionally references or alludes to 
psychoanalysis, the same being true vice versa, there does not appear to me to be enough 
literature, neither primary nor secondary, to advance an argument based exclusively on 
direct comparison. Furthermore, given the subject matter, such a comparison would 
generally lack a foothold in formalized thought and thus be largely confined to the 
“unproductive” domain of unthinkability.  For these reasons I have chosen to mediate this 
discussion with Hegel in order to establish some theoretical groundwork for Bataille’s 
thinking and, via Derrida, attempt a transposition.  
 In addition to Derrida’s extensive writings on Freud, he also produced a crucial essay 
 
74 One the many bilingual puns in this essay: “step” in French is pas, which is also the most common word 
for negation. Hence, as Derrida explains, “steps for nothing,” the legwork/legacy that goes nowhere.  
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on Bataille’s theoretical relation to Hegel. However, despite the fact that in Archive Fever 
Derrida discusses how the introduction of the death drive transformed the psychic 
economy into an “aneconomy,” that in the same sentence he describes the expenditure of 
its annihilating force as “the accursed share,”75 this very obvious gesture towards 
Bataille’s 1949 text of the same name is not elaborated. Actually, Bataille is not mentioned 
at all. The two are never explicitly brought into consideration with one another. But I 
argue here that there are compelling similarities (and one glaring difference) between the 
textual and conceptual movements that Derrida describes in relation to the athesis of the 
death drive to those he identifies in Bataille’s general economy.  
 In “From Restricted to General Economy,” Derrida deconstructs Bataille’s 
complicity with Hegel, suggesting that in spite of his temperamental resistance, Bataille 
actually poses no philosophical objection to Hegel’s logic or discourse. Instead, he 
introduces “a certain burst of laughter”76 that exceeds and dislocates its sense. However, 
Derrida explains, this “can be done only through close scrutiny and full knowledge of what 
one is laughing at.”77 According to Derrida, Bataille calls into question the Hegelian 
system while maintaining the rigor of its reasoning. He does not extract, manipulate, or 
transpose individual elements of the Hegelian system. Rather, he takes the system in its 
totality and through the suggestion that in addition to the interdependence of its internal 
elements, it is also contingent on functions of exclusion and impossibility, sends a 
shudder through it.78 Derrida writes:  
 
75 Derrida, Archive Fever, pp. 9-10, 12.  
76 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 253.    
77 ibid.  
78 Interestingly, in The Gift of Death as well as in his auto-biographical “Circumfession,” Derrida also 
describes religious belief as a trembling. God, he explains, has no essence, no presence, no substance – no 
ontology. Either he is or he is, but in either case he is not and as a result true faith is always exposed to 
and accompanied to by radical doubt and, in a sense, atheism. He writes, “[i]t is in the epoché, the 
suspension of belief, the suspension of the position of God as a thesis, that faith appears” (1993, p. 46). 
For more on Derrida and religion see also John Caputo’s “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical 
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Taken one by one and immobilized outside their syntax, all of Bataille’s 
concepts are Hegelian. We must acknowledge this without stopping here. 
For if one does not grasp the rigorous effect of the trembling to which he 
submits these concepts, the new configuration into which he displaces and 
reinscribes them, barely reaching it however, one would conclude, 
according to the case at hand, that Bataille is Hegelian or anti-Hegelian, or 
that he has muddled Hegel. One would be deceived each time. And one 
would miss the formal law which, necessarily enunciated by Bataille in a 
nonphilosophical mode, has constrained the relationship of all his concepts 
to those of Hegel, and through Hegel’s concepts to the concepts of the entire 
history of metaphysics.79  
The result is not a contestation per se, but the signaling that in any system that appears 
stable, complete, or “impenetrable” there is a constant unease, an interminable shifting – 
a system not of differences but of intervals. As Derrida explains of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle: there is no stopping, no advancing.  
 This is not far from the Hegel that emerges in Rose’s reading, but as always there is 
a certain violence in Bataille’s thinking that stems from the focus on the loss of meaning 
as a lived experience of contingency – an experience that he equates with death – rather 
than as a theoretical construct.80 By this equivalency, he attempts to approach death as it 
is whenever thought is concerned: the unspeakable excess rendered by a situation of 
alternation and ambivalence between the desire for meaning and the drive to surpass it. 
But the fascination-turned-horror of a transgression that puts one beyond alterity 
reawakens the desire to install again the limits that one has just surpassed. Death, in other 
words, is not an ontological category of its own: as such it would be either unviable or 
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79 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 254. 
80 See Robyn Marasco’s Highway of Despair: Critical Theory after Hegel, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015).  
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fundamentally fraudulent. Rather, it is only “knowable” as the situation of ontological 
uncertainty that it reveals or the ontological oscillation it evokes – as what Derrida refers 
to in “To Speculate” as life death.  
 From this perspective, the master/slave episode is transformed as follows: 
Sovereignty, as an extreme (but fleeting) experience of non-savoir, results in a necessary 
regression to the condition of slave or bondsman who represents the “truth of the 
independent consciousness.”81 The slave recognizes that it is none other than servility that 
makes consciousness and its mediation possible. Or, as Derrida writes, “[s]ervility is 
therefore only the desire for meaning.”82 As for the master, he exposes himself to death 
but in doing so “for pure prestige” is unaware of the doubling that this situation creates: 
his mastery – like all mastery – is always an act of servility to meaning, and his encounter 
with death, far from an expression of sovereignty, is “mute and unproductive.”83 Without 
the step backward that allows us to contemplate the experience from the perspective of 
life, the mute death of the master, of one who feels his work is finished, is reduced to 
abstract negativity. And yet if life restricts itself exclusively to its conservation it can never 
express its highest principle. The question for Bataille is: how to negate and conserve at 
the same time, thus accomplishing both and neither?  
 We can discern here a distinct resonance between Bataille’s relation to Hegel and 
the athesis that Derrida identifies in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, incidentally also 
“enunciated in a non-philosophical mode” through the departures and returns of Freud’s 
text. Of the former, Derrida writes:  
What has happened here? In sum nothing has been said. We have not 
 
81 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit quoted in Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing 
and Difference, p. 256.  
82 ibid, p. 262.  
83 ibid.  
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stopped at any word; the chain rests on nothing; none of the concepts 
satisfies the demand, all are determined by each other and, at the same time, 
destroy or neutralize each other.”84 
We see here the same “impossibility of a resting point”85 that emerges in relation to the 
death drive. In this way, perhaps Bataille also seems to behave like Freud’s grandson 
Ernst.  
In the exemplary example the child throws away and brings back to himself, 
disperses and reassembles, gives and takes by himself: he reassembles the 
reassembling and the dispersion, the multiplicity of agents… the unity of a 
multiplicity that can be scattered.”86  
It would appear that the sovereign operation, very much like the death drive, must by 
necessity confirm or conserve that which each exceeds in order to affirm itself or, more 
precisely, accede to the impossibility that characterizes it. But again, we notice that 
Bataille’s approach does not have the same Sisyphean quality. The issue is not a desired 
object always-already out of reach but an object that is not-one, not a simple repetition 
but a violent re-doubling that shatters and affirms, that affirms by shattering: through 
the expenditure and loss of self, one arrives again at the fractured ipse that one always-
already is. Or as Derrida writes, “[n]ot a reserve or a withdrawal, not the infinite mummer 
of a black speech erasing the traces of classical discourse, but a kind of potlatch of signs 
that burns, consumes, and wastes words in the gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice and a 
challenge.”87 
 I attempted in the previous pages to trace out the ways in which Bataille’s work 
represents reinterpretation of Hegelian discourse that is also a repetition or re-
 
84 ibid, p. 274.  
85 ibid, p. 261.  
86 Derrida, “To Speculate – On Freud” in The Postcard, pp. 309-10. 
87 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 274.  
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instantiation. Moving forward however, I would like to emphasize the “sacrifice” that 
Bataille introduces in the form of excess. He follows Hegel beyond Hegel, into the domain 
of the unassimilable wherein negativity ceases to “work.” The challenge that Bataille’s 
excess presents to Hegel’s notion of negativity (and likewise to the psychoanalytic attitude 
of mourning) will be discussed in greater detail shortly, but to conclude, although 
inconclusively, the discussion of Bataille’s so-called opposition to Hegel: the introduction 
of an unassimilable element does not alter the play of forces; it does however reveal them 
as defiantly paroxysmal.    
 If excess is, as per Derrida’s description, that which “fold[s] into strange shapes”88 
beyond the oppositions governed by logic, then I believe we can begin to discern these 
“strange shapes” in the uneasy relationship between these two economies (if they can in 
fact be posited as separate) and what is performed by their writhing. First, Bataille’s 
resistance to Hegel is constrained to Hegelian thought, and as such is a re-affirmation of 
the dialectic which it would like to challenge or contest. Bataille’s critique, in other words, 
takes the form of a recognition of its own invariable failure through its subordination to a 
discursive goal: “[w]isdom alone will be full autonomy, the sovereignty of being… At least 
it would be if we could find sovereignty by searching for it: and, in fact, if I search for it, I 
am undertaking the project of being sovereignly: but the project of being-sovereignly 
presupposes a servile being.”89 Raymond Queneau, who also attended Kojève’s lectures 
and like Bataille was eventually spurned by the Surrealists, expresses this uneasy 
relationship as follows: “[Bataille] came to know himself – know himself as radically non-
Hegelian, but by knowing that this self-knowledge could only take place after he had 
knowledge of a doctrine which he claimed was comparable to no other, and by this finding 
 
88 ibid, p. 253.  
89 Bataille, “Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice” in The Bataille Reader, pp. 292-3.  
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himself once again, mediated but not reduced.”90 And so in this interplay of ideas, Bataille 
also comes to represent the excess which he so championed – that which reifies the 
grounding system but in the form of a threat. If the two do indeed co-exist in opposition, 
it is one which cannot be stabilized because each simultaneously mutilates and affirms 
the other. The relationship between their thought – one of necessary and inevitable 
reversals taking place around impossibility – performs and supports each of their 
positions through a demand for the other. That the “anti-Hegelian” system is deeply 
Hegelian whereas Hegel’s system carries within itself its own “anti-matter” seems to be 
support for a general economy – a system given to and contingent upon its own 
overflowing.  
 Furthermore, I believe that the relation between the two operates as an 
epistemological representation of the notion of the drive economy that I am attempting 
to put forth here, whereby any attempt to exceed the system results in a return or 
repetition as well as an unassimilable remainder. Life posited as a function of lack, work, 
or desire strives towards a fulfillment which is also an extinguishment, but this encounter 
with death can only claim significance if it calls out to its other in the form of life or 
meaning. However, while this necessary dependency is reciprocal, the principles 
themselves are not equivalent. This lack of equivalency submits the entire economy to a 
situation of trembling much like Bataille’s “anti-philosophy” does to the Hegelian 
dialectic. Death, by this interpretation is not the principle of return or repetition itself but 
the remainder, the excess rendered by a psychic economy in which the aim of the death 
drive surpasses its reciprocal other and thus cannot be articulated or represented in the 
psyche except as its own impossibility. The death drive, in turn, could be thought of as a 
psychic force of expenditure oriented towards the mutilation of the difference that 
 
90 Raymond Queneau, “First Confrontations with Hegel” in Critique, 195-6 (1963): 694-700; my italics.  
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sustains it. However, it is in every sense dependent upon that relation, existing only in so 
far as it is mediated by the life drive to which it consistently returns in order to perpetuate 
itself. The impossibility of its aim is the impossibility of the sovereign operation: it cannot 
be known except as the failure of being known.  
 Bataille’s contribution then consists in showing that even if the movement of 
knowledge accomplishes the absolute, the individual as such cannot. The reason is clear: 
death, being beyond alterity, is beyond the functions of desire and discourse that maintain 
the self as a separate entity. Returning to Derrida’s essay,   
the impossible mediated by Bataille will always have this form: how, after 
having exhausted the discourse of philosophy, can one inscribe in the 
lexicon and syntax of a language, our language, which was also the language 
of philosophy, that which nevertheless exceeds the oppositions of concepts 
governed by this communal logic?91  
From this Bataille concludes that there are some occasions when the mind fails to 
articulate or to proceed in the direction from the unknown to known. Upsetting the 
function of mind, these heterogeneous occasions or elements open up to the domain of 
the impossible, triggering an experience resulting in the collapse of the very faculty 
through which world becomes known. It is exactly at these points or moments, referred 
to by Bataille as “blind spots,” that the individual becomes sovereign precisely because he 
ceases to be, and though this blind vision is fundamentally untenable, by it something is 
accomplished and affirmed. This will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter 
through a consideration of the psychological structure(s) of masochism and mysticism, 
and subsequently in relation to violent forms of representation which appear to trigger 
similar effects. But before proceeding in the domains of experience and representation, I 
 
91 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 253.  
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wish to focus the remainder of this chapter on the concepts that allow us to approach such 
a situation of subjective/objective collapse as unbound energetic flux rather than an 
inconceivable encounter with negativity.  
 To that end, I offer here a few words in which I believe we can find encapsulated the 
uncanny oscillations of Bataille’s non-philosophical mode as well as its constraint to 
Hegel: “These judgements should lead to silence yet I am writing. This is in no way 
paradoxical.”92 It is this attitude that I wish to apply to Freudian metapsychology, wherein 
death remains largely unspeakable.  
 
DEATH AND DIALECTICS  
In his 1950 paper “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,”93 Bataille expresses admiration of Hegel’s 
audacity in trying to subsume death and his lucidity in recognizing the threat that death 
posed to any philosophical system. Here he includes a passage from the preface to the 
Phenomenology wherein Hegel writes:  
Death – if we wish so to name that unreality – is the most terrible thing 
there is and to uphold the work of death is the task which demands the 
greatest strength… Now, the life of Spirit is not that life which is frightened 
of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death 
and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute 
dismemberment.  
Up to this point, we can notice a profound resonance with Bataille’s thinking, but Hegel 
continues, 
It is not that (prodigious) power by being the Positive that turns away from 
 
92 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 68.  
93 An English version was not published until 1990, when it appeared in Yale French Studies, No. 78, 
translated by Jonathan Strauss. The version of “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” I refer to can be found in the 
Bataille Reader, (Ed. Botting and Wilson), pp. 9-28.  
 
 129 
the Negative, as when we say of something: this is nothing or (this is) false 
and, having (thus) disposed of it, pass from there to something else; no, 
Spirit is that power only to the degree in which it contemplates the Negative 
face to face (and) dwells with it.94 
For Hegel then, it would appear that death can be transposed onto being as a 
consciousness of negativity: the work of death can be upheld and looked in the face. And 
on this foundation of nothingness rests the whole of concrete reality, subjects 
differentiated from objects and each from its other. “Man works and fights,” Bataille 
writes of Hegel’s approach, “he transforms the given; he transforms nature and in 
destroying it he creates a world, a world which was not.”95 Only in this way can he arrive 
at any awareness of his condition and of the negativity which precedes and perpetuates it. 
In this discourse, considered also by Derrida in his essay on Bataille, negativity exists as 
the “underside and accomplice of positivity. [It] cannot be spoken of, nor has it ever been 
except in this fabric of meaning.”96 This, by Bataille’s understanding, recuperates 
negativity, makes it useful.  
 Furthermore, this “dwelling with death” presents a theoretical problem when 
coupled with the desire to be recognized that initiates the master/slave episode so 
prominent in Kojève’s reading. Relying again on Kojève’s interpretation, Bataille quotes: 
“It is only in being or becoming aware of one’s mortality or finitude, in existing and in 
feeling one’s existence in a universe without a beyond or without a God, that Man can 
affirm his liberty, his historicity and his individuality – ‘unique in all the world’ – and 
 
94 Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” in The Bataille Reader, p. 283.  
95 ibid, p. 280.  
96 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 258.  
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have them be recognized.”97 But, as Bataille identifies, this desire for recognition is not 
easily reconciled with Hegel’s notion of “absolute dismemberment.”   
 To some extent, the same is true of psychoanalysis. Freud, for instance, writes the 
following of the impossibility of thinking death:  
The theoretic significance of the instincts of self-preservation, power and 
self-assertion, shrinks to nothing, seen under this light; they are part-
instincts designed to secure the path to death peculiar to the organism and 
to ward off possibilities of return to the inorganic other than the immanent 
ones, but the enigmatic struggle of the organism to maintain itself in spite 
of all the world, a struggle that cannot be brought into connection with 
anything else, disappears.98  
We can discern here what Norman O. Brown is referring to when he describes the 
psychoanalytic attitude towards death as one of mourning. In Life Against Death, 
published around the time of Bataille’s Erotism, Brown attempts to reframe the function 
of death in instinctual life. The death drive, he argues, is abandoned because of the opacity 
and pessimism it introduces and likewise because its only therapeutic application is as 
obstacle to the analytic cure, as Freud himself suggests in 1937 with “Analysis Terminable 
and Interminable.”99  
 As considered in Chapter 1, Freud’s formulation of the instincts reflects a dualism: 
a conflict between the drive(s) to preserve life and the drive to reduce life to the inorganic 
state out of which it arose. Death here appears as both “less than” life and its final goal, 
an absence out of which life emerged and to which it invariably returns. But this reading 
 
97 Kojève quoted in Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” The Bataille Reader, p. 289. The original text, 
as well as most of Bataille’s references in this essay, are found in Appendix II, “The idea of Death in the 
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Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.  
98 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 39; my italics.   
99 Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History, (Hanover: Welseyan 
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turns the death drive into a mode of resignation to negativity. The outright dismissal of 
the death drive on the basis of this theoretical pessimism, however, leaves us with 
instinctual monism. Neither allows us to consider how the prerogative of the death drive 
sustains the ambivalence which characterizes psychic life. “We need,” as Brown writes, 
“instead of an instinctual dualism, an instinctual dialectic.”100  
 Much like Bataille, he distinguishes the neurotic or conflictual human condition 
from the harmony of animality: “a strife of opposites is produced by the separating of 
opposites out of a primal state of undifferentiated unity.”101 Brown too calls upon Hegel 
in this context, identifying “an intrinsic connection between death and the essence of true 
life, individuality:”102 the “ontological uniqueness” claimed by the individual is a function 
of a mortal body rather than an immortal essence, as the latter would render the 
“individual” none other than a mode in an infinite and eternal substance. Death then is 
that which confers individuality; an organism “has uniqueness and individuality because 
it lives its own life and no other – that is to say, because it dies.”103 According to Brown, 
Freud’s drive theory suggests something similar. “The aim of all life is death,” Freud is 
“compelled to say,”104  but the life drives, always under the pressure of this first and final 
instinct, function to “assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death.”105 
 However, a model which emphasizes dualistic opposition, as Brown argues, is 
unable to conceptualize death as a pre-ambivalent fullness, only as a vacuity which life or 
Eros works to conceal through the processes of separation and binding and which death 
restores through diminution. Brown however suggests modifying Freud’s ontology in a 
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way that accommodates the notion of dialectical unity. With this interpretation, Brown 
challenges the notion of the death drive as an innate aggressiveness inclined toward and 
in service of indifferent destruction, and in its place offers a view of the death drive that 
we might conceptualize as “extroverted,” aimed at restoring an obscured continuity rather 
than a disguised negativity. And yet, to organize concepts of identity, truth, history, 
meaning, etc. around negativity, reveal negativity as a philosophical determinant, but one 
that is always made intelligible through work which subsequently gives it meaning 
through labor. As Brown also indicates, death by such readings is something lost by the 
individual, something to be either repressed or recuperated rather than attained or 
affirmed. But if negativity is always re-appropriated in a dialectic, how radical can it be?  
 Bataille’s ipse signals that he too operates around a negative nucleus. However, he 
does not aim to signify the vacant center but to (1) elevate it as the basis of insufficiency 
which is, incidentally, the condition for continuity and (2) simultaneously call attention 
to the nonproductive expenditure that leaves no “underside,” challenging the dialectic 
between positivism and the negativity that makes it possible by introducing a third term 
– excess. This is a threat to the system that does not appear in the form of an inverse, that 
does treat negativity as resource on which to sediment layers of meaning.  
 Unlike André Green’s negative, which “works,” Bataille’s expenditure without 
reserve is the very surpassing of any reciprocal other and thus cannot be circumscribed in 
either positive or negative terms. In this reading, death is not a straightforward reduction 
of tension, but a situation of release through expenditure: an emptying out of the tensions 
held together by the necessary fiction of the “I” and by the processes of Eros that maintain 
its individuality through separation. Paired with Bataille’s notion of insufficiency, which 
identifies each “whole” as less-than or lacerated (i.e. always-already organized around an 
absent center), this expenditure signals an opening, namely to the community/continuity 
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that lies beyond the separation(s) maintaining the “I” as a discreet entity. This is not the 
expanding vacuity of Green’s negative narcissism, but a dissolution or scattering of self 
which takes place precisely through a narcissistic wound. As Bataille articulates:    
 
It seems to me that the totality of what is swallows me, and if it swallows 
me, or since it swallows me, I can’t distinguish myself from it; nothing 
remains, except this or that, which are less meaningful than this nothing. In 
a sense it is unbearable and I seem to be dying. It is at this cost, no doubt, 
that I am no longer myself but an infinity in which I am lost…106  
What I am proposing here is an application of this perspective to psychoanalysis, the 
theoretical significance of which would be twofold. First, in relation to the economy of the 
drives, we might consider the death drive as the instinctual component that surpasses its 
other and, as such, aims for a situation without discursive points of reference. And 
secondly, it might be that Freud, in spite of his pessimism or skepticism, does in fact 
provide a means of conceptualizing this engulfing totality when he outlines the ‘oceanic’ 
feeling. This would challenge the prevailing preconception of the idea of the death drive 
as an aggressive force, suggesting that perhaps it aims instead for the fusion or continuity 
beyond the individual restlessness of the pleasure principle, yet still in constant motion.  
 Eros then reflects what Bataille describes as “the monstrous energy of thought” that 
maintains the “pure abstract ‘I’” and upholds the separations that create its world. Here I 
believe that Brown expresses quite clearly the affinities that we begin to see between 
Hegel, Freud, and Bataille:  
The history of mankind consists in a departure from the condition of 
undifferentiated primal unity with himself and with nature, an intermediate 
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period in which man’s powers are developed through differentiation and 
antagonism (alienation) with himself and with nature, and a final return to 
the unity on a higher level or harmony. But these categories – primal unity, 
differentiation through antagonism, final harmony – remain in the 
romantics arbitrary and mystical because they lack a foundation in 
psychology.107  
Perhaps, as Bataille’s texts seem to suggest, this “mysticism” is the only way to approach 
these concept at all. In adopting this highly-controversial approach, Bataille rejects and 
opposes both Freud’s dualism and the recuperation of negativity as feature of the “classic 
dialectic,” both of which I would argue account for difficulties within the psychoanalytic 
formulation of the drive theory. However, if we shift from a restricted to a general 
economy, if we apply here the trembling to which Bataille submits Hegel’s concepts we 
might, I believe, perceive the drive economy “differently” without altering any of its 
formal elements.  
 With the theory of the general economy, Bataille does not outline an efficient system 
but rather one that relies on extreme (non-productive) expenditure, excess to the point of 
destruction, which incidentally is the highest expression of the life principle – an 
emptying out of the tensions contained in the fiction of the self-possessed, self-sufficient 
individual.  Then perhaps if there is indeed a dialectic between primary narcissism and 
the death drive, it is unstable, prone to violence or excess which cannot be accounted for 
by system as a whole. 
 Bataille “defines” excess as follows: “[e]xcess transcends its foundations and by very 
definition sets being beyond the limits of definition. Being no doubt also exists within 
limits and they allow us to be articulate.”108 Excess then is the remainder of the relation 
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of the subject to his limits, signaling what overflows of being as he operates within and 
beyond them. By replacing the fixed limit with this situation of oscillation, we might 
maintain not only the subject, but also the experience that subjectivity cannot contain. 
For Bataille, whether one lives or dies, an immediate knowledge of death is unthinkable. 
With the notion of sovereign operation, however, Bataille attempts to draw this 
impossibility back into the economies which exclude it, even if this can only be 
accomplished as failure. As Derrida describes, “[n]ow the sovereign operation, the point 
of of nonreserve, is neither positive nor negative. It cannot be inscribed in discourse, 
except by crossing out predicates or by practicing a contradictory superimpression that 
then exceeds the logic of philosophy.”109 
 We are indeed faced with two groups of processes continuously unfolding in 
“contrary directions” – assimilation and dissolution, life and death – but the relationship 
between them would appear to be one of violent alternation rather than opposition. This 
approach, I believe, allows us to conceptualize the system precisely by destabilizing it, by 
setting in motion as interdependent principles what is theoretically inaccessible when 
posited as a fixed state. By focusing on the mutual processes of accumulation and 
dispersal rather than the pure-loss, this economy110 of reciprocity without recuperation 
leaves room for a provisional subject – the not-quite One who is caught between insisting 
and resisting to be. This albeit partial preservation of the subject allows us to reconsider 
the role of death in the psyche, to consider it as the subject’s relation to his own 
precariousness: as “the totality in which we lose ourselves insofar as we take ourselves for 
a strictly separate entity (for the pure abstraction that the isolated individual is, or thinks 
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he is).”111  
 But how can we think of an aim that is not one, that is its very own disintegration? 
Following Bataille, the (non-)response is to be found in the eruption of the heterogenous 
or excessive, which threatens the oppositions that sustain life as a situation of separation 
and as such evoke in the individual an experience of death as the loss of a discrete or 
“stable” self. By this reading, the death drive would not signal a destructive instinct, as it 
is so often understood and portrayed, but a destabilizing instinct. The question then 
would be: in service of what?  
 
LIBIDINAL MATERIALISM 
In Hegel and Psychoanalysis, Molly Macdonald presents an alternative reading of Hegel 
that challenges the predominant interpretations of Absolute Knowledge. Framing the 
reading through the perspective of the Third (Dritte), Macdonald puts forth a bird’s-eye 
view of the dialectic – the constant mechanical shifting between two observed from a 
position of exteriority as the organic movements of a larger whole. By introducing this 
witness, she bypasses the overemphasis on the individual trajectories of either lord or 
bondsman. Rather, she foregrounds the mo(ve)ment in which two terms, mutilated 
beyond the possibility of recognition (that is, distinguishment) give way to a dynamic 
interplay between unbound forces – a reciprocal interaction that we might refer to as 
“intersubjectivity” were it not for its lack of any identifiable subjects.  
 This interpretation is made possible by the emphasis on Force – on the energetics 
or economics of the system in its totality instead of the integrity of its individual 
components. In that sense, Macdonald reads into Hegel the play of forces more commonly 
attributed to Nietzsche. However, she introduces a stipulation that deconstructs 
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dialectical opposition: Force as Universal Medium. Force, as Macdonald explains, is a 
unique concept within the Phenomenology: “in order for it to ‘be, it must be completely 
set free from thought,’ it must be allowed to exist and function without meddling from 
any process other than its own.”112 That is, Force cannot be ideated or iterated: it 
manifests as its own existence, bound or unbound, and corresponds to the multiplicity, 
potentiality, and changeability of form rather than any given form as such. By reading the 
movements of the dialectic through the differentiations of Force, Macdonald puts forth a 
model capable of considering the negation of the subject on the principle that doing so 
does not lead us into the field of abstract negativity. Undergirded by non-differentiation, 
such a model signals the radical otherness most foreign to individual thought. However, 
in this interpretation, the absence of the individual does not assert itself as a mourning. 
Instead it gives way to a reuptake in the form of an experience of oneness with the whole.  
 “Force,” Macdonald writes, “is the movement of ‘matters,’ of moments, of objects 
that causes them to leave their individuality behind, becoming one with other(s), only to 
break this unity back up into its particularity and then start the whole process again.”113 
Thus, Force functions as a transitional material between particularity and unconditional 
unity: no force is inherently different to its “other” but an opposition is produced so that 
one might arrive at the realization of the absolute-as-impossible through consciousness 
(i.e. self-consciousness), which is always an awareness of difference.    
 The juxtaposition of this energetic model with Freudian metapsychology allows for 
an otherwise interpersonal dynamic to be transposed onto the intrapsychic level. In this 
way, the monadic (though internally divided) ego can be substituted for the movement of 
self-consciousness as a process of binding-unbinding-rebinding. As in the psychoanalytic 
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schema, the subject is at once bound to itself, to its own process of consciousness, and to 
the external world. But the emphasis on a general energetic economy privileges the 
porousness of these implications rather than the subjective self-perception they sustain. 
In foregrounding externalization as a necessary movement of thought, this interpretation 
addresses the impossibility of theoretically isolating death or narcissism. However, by 
taking a primordial condition of non-differentiation as the “starting point” Macdonald 
supplants the fight for recognition as the hinge of the Hegelian dialectic. Focusing instead 
on an episode through which the whole is restored to itself by the mutual permeations of 
its particulars, this hermeneutic allows us to think two “impossible” variables – loss of the 
subject and totality – as functions of their reciprocal dependency. Sacrifice, in other 
words, is also the means of fusion, and this equivalency fills an otherwise conceptual void 
by re-imagining it as a situation of superfluidity: what would otherwise appear as abstract 
negativity is formulated as an energetic flux that is mobile, mutable, and total.  
 It is my impression that the variegated lines of reasoning of this chapter converge 
here and might be summarized as follows: death operates as the “vanishing mediator” 
that never quite vanishes, the elusive third term of a psychic economy of binding and 
unbinding forces, driven by the latter but only able to posit itself through recourse to the 
former. Death, by this reading, would be that which insists and through that insistence 
(i.e. the impossibility of its re-uptake by the system) maintains the system in motion, the 
first struggle reproduced again and again, always equal to itself and yet never quite the 
same. As the aim of a drive then, it would correspond neither to a “return to zero” nor to 
“the end of history” – both of which reflect terminal conditions – but rather to an 
affirmation of the grounding non-differentiation out of which forms proliferate and into 
which they dissolve so that the process might begin again. Repetition and remainder.  
 To square this in Bataillian terms we would say that the insufficiency of the self 
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signals more than a constitutive lack: it is also that which ensures contact with the other, 
not only through the intersubjective dynamics of reversal, introjection, and identification, 
but also as a form of porous communication. That is, the narcissistic wound as a cause of 
mourning, anxiety, or anguish is also the means for an ecstatic transmission unrestricted 
by the formalism of subjectivity, what Bersani describes as “an intransitive pleasure 
intrinsic to […] a self-subtracted being.”114 Indeed, as both Bataille and Bersani suggest, 
such a transmission occurs precisely through the fissure in subjectivity that otherwise 
propels desire and relationality, however it exceeds both of those functions as 
determinants of difference.115 And yet, I reiterate, concentrating on non-determination as 
that which constitutes identity as its own non-existence leads us down a theoretical dead 
end. After all, how to produce evidence of a negative proposition? Macdonald’s 
interpretation, however, puts into Hegelian terms one of the fundamental precepts of 
Bataille’s work: the communication or fusion of difference made possible by the openness 
of non-determination, a situation that cannot be described in terms of the appropriation 
of the other nor the expropriation of the self because what is foregrounded instead is a 
total situation of mutual and mutable permeability. This hermeneutic reconciles the 
“anti-philosophical” Bataille with the “impenetrable” Hegel because it supposes a totality 
that is profoundly heterogeneous: instead of taking difference as the valued term in 
opposition with sameness or homogeneity, such a model takes the two to be complements 
 
114 Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? And other essays, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 
48.  
115 Or, as Bersani continues: “There is no other explanation for that pleasure. It doesn’t satisfy conscious 
or unconscious desires; instead, it testifies to the seductiveness of the ceaseless movement toward and 
away from things without which there would be no particular desire for any thing, a seductiveness that is 
the ontological ground for the desireability of all things” (ibid, p. 48). Here, Bersani is specifically 
describing the pleasure of queer sociability as a relational mode operating with a “partially dismantled 
subject.” While his object of inquiry differs from that of this investigation, the exploration of self-
renunciation as a means to alternative ways or relating – or “knowing” – resonates with the present aim. 
The affinity with Bersani’s work will be discussed more thoroughly in relation to masochism in the 
following chapter.  
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and complices that can be synthesized by establishing the primacy of contact and its 
porousness. Thus, we displace (and abstract) the site of mutual constitution, privileging 
not the subjective “self-object” in relation to its other(s) but rather, the irrepressible 
energetic flow between non-differentiation and the differentiated forms that emerge out 
of that pre-existing situation and make it, at least to some degree, conceivable.    
 Borrowing from accelerationist Nick Land, we might describe this approach as 
libidinal materialism. With features of Lyotard’s libidinal economy (1974) and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s complexity theory (1988), Land’s theoretical approach is not the first 0f its 
kind. It is, however, the only such interpretation couched in Bataillian rhetoric, and for 
that reason is of particular interest here.  
 All three perspectives share an emphasis on the productivity of differentiating force 
in relation to the secondary position from which non-differentiation might then be 
considered. This idea emerges in Deleuze’s writing as early as 1962, with Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, and is carried through in collaboration with Guattari in both Anti-Oedipus 
(1972) and A Thousand Plateaus, where it culminates in an exploration of the thresholds 
at which matter achieves self-organization. Free of transcendent agents, this model of 
identity-producing difference refuses any effort at totalization through a decentralization 
of dialectical contradiction. “Pluralism,” Deleuze writes, “sometimes appears to be 
dialectical – but is its most ferocious enemy, its only profound enemy,”116 and with the 
rhizomes and assemblages of complexity theory, he and Guattari endeavor to 
deterritorialize opposition. However, in light of the theoretical frameworks outlined in 
this chapter, such a model leaves us wondering: without friction, how do we account for 
movement?  
 
116 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p. 
8. 
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 We find a comparable difficulty in attempting to transpose Lyotard’s libidinal 
economy. Though Lyotard’s elevation of the energetic component of the unconscious is 
much in line with general economic view of the drives being elaborated here, his framing 
of representation as a local effect of libidinal intensities does not quite allow us to account 
for the importance of representation in Freudian and Lacanian theories of ego/subject-
formation. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard employs the concept of libido at its most 
diffuse in order to replace ego- and anthropocentric considerations with a more 
ecological/energetic interpretation. It is my impression, however, that such models 
cannot quite accommodate psychoanalytic speculation, at least not without an element of 
disingenuousness, and this is what sets Land’s libidinal materialism apart.   
 Following Bataille, Land takes into consideration what is at stake when privileging 
the decentralized and deregulated flow of energy between matters, namely subjectivity 
itself. In other words, this thinking can only be experienced as a crisis for/of the thinking 
subject. Such a reading re-inscribes the subjectivity as the sacrifice that such a perspective 
implies and demands. Thus, the “self” is somewhat retained, if only as its disintegration 
and loss, and this allows for the possibility of recourse to psychoanalytic thinking, if only 
through a consideration of its limitations. In his elaboration of libidinal materialism, 
Land identifies this mode of interrogation as one that is thematically psychoanalytical but 
morbidly and perhaps even “irresponsibly” so in its “enthusias[m] for the accentuation of 
intensity that will carry it through insurrection into anegoic delirium.”117 Like Deleuze and 
Lyotard, he speaks to a compulsion to abstract civilization and subjectivity into tides of 
impersonal energy, a model that operates largely according to thermodynamic principles 
however, as Land explains, it has no predicates: “in contrast to the energy of physical 
 
117 Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. xx.  
 142 
thermodynamics, libidinal energy is chaotic, or pre-ontological.”118 In this view, chaos is 
the irrepressible flux of compositions and being (or rather becoming) is its effect. This, 
Land argues, is against Lacan’s foregrounding of lack, as well as the Platonic or Christian 
positing of an end to desire. Actually, he describes that this view is closest to Freud’s 
“dissipative energetic flows,” a return to Freud that is especially relevant here given that 
it is discussed in the context of Bataille’s peculiar nihilism.  
 Libidinal materialism, it would appear, accounts for the associative link between 
Freud and Bataille. But Land is wary in this regard. In a way that both echoes Bataille’s 
view of his own work as “failure” and encapsulates the implicit or inhibited complexity 
beyond the level of signifiers in the Freudian texts, he writes:    
No one could ever ‘be’ a libidinal materialist. This is a ‘doctrine’ that can 
only be suffered as an abomination, a jangling of the nerves, a combustion 
of articulate reason, and a nauseating rage of thought. It is a hyperlepsy of 
the central nervous-system, ruining the body's adaptive regimes, and 
consuming its reserves in rhythmic convulsions that are not only futile, but 
devastating.119  
How, then, do the two attempt to accommodate this “abomination” of thought?  
 
LIKE WATER IN WATER  
To conclude this chapter, I propose that we consider the metonymical use of water as 
means of conceptualizing this state of constant, churning flux. Both Bataille and Freud 
employ aquatic metaphors in order to imagine the exuberance of such a state.120 These 
 
118 ibid, p. 43.  
119 ibid, p. xiii.  
120 As do Wilfred Bion (1970) and Sandor Ferenczi (1924). Bion describes the movement from knowledge 
(“K”) to the ineffable (“O”) as an experience of “psychological turbulence” and an “act of faith.” As 
examples of turbulence as a characteristic of “O” he offers the mystic writings of Saint John of Cross – 
specifically the metaphor of the “dark night of the soul” – and the depictions of unsettled water in 
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elaborations present libidinal materialism at its most material, and the theoretical 
implications are twofold. The first and perhaps more evident is a reduction of the 
nebulousness of this interrogative mode in a manner that nevertheless resists structural 
formalism. The second implication, as I see it, is more contextually specific: the 
juxtaposition of Bataille’s fluid descriptions of continuity and inner experience with the 
Freudian ‘oceanic,’ allows us to consider religious contemplation as an expression of the 
death drive – a possibility that seems to be implicit in Freud’s later writings but remains 
largely undeveloped.  
 “The separate being,” Georges Bataille writes, “is precisely a thing in that it is 
separated from itself: it is the thing and the separation...”121 Psychoanalytically-speaking, 
this “separate being” would correspond to the ego, which in so far as we come to 
understand it, corresponds to feelings of certainty and autonomy, of being “marked off 
distinctly from everything else.”122 But this, as Freud plainly states, is deceptive. “The 
feeling of our own ego is subject to disturbances,” he writes in Civilization and its 
Discontents, “and the boundaries of the ego are not constant.”123 The ego, in other words, 
is not a distinct entity, but the projection or perception of unity where it is uncertain, 
unstable, unr/Real – “the shrunken residue of a more inclusive – indeed, an all-
embracing – feeling.”124 This primary, “all-embracing” ego-feeling – which Freud 
associates with a feeling of limitlessness or oneness with the universe, wherein something 
like an ego is perhaps not discernable at all – Freud describes as oceanic, borrowing the 
 
Leonardo da Vinci’s sketches. See, for instance, Attention and Interpretation, (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1983), pp. 106-113. Ferenczi, on the other hand, considers the importance of the “aquatic” in 
Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality, (Trans. Henry Alden Bunker, London: Karnac, 1989), wherein he 
develops the view that life strives to return to womb and water as embryonic environments.  
121 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 75.  
122 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, SE XXI, p. 66.  
123 ibid.  
124 ibid, p. 68.  
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term from a letter written to him by French poet and mystic Romain Rolland in response 
to The Future of an Illusion. Therein Rolland accepts Freud’s critique of religion and the 
juvenile nature of prevailing forms of belief but clarifies that Freud’s analysis neglects the 
“the true source of religious sentiments” which he would like to call a sensation of 
‘eternity,’ an experience of the limitless and unbounded – une sentiment oceanique.  
Freud is willing to acknowledge that this ‘oceanic’ feeling exists but finds 
uncompelling the claim that it might be regarded as the source of religious need, insisting, 
as per his argument in The Future of Illusion, that the motives for religious tendencies lie 
instead in infantile helplessness, the desire for submission to a superior power, and the 
narcissistic wish of an ego to endure beyond death. “I cannot discover this ‘oceanic’ feeling 
in myself,”125 Freud confesses, nor does he feel able to “work with such intangible 
quantities.”126 Classing the ‘oceanic’ as a sensation which defies scientific 
characterization, Freud concedes that “nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational 
content most readily associated with the feeling.”127 And it is here that I wish to introduce 
a caveat, namely that the ‘oceanic’ suggests to us the altogether absence, perhaps even the 
irrelevance, of ideational content as such. In fact, I would argue, this “feeling of an 
indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole”128 seems to suggest 
the very emptying out of the centrifugal circularity of language and subjectivity as the 
mutually constituted contrivances that provide the “I” its pseudo-stability on the 
condition of difference and separation.  
Freud does not conceive of this outpouring of self, perceiving in its place an 
affirmation of inferiority and the consolation it offers to feeble or tenuous ego. By 
 
125 ibid, p. 65.  
126 ibid, p. 72. 
127 ibid. p. 65.  
128 ibid.   
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Rolland’s approximation, however, the ‘oceanic’ is quite contrary to the desire for eternal 
self-preservation: it is a situation of intense contact and free vital upsurge, a state of 
constant flux opposed the immortalization of the “I” and, as such, a limit of reason rather 
than its opposition.129  
Freud, following Rolland, associates the ‘oceanic’ with religious sentiment, but I 
suspect it also shares profound affinities with Freud’s most speculative concept. Still, 
despite the fact that he postulates the aim of the death drive as a restoration of a 
primordial situation of non-existence, Freud draws out no relation with the ‘oceanic’ 
feeling. We might, following Ana-Maria Rizzuto, attribute this to his skepticism on the 
matter,130 or it to the fact that he associates the ‘oceanic’ with psychic content of some sort 
whereas death, he maintains, has no place in the unconscious. Still, the unboundedness 
of the ‘oceanic’ – wherein the individual is no longer discernable as such – also seems to 
connote a collapse or dispersion of the ego and its objects. However, in the place of the 
“zero” associated with the death drive, it describes a situation of pre-ambivalent fullness 
– of oneness.  
In a sense, it is here, in the absence or dissolution of its object and mode of inquiry, 
that the enterprise of Freudian psychoanalysis, perhaps even of philosophy more 
generally, begins to disintegrate. But, as I have attempted to substantiate in this chapter, 
such a disintegration is not a mark of theoretical failure, but a position in and of itself. 
That is to say the irrepresentability of death need not present a fixed limit. Rather, we 
might take this irrepresentability as death’s characteristic feature – a situation of 
impossible closure accessible only as the forfeiting of language and subjectivity, that is to 
say the forfeiting of individuality as a function of difference.  
 
129 Henri and Madeline Vermorel, Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland correspondence (1923-1936), 
(Paris: PUF, 1993).  
130 Ana-Maria Rizzuto, Why Did Freud Reject God? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).  
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According to Derrida, for instance, the only of means of expressing the death drive, 
both in psychic life and in textual performance, is through the postponement of any 
conclusion because the loss of a subject always constituted in and by language can only 
be articulated as the impossibility of articulation. But what if we move away from an ego- 
or anthropocentric model? Surely the loss (or sacrifice) of self as point of reference or 
primary mode of interface does not come at the expense of the so-called “external” world. 
And in the notion of the ‘oceanic,’ I believe, we begin to discern a post-human current in 
Freudian psychoanalysis, an attempt to think through or at the very least in the absence 
or anonymization of the subject.   
Here, egocentricity is neither supplanted nor replaced. Rather it gives way to a 
model without any discernable center at all, one which – like Macdonald’s interpretation 
of Hegel – emphasizes economic or ecological flux in its entirety rather than the integrity 
of individual components: a turbulent, constantly churning dynamic that can be 
transposed onto the intrapsychic level on the principle that the very categories of “inside” 
and “outside” cease to be viable determinants. The result is not a play of actors but a play 
of forces, not an opposition but a situation of dependency that is also a mutilation of each 
of the individual terms – an aquatic mode of thinking wherein even a discernable wave is 
not separable from any other nor from the entire agitation of the water which together 
they sustain.  
Bataille’s writing teems with such marine metonymy. “The animal is in the world 
like water in water,”131 he writes, defining animality as the absence of individuality that 
reduces being to a thing. Animality then corresponds to a situation of immanence and 
intimacy, an experience of the world entirely different from the one mediated by 
subjectivity and in which the subject ordinarily lives – different precisely because it is 
 
131 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 19.  
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experienced as entirety. This, in other words, is difference beyond difference, a situation 
of radical otherness that subverts any form of completion or closure and instead affirms 
exposure and openness as that which ensures contact through permeability. In other 
words, the situation described here is not one of intersubjectivity as a mode of interaction 
mediated by self as opposed to other/ness. Rather, it is one of intrusions and introjection, 
of mutual contingency and necessary insufficiency.  
But the individual, in so far as he arrives at this through contemplation or 
consciousness, adheres to his own presence as such. According to a formula borrowed 
from Saint John of the Cross and referred to repeatedly by Bataille, the subject veut etre 
tout – “wants to be all” – but even this desire is sustained by the discontinuous need to 
survive in an integral form.132 Bataille stays with this paradox, and the impossibility of 
this sustained engagement erupts in the convulsiveness of his writing. For instance:  
In picturing the universe without man, a universe in which only the animal’s 
gaze would be open to things, the animal being neither a thing nor a man, 
we can only call up a vision in which we see nothing, since the object of this 
vision is a movement that glides from things that have no meaning by 
themselves to the world full of meaning implied by man giving each thing 
his own.133 
It is consciousness then that distances us from that unknowable or unfathomable truth 
that appears only as its own slipping away – and ours.  
The totality then, might be expressed as that which “is truly alien to ordinary 
reflection in that it includes at the same time objective reality and the subject who 
 
132 Joseph Libertson, “Bataille and Communication” in Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995), pp. 209-230; p. 215. See 
also Liberston’s 1990 essay “The Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille,” in Yale French Studies, 78, pp. 
124-39.  
133 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 21 
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perceives objective reality.”134 Just as the emphasis on Force-as-Universal Medium 
supplants the individual trajectories of the lord and bondsman, here too we see a 
foregrounding of the relation of form to itself made “possible” through the positing of an 
energetic flux that is true to its existence in either form or formlessness and, as such, 
presents a contestation to essence. By this understanding, opposition is produced so that 
one might arrive at the realization of the whole or Absolute through the experience of the 
particular. And yet, so long as one arrives at the whole through (self-)consciousness, it is 
always-already as a result of the initial experience or perception of difference. The result 
is as glaring as it is inescapable: the subject as such cannot access or accede to the totality 
of the whole.  
Death, in turn, insofar as it manifests in psychic life ‘oceanically,’ would suggest 
the demise of individual principle rather than of being in itself. It would represent 
therefore a Third: not a term in binary opposition with life, but the entirety of a precarious 
system which cannot be grasped from either position, only as the contamination or 
collapse of the categorical integrity of the two – a “vanishing” mediator. Or, as Freud 
writes, it is “something that was originally there” and that persists “alongside of what later 
derived from it.”135 In other words, death (as the trace of situation of non-differentiation) 
has neither evolved nor disappeared, simply given itself to alternate mode that allows for 
it to be experienced precisely as that alternative mode’s excess – as that which cannot be 
enunciated but exists as the wordlessness that it engenders as its condition. If we adopt 
this approach, death is not opposed to the exuberance of life: it is opposed to ontological 
totalization, corresponding instead to an absence of alterity, an all which leaves nothing 
outside. This abolition of exteriority is what Bataille describes as continuity – a mode of 
 
134 Bataille, “The Object of Desire and the Totality of the Real” in The Bataille Reader, p. 268.  
135 Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE XVIII, p. 68.  
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being without the limits or enclosures of particularity, and whose so-called “ideational 
content” bears a striking similarity to the Freudian ‘oceanic.’  
 The specificity of Bataille’s dialectic however is the sacrifice of synthesis in favor of 
tense contamination in which two modes – individual and all – invade and compromise 
one another while paradoxically retaining the integrity of their difference. Violent 
alternations roll over one another like the tides as he posits a discontinuous being that, 
above all else, desires to escape its limits but is constrained to rely on them as a point of 
reference; a subject who attempts to exceed a prohibition but whose transgression cannot 
be other than a maintenance of the prohibition; an intersubjectivity that must abolish 
alterity but which cannot function as other than a mutual impenetrability.136 Each relation 
is more than what the opposition of its independent terms can contain. A duality will not 
hold. Instead, an endless rising and falling wherein the only recurring theme is the 
absence of any fixed or certain boundaries.  
 Throughout his oeuvre – though most notably in the Summa Atheologica – Bataille 
develops this heterology in terms of waves upon waves. From reproducing cells and erotic 
couplings to sacrificial rituals, Bataille describes situations in which the participating 
elements are indistinguishable without being the same, not just mutually constituted but 
together comprised of and comprising the whole. This thalassic thinking does not allow 
for any sort of identification, but nor does it signify a self-evident field of unity. The result 
is a mode of contact that is uncontainable, a persistence of the finite but without limit: 
“no more separate than are two waves, but their unity is undefined, as precarious as that 
of the agitation of the waters.”137  
 Sabina Spielrein poetically expresses this littoral phenomenon in “Destruction as 
 
136 Liberston, “Bataille and Communication” in Boldt-Irons, Ed. (1995), pp.212-3.  
137 Bataille, Inner Experience, pp. 95-96.  
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the Cause of Coming into Being.” Encapsulating the conceptual unfettering opened up by 
the disappearance of the self, she writes: “each differentiated image will be dissolved, i.e. 
it will be transformed into an undifferentiated state.”138 Indeed, she too turns to fluid 
metaphors and myths to convey this indeterminacy, reminding us that it is impossible to 
say whether the water in the mouth and gills of the fish belongs to fish or to the sea. In 
aquatic thinking, it seems, we can discern – however “impossibly” or tenuously – a fluid 
heterology that beats back against the currents of homogenization and totalizing 
ontologies. For Bataille, this play between isolation and dissolution is communication at 
its most open and it is also the very substance of existence: the constant overstepping of 
one’s own bounds in the hopes of reaching the other, of reaching otherness itself.139  
 The sense of the totality then demands an extreme intensity of the most ambiguous 
sensations, which reveal to us nothing clear or distinct but effect a reversal which 
“restor[es] things to the immanence from whence they come, to the vague sphere lost 
intimacy.”140 This intimacy, however, is incompatible with the positing of separate 
individuals and thus is not without the trace of death. It marks “the totality in which we 
lose ourselves insofar as we take ourselves for a strictly separate entity (for the pure 
abstraction that the isolated individual is, or thinks he is).”141 These categories – primal 
unity, final harmony, intimacy, totality – remain, in a sense, mystical because they evade 
formalized/formalizable thought. But the mystical, in so far as it concerns the experience 
of a totality which lays bare the precariousness of the subject, perhaps can only be 
 
138 Sabina Spielrein, “Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being” in Journal of Analytical 
Psychology, 1994, 39: pp. 155-186; p. 158.  
139 Or, as Hegel writes in the preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit: fruit and blossom are mutually 
incompatible, “[y]et, at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in 
which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual 
necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole,” p. 2.  
140 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 50.  
141 Bataille, “The Object of Desire and the Totality of the Real” in The Bataille Reader, p. 267.  
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articulated in a vocabulary that is energetic or ecological, one which allows us to think, 
however deceptively, beyond the subject as center of the visible world. The enigma of the 
‘oceanic’ feeling then, is perhaps not enigmatic at all, but rather a very precise description 
of a most imprecise feeling. 
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4. 
DESIRING DISSOLUTION/DISSOLVING DESIRE 
 
 
 
 
If I could sketch I would allegorically show pain chasing the soul out of the 
body, but at the same time I would give the impression that it's all untrue:  
mere modes of a complex whose unity lies in not having any. 
— Julio Cortázar, Rayuela1 
 
 
 
 
If metapsychology is concerned with the instability of the subject as introduced by the 
suggestion of unconscious life (or death), its “object” is one that cannot be adequately 
contained by formalized discourse(s). The previous chapters have considered Freudian 
psychoanalysis, particularly leading up to and following the publication of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, as a deeply speculative project whose theoretical knots become most 
 
1 In “Eroticism, Mysticism and Desire in Julio Cortázar’s Rayuela” (International Journal of English 
Literature and Social Sciences, Vol. 4: 1 (2019): pp. 1-5), Maria Luisa Cappelli makes the argument that 
Morelli, the fictional philosopher that Cortázar deploys to express the experimental novel’s fractious 
philosophy, is in large part based on Bataille and his work on transgression. A similar comparison is made 
by Juan Carlos Ubilluz in Sacred Eroticism: Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski in the Latin 
American Erotic Novel, (Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 2006), wherein he explores how all these 
authors – real and fictional – rely on fragmentary writing to transmit a message that is not literary but 
experiential (pp. 130-4).  
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tangled around the question of an ego that itself appears to be the product of a 
speculation. This certainly did not escape Freud, who writes in the 1914 paper “On 
Narcissism” that “…a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist”2 and reiterates in 
Civilization and its Discontents (as well as in the metapsychological papers published in 
between) that “the boundaries of the ego are not constant.”3 However, the question here 
regards neither the instability nor pseudo-stability of those boundaries but rather the 
complex relation that the always-tenuous ego has to them, a difficult dynamic of 
insistence and suspicion, of release and recoil.  
As the insistence on a self-identical origin, narcissism poses a paradox that stems 
from a crisis of the reflexive surface: all the confirmation one seeks lies external to the self 
being “affirmed” as whole and sufficient. Narcissism then signals a situation of 
woundedness that presents as the denial of that woundedness. But in so far as layers of 
meaning are sedimented on that wound, the result is an alienating process of self-
construction that uses undergirding lack or laceration as a resource while concealing the 
heterogeneity of its composition. Of course, this production of the fantasy in which other 
fantasies originate is psychic work in its most vital form, laying the foundation for one’s 
imaginary and discursive interaction with the external world. But what about something 
that we might designate as psychic play, something other to the tension-increasing 
processes of binding and construction? These processes, as I have gestured at in the 
preceding chapters, are inextricable from the denial and disavowal of an otherness which 
can neither be assimilated through identification nor inscribed symbolically. But if we 
begin to conceptualize this “otherness” as an oceanic Oneness wherein otherness itself 
dissolves, the question then is can psychoanalytic thinking tolerate the temporary 
 
2 Freud (1914), “On Narcissism,” SE XIV, p. 77.  
3 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, SE XXI, p. 66.  
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disappearance of subjects, objects, and subjects-as-objects? If so, I believe that t/here we 
find psychic life at its most effervescent where, incidentally, it coincides with death. 
Moving “forward” then, I draw into this continuously expanding and contracting 
discussion the notion of masochism, tracing its elaboration as it relates to the desire for 
violence in psychic life and, consequently, textuality. “Text” here is deployed in a 
decidedly post-structural manner, referring not only to what is pressed into signification 
but also to that which is conveyed or exposed by the instabilities and uncertainties arising 
from this process. With this approach, the decisive part of the text is precisely that which 
cannot be written and instead manifests on the level of signifiers as a disruptiveness that 
calls attention to a certain misfit between referent and semblant. We could say, in this 
sense, that ego too has a “textuality” – as does the body on which it is written or projected. 
Given the unsparing vicissitudes of signification, all “texts” are subject to unsettling, and 
in this chapter, the inclination toward such disruptions is explored under the aegis of 
masochism.  
Where primary narcissism functions by affirming an absence through its 
concealment under the (un)stable sign of the “I,” primary masochism indicates a 
countercurrent in the form of an impulse to undo, negate, or disperse the subject that is 
always-emergent under that sign. As aims both circle around an absent origin, but only 
masochism seeks to collapse the two through the seeking of its own extinguishment. And 
yet, even as the insistence on the destruction or dissolution of the perceived unity of the 
ego, fictive as it may be, masochism too signals a dialectical procedure without the 
possibility of closure or completion: it requires the very life, desire, or fantasy it seeks to 
extinguish. Thus, any effort of self-construction involves a loss of self, whereas any effort 
of self-destruction cannot help but call upon and make use of the very object it seeks to 
destroy. In other words, the wish not to be deconstructs the ego in which that very wish 
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originates and so fulfillment coincides with the impossibility of fulfillment, with 
fulfillment-as-impossibility.4  
Given that such a procedure resists closure and, therefore, straightforward 
formalization, I suggest retracing a conceptual perimeter that foregrounds this very 
impossibility as its characteristic feature. That is, the difficulty that masochism presents 
for psychoanalytic inquiry might be accounted for by the manner in which this inclination 
strives towards the subversion or erasure of the subject in whom the wish or fantasy 
originates. We find a similar difficulty, I argue, in mystical forms of religiosity that give 
way to apophatic revelations and/or a rapturous loss of self. Perhaps by drawing out the 
affinities between these traditions we can conceptually approximate the experience of 
self-contradiction which lies at their core. Such a juxtaposition also allows us to consider 
the manner in which “self-shattering” practices – be they erotic or spiritual – 
fundamentally destabilize or exceed psychical organization and thus resist containment 
in these narrow categories. Both overflow their containing structures – corporeal, 
discursive, and subjective – intimating that the motivations for such practices may not be 
as dissimilar as the divergent cultural constructions of these domains would have us 
believe.  
In this discussion, masochism is understood as the self-canceling tendency of the 
subject, an operation of which can be summarized succinctly by Freud’s dissection of the 
beating fantasy: the child being beaten is never the one producing the fantasy. That is to 
say, the fantasy or wish of self-annihilation – in so far as it involves thinking about (one’s 
own) death – is, like narcissism, paradoxical but it is also paroxysmal. We have here a 
Hegelian sense that neither self-consciousness nor dissolution can be extricated from the 
constraints imposed by the demands of subjective identity. This position, which seems to 
 
4 For Bataille, this is sovereignty.  
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pertain more to the difficulty of narcissism, challenges the positivist model of a self-
identical subject. Masochism however disrupts this model even further. Whereas the 
former suggests a structural inconsistency – the gestalted spectral image that is not 
equivalent to the fractured/fragmented self it reflects – the latter is highly mobile, not 
“the static existence of an elusive internal otherness”5 but an active tension between the 
desire and fear of self-undoing that expresses the “daemonic” force of the death drive in 
the form of violent alternations.   
However, following from the previous chapter, I would also argue that as far as 
masochism is concerned the issue is not necessarily a destruction or diminution of self. 
Certainly we see this in accounts of moral masochism and negative narcissism as more 
melancholic constructions (where a morbid pleasure is nevertheless derived), but we also 
find more ecstatic forms which suggest that the masochistic inclination is not simply 
about the erasure of a hated self or its swallowing up by an ever-expanding negativity. 
Instead, at its most primary, it seems to signal a sort of almost playful deployment of the 
death drive as repetition compulsion: the disintegration or temporary disappearance 
(fort) of a fictive unity that takes place through that fictive unity and “concludes” in the 
release of the tensions held together by it. But as an experience of dispersal or disbanding, 
the psychical state which this inclination seeks can only be conceptualized with great 
difficulty – both by theoretical approaches which cannot quite accommodate the 
“pleasurable abandonment of identity”6 and by the self-same subject who in the 
movements of disappearance and reappearance comes to occupy spaces beside oneself. 
 
5 Cynthia Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 
35-6. Referring back to the discussion of narcissism in Chapter 2, perhaps “static” seems reductive, 
however it is used here to refer to the perception of one’s one own ego under the sign of the “I” rather than 
the narcissistic modes themselves which are always leaning on or incorporating otherness into that self-
perception.  
6 John Noyes, The Mastery of Submission: Inventions of Masochism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997), p. 4.  
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The subject of masochism is further complicated by a vast and variable range of 
manifestations, both conceptually and in practice. Aside from fantasies of bodily harm or 
injury, other masochistic determinations might include objectification, humiliation, 
bondage, restraint, or total power exchange as forms of surrender or self-abandonment. 
However, the present discussion is not necessarily about masochistic practices per se, but 
rather the psychic current that such desires seem to express. Nevertheless, in all of these 
“techniques” there is an element of willful submission by which the masochist comes to 
occupy an ambivalent position in relation to control or power, suggesting that what the 
masochist seeks lies somewhere in the complex dialectic between self-abandonment and 
self-reflection on that abandonment.7 Thus, both in theory and in practice we find that 
masochism corresponds to a difficulty of positioning: where  discourse or subjective self-
fashioning seeks synthesis, masochism revels in the fragmentation, disruption, or 
interruption of identity through a super-sensuality that turns desire itself against the 
grand narrative of self-possession. In so far as these disruptions are experienced as 
‘pleasurable,’ they reflect a renunciation of the subjective demands of coherence or 
integrity in favor of a vulnerability and/or contingency in which the binding principles 
that hold the “stable” or “autonomous” self together come undone. Following John Noyes, 
we might say then that masochism, in its multifarious instantiations, “fantasizes scenes 
in which the subject is suspended delicately on the brink of death.”8  
However, as we have seen, insofar as death is concerned, the conclusion invariably 
comes in the form of its own absence or deferral: ecstatic release gives way to a return and 
the remainder, an unassimilable situation of ontological uncertainty, which maintains the 
system in motion, perpetually shifting to accommodate that which resists any form of 
 
7 Noyes, The Mastery of Submission, p. 49.  
8 ibid, p. 12.  
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stabilization or fixity. We have explored this remainder as it emerges in Bataille’s thought 
under the term excess and considered how the introduction of a principle without reserve 
or restraint both mutilates and reifies the functions of life and death in the psyche. In this 
chapter, this principle appears in its Lacanian instantiation as the pleasure beyond the 
limit of satisfaction – jouissance.  A referent which resists stabilization, jouissance speaks 
to the mutual embeddedness of eroticism and sacrifice as beyond-symbolic encounters. 
As a rupture or intervention in a language that enables subjectivity by transferring 
experience to the symbolic domain, jouissance corresponds to the pleasure of restoring 
the immanence of reality to itself but at great cost to the self, which in the loss of symbolic 
anchors has no recourse to subjectivity as a binding principle.  
In the discussion of narcissism, Lacan’s positing of three interlocking registers 
allows us to account for the gaps and displacements that make self-positioning an 
unstable enterprise. In this chapter, his foregrounding of language as that which 
constitutes and is constituted by the mobility of a subjectivity that never quite finds itself, 
provides the means of re-signifying violence or aggressiveness in textuality. At the 
intersection of the alienated ego, the circularity of discursive life, and the inaccessibility 
of the Real, lie “the paradoxical losses and gains of language acquisition.”9 Here I suggest 
a reversal through the consideration of textual disturbances and symbolic failure: what is 
“lost” and “gained” when discursive thought encounters its self-referentiality? If the 
symbolic circling around an unstable (or absent) origin creates the illusion of a perimeter, 
permitting the subject to access himself as a discursive entity, as his own other, then 
jouissance refers to the failures or excesses of these stabilizing functions that, through 
resistance to symbolization, restore the subject to himself through a collapse of 
subjectivity as intermediary. In other words, the eruption of the Real unravels discourse, 
 
9 Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, p. 52.  
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reveals the fault-lines of the subject, and exposes the always-partial nature of the ego. 
However, given that these processes always-already reflect an interplay with their own 
tenuousness, perhaps the flight from subjectivity expressed in jouissance is also a return 
to its questionable core.   
By this understanding, jouissance is integral to masochistic fantasy insofar as the 
latter corresponds to the unraveling or undoing of the conscious ego in favor of a non-
phallic “truth” in which the subject is untenable and non-viable. Moving beyond 
discourses of self-punishment, sexualized or otherwise, masochism could be interpreted 
as the “adaptive mechanism” through which the individual seeks the “shattering of […] 
psychic stability as a source of pleasure.”10 Such a reading, exemplified by Laplanche and 
Bersani, posits the ego as a response to a wish for its own dissolution and constituted 
through that wish.11 The self-cancelling structure of masochism, in turn, provides a means 
of reflecting – albeit inconclusively – on the subject’s paradoxical “origin.” But, as we have 
been discussing, psychoanalytic theory can only uneasily accommodate the tendencies or 
processes that circle inexhaustibly around subjective absence or disappearance. Looking 
outside the psychoanalytic framework, however, we find a resonance between 
psychoanalytic discourses on masochistic self-shattering and the ruinous apotheosis of 
mysticism.  
This is not to imply that the two are equivalent, nor that mystical theology offers 
the means to “explain” masochism. Actually, the impression I wish to leave is far more 
subtle: the difficulties that arise in attempting to stabilize a theory of masochism might 
be accounted for through recourse to mystical expositions and their resistance to 
narrative formalization. As practices that gravitate around the dispersal of the subject, 
 
10 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 40.  
11 Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, p. 10.  
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both appear to be effects of the very instability (or impossibility) that they fold back into 
– the incommensurability of the subject with the primary desire to become nothing or to 
become all. What I suggest, therefore, is a complicity between masochism and mysticism 
established not on the grounds of sexuality but based on the ontological crisis provoked 
by proximity to death and through which that asymptotic approximation expresses itself. 
As discussed thus far, this crisis insinuates that “nothing” and “all” are perhaps not so 
different, at least in so far as the vanishing subject-in-question is concerned.  
 
LOCATIONS AND DISLOCATIONS  
The view of masochism being put forth here cannot be separated from the fractured or 
fragmented status of the subject. Seen from a historical or genealogical perspective, this 
subject is a product of changing social, cultural, political and/or epistemological values, 
expectations, discourses, etc. Following this approach, exemplified by Foucault, the 
introduction of new modes of self-construction or self-understanding coincide with the 
emergence of deconstructive practices in a multiplicity of theoretical, literary, as well as 
material forms. Approached in this manner, locating the dislocated subject is largely a 
question of where and when.  
According to Carolyn Dean, for instance, the “decentered subject” as she refers to 
it in The Self and Its Pleasures, emerges in France in the early 20th century as a response 
to the image of the fractured male body brought to the fore by WWI. The inter-war period, 
she explains, gave rise to the historical conditions necessary for the construction of a new 
form of subjectivity, conditions which include but are not limited to a crisis of masculine 
authority and the reconsideration of the boundaries between normality and pathology. 
The result was a moment of critical rupture in which an individual emerges but always-
already dispossessed of its anchoring signifiers – a castration which becomes a source of 
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mourning (or melancholia) but also of reflexive agency. Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg 
undertakes a similar project in Sublime Surrender, however she argues that the 
decentered self emerges earlier, in mid-19th century Germany in the discourse 
surrounding male masochism. Like Dean, Stewart-Steinberg locates the origins of this 
“modern” subject in a constitutive split of the phallic signifier, where law and authority 
originate and against which all forms of subjectivity seem to measure themselves. 
Conceptualizing the gap between the phallic signifier and the concrete subject of a 
particular historical moment, Stewart-Steinberg, like Dean, presents the decentered 
subject as one that is historically determined.  
At the risk of digressing or deviating from the subject at hand – then again, perhaps 
we only find our subject in such deferrals – I would like to call attention to the fact that 
these investigations focus on the male body. Analogous accounts of the embodied 
practices of women, however, seem to resist determination by a defining moment. This is 
not to say that the analyses by medieval scholars such as Caroline Walker Bynum and 
Amy Hollywood are undertaken without historical contextualization, quite the contrary, 
but rather that they foreground paradoxical or self-contradictory inconsistencies as 
different ways of knowing rather than as products or effects of a particular cultural 
current or epoch. Engaging closely with Christian mysticism and feminist theology, their 
work is of great relevance to this investigation. For the moment, however, what I wish to 
emphasize is that such accounts operate from a more nuanced awareness of the cultural 
construction of the body not only as the site in, on, and through which gendered and 
historically-coded mores transpire, but also as a sign or symbol of a deeper duality at play: 
a problem of parts versus whole. This may seem like a fine distinction, perhaps one which 
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alters little as far as what is actually perceived, but what is at stake is a matter of looking 
with the decentered subject rather than looking at her.12 
By considering the body as a locus of pleasure and personhood as well as a mode 
of limitation, bodily practices – particularly those of an ascetic or masochistic nature – 
take on a subversive quality. Indeed, according to Bynum and Hollywood, mystical and 
paramystical experiences owing to aesecticism or self-inflicted suffering, all of which were 
far more common of female devotion, suggest a mode of religiosity that teeters on heresy. 
As Bynum suggests in Fragmentation and Redemption, these forms of devotion signal a 
piety without characteristic or institutional form, thereby undercutting the sacramental 
authority of the church and clergy. Focusing on the semi-monastic beguine communities 
that formed in northern Europe between the 12th and 16th centuries, Bynum explores a 
piety wherein participation was not defined or delineated by vows, rules, or hierarchical 
leadership: to view the humility, chastity, and servitude that characterized the beguines’ 
voluntarily involvement as reproductions of gendered expectations, Bynum argues, 
undermines the fact that their autonomous religiosity reflected a bypassing of or rebellion 
against ecclesiastic structures, not quite anti-institutional but a-institutional – we might 
even say acephalous. When “looked at,” however, these forms of piety and modes of 
spiritual expression are inevitably signified to suit some other/other’s purpose. But the 
attempt to formalize the informe, to homogenize that which is characterized by a state of 
exclusion, exhausts its “defining” feature by submitting it to discourses of knowledge or 
utility. Thus, a question bearing a distinctly Lacanian impression arises: can we 
theoretically engage with jouissance in any way that doesn’t sacrifice it for meaning?  
 
12 Carolyn Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 47.  
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We see the imperative to categorize in Max Weber’s posthumously published 
Economy and Society, wherein he outlines three “ideal types” of religious activity: world-
fleeing mysticism, world-rejecting asceticism, and innerworldly asceticism. Whereas the 
former aims at a possession of truth that culminates in ecstatic trance – Weber uses 
examples of mysticism in India – the two forms of asecticsm are described as active as 
opposed to contemplative, characterized either by a formal withdrawal from or engaged 
participation in the world. Of the latter, more participatory innerworldly asceticism he 
qualifies that involvement takes place “within the institutions of the world but in 
opposition to them,”13 which would seem particularly relevant given what we have just 
discussed about the beguines. Nevertheless, this categorical view obscures both the 
ontological uncertainty of the participating subject and the paradoxes that present 
themselves when liminal experiences mutilate the boundaries between classifications, as 
they invariably do. Furthermore, as Bynum notes, Weber’s classification leaves no room 
for a mode of spiritual engagement that is neither a rejection nor a retreat and which 
might be described as “world-affirming.”14 These aims will be taken up throughout the 
course of this chapter in relation to their psychoanalytic counterpoints, as will the way in 
which the Bataillian framework allows us to posit the category excluded in Weber’s 
classification. It is however worth noting that within this sociological encyclopedia Weber 
associates women’s religiosity, across cultures and world religions, with a “distinctly 
feminine emotionality.”15 Writing of the “legitimization” that salvation religions 
supposedly offered the disprivileged, he writes, “the influence of women only tended to 
 
13 Max Weber, Economy and Society: Vol. 2, Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2013), p. 542. 
14 Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, p. 71.  
15 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 490.  
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intensify those aspects of the religion that were emotional or hysterical.”16 A loaded 
descriptor.  
Returning then to Dean and Stewart-Steinberg, there is something of a revelation 
involved in their historical analysis: a new subject appears as a result of a mis-en-scéne of 
which he in turn becomes representative. This subject and the shifting self-perceptions 
that constitute his subjectivity are historically determined and become coded. That which 
might be designated “hysterical,” on the other hand, does not lend itself so readily to 
genealogical inscription. From the “wandering uterus” of Ancient Greece to medieval 
humoralism and possession to its uptake into psychoanalytic discourses, the hysteric 
appears to be a perennial (though highly-mutable) figure signaling an always-emergent 
subject that, owing to an “excessive” (i.e. non-discursive) expressiveness, cannot be 
reconciled with the pseudo-stabilizing function of subjectivity. The distinctions between 
subjectivity, textuality, and embodiment are disrupted as that which is disavowed or 
repressed by the former two find alternative expression in the latter, the body enunciating 
what the speaking subject or text can only approach as crisis or failure. So, what are we to 
make of Weber’s association of feminine religiosity with the hysterical?  
If we read mystic contemplation or ascetic practice as refusals or repressions of a 
sinful body, we arrive at a view of religiosity which is anti-incarnational and, in so far as 
these practices supposedly mark a fleeing from or rejecting of the world, ahistorical. And 
yet, like the conversion phenomena that for so long characterized hysteria, these practices 
make use of the body as well as its historical or cultural construction. However, they do 
 
16 ibid. The connection between hysteria and religion also appears in the history of psychoanalytic 
discourse, particularly as regards neurologist and anatomical pathologist Jean-Martin Charcot, who 
Freud observed during a relatively brief stint (1885-1886) at the Salpêtrière and whose work on hysteria 
and hypnosis was a noteworthy influence for Freud. Through questionable and, at times, counter-intuitive 
methods that will be discussed further in the following chapter, Charcot’s mission was to expose religion 
as always having been a hysterical phenomenon.  
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so, I argue, in relation their terminal subversion in paradoxical enjoyment. Just as the 
hysteric “enjoys” a symptom without knowing its cause, the mystic experiences the non-
savoir of ecstasy or, rather, experiences non-savoir as ecstasy.17    
In the sensual descriptions of union with God, these self-negating or self-evading 
practices are inscribed as bodily occurrences, thinning distinction between the mystical 
and the erotic. But how do we reconcile the innerworldly or world-fleeing aim of such 
forms of religious activity with their otherworldly sensuality? An analysis which 
maintains that monastic asceticism or self-mortification represents a sublimation of 
repressed sexual desire, I believe, forecloses the richness of such a question. Scholars like 
Bynum and Hollywood argue that these forms of ecstatic religiosity, particularly as 
experienced by women, are too polysemic to be read through modern dichotomies such 
as active/passive or sensual/spiritual. For Bynum specifically, the issue is how medieval 
women seemed to signify their own practice as a passive suffering for God which was also 
a mode of active service, both for-another18 in the form of acts of charity and for the 
spiritual “self” as disciplined through asceticism. In other words, neither a purely world-
rejecting or innerworldly asceticism nor a sustained state of mystic contemplation, but a 
“mixed life” of withdrawal, opposition, participation and above all ecstasy in which the 
contradictions arising from the other three forms of engagement are effectively 
subsumed. In this view, “being a vessel” loses its purely passive connotation and becomes 
decisive way of being in the world, of engagement or participation as such, with all the 
 
17 In their collaborations, Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément consider hysteria as an “unsettling force” 
similar to that of female mystics. Teresa of Avila, Cixous suggests, is a hysteric. This is not intended as a 
pathologization of ecstasy, but rather as a recognition of its disruptiveness: the hysteric/mystic “demand 
for totality […] is intolerable,” unthinkable within a “restricted little economy” whose rigid structures it 
destroys. See Cixous and Clément, The Newly Born Woman, Trans. Betsy Wing, (Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 155. For more on hysteria and female sanctity in the context of sexual 
difference, see also Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, pp. 236-273.  
18 If we follow Lacan’s reading of hysteria as complicity with every imaginary father – each [little] other 
assuming the place of the [big] Other – than this “for-another” becomes “for-everyother.”  
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contradictions this entails, as opposed to as a self in which such contradictions must be 
flattened to produce a coherent narrative corresponding to a particular contextualized 
subject.   
I would like to clarify that my focus here is not on the empirical conditions that 
render such a subject, but more so on the notion that in ecstasy or jouissance otherwise 
containing structures fail (or are revealed as inadequate) and the loss of recourse to these 
stabilizing functions effectively scatters the subject. I emphasize this particular and 
decidedly more abstract idiosyncrasy because I believe that in these motions of 
dissembling, scattering, and re-assembling we discern the death drive as a destabilizing 
force. Bynum, for instance, defends the a-institutional character of beguine devotion as a 
resistance to hierarchical structures – structures that according to Nietzsche and the 
Nietzschean echoes in Bataille are fundamentally un-religious.19 I don’t dispute this. 
However, the heterogeneity of actions, activities, and affinities that characterize the semi-
monastic “mixed life,” I would argue, relate not only to specific modes of practice and 
their contextualization, but also to a peculiar quality of the self in liminal states: it is not 
there. How then can we positively identify or interpret these uncertain subjectivities? 
How can we locate a subject actively-passively engaged in its own erasure, dissolution, or 
disappearance? And these questions are bound up with another: why might we feel 
compelled to do so? With these questions the acephalous nature of mystical practice 
appears to be less of a deliberate choice, cause, or characteristic and more of an inexorable 
effect of an unstable or uncertain subjectivity.  That is to say, I have not chosen to discuss 
the mystic tradition with the intention of enunciating something about it. Rather, I bring 
mysticism into this investigation because it enunciates what is to an extent unsayable in 
 
19 See Nietzsche’s Antichrist, Trans. H. L. Mencken, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1924) and Bataille’s Inner 
Experience.  
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psychoanalysis, perhaps in philosophy more broadly, namely the subject’s experience or, 
more specifically, enjoyment of his/her own absence.  
Bataille also chooses mysticism as mode of expressiveness capable of surpassing 
the confines or limitations of philosophical discourse. In this sense, mysticism operates 
for Bataille similar to mythology for Freud or mathemes for Lacan, all of which reflect 
mediums that deploy metonymy as a means of acceding to that which lies beyond speech 
or text. As Lacan writes, “[t]he Real can only be inscribed as an impasse of 
formalization.”20 Unlike mythology or mathemes, however, the venture into the mystic 
domain also carries implications beyond the poetics of its use. It allows us, I maintain, to 
draw a connection that thus far appears only implicitly in the psychoanalytic framework: 
an association between the death drive and religiosity. With that in mind, what I hope to 
accomplish in these pages is to draw out the likeness between complex forms of religiosity 
and another practice or tendency more prevalent in psychoanalytic literature, though still 
very much ambiguous, which also deploys the body and conventions of subjectivity the 
interest of their subversion. A tendency which, I argue, affirms through acts of erasure – 
masochism.  
Bynum, for instance, rejects the allusion to masochism in cases of asceticism or 
bodily mortification.21 This is in part because masochism is unable to shake its sexual 
connotation and its use in these contexts tends to suggest a capitulation of religious 
experience under the influence of sexual drive. But also, with regards to the Christian 
narrative more specifically, pain and suffering appear as the opportunity or cause of 
 
20 Lacan, “Knowledge and Truth” in Seminar XX: Encore, 1972-1973. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits 
of Love and Knowledge, Trans. Bruce Fink, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (New York/London: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1998), pp. 90-103; p. 93.  
21 See Bynum’s Fragmentation and Redemption as well as Holy Feast, Holy Fast, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988).  
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salvation – as is the case in the enfleshing and passion of Christ – rather than as a means 
of self-negation. As Bynum argues, in this view the experience of pain is willful and 
purposeful, thus far more “active” than the passivity suggested by prevailing 
understandings of masochism. But to this I would raise a few objections. First, given that 
Bynum’s argument hinges on the polysemy of autonomous forms of devotion, on the 
problematization of active versus passive, it seems odd to dismiss masochism on the basis 
of such a restricted definition. And secondly, read through the French (post-)Freudian 
lens of this investigation, it seems that what Bynum terms “salvation” need not be 
extricated from the self-abasing or self-shattering sought out by masochistic tendencies.  
Most salient in Laplanche and Bersani, the interpretation of masochism being put 
forth here is one in which sovereignty coincides with refusal of autonomy. When read as 
a compulsion this tendency cannot be easily reduced within an active-passive dualism as 
submission to the drive gives way to the irrefutable force of the drive itself. Here, the 
compulsive movement towards annihilation is not read as being in the interest of 
destructiveness. On the contrary: as an undoing of individuated forms which gives way to 
an ecstatic fusion with otherness, it seems to follow the conservation principle, the 
outcome or aim being not a destruction, but a release that takes place when the subject – 
along with the separations and perceptions of separations that subjectivity sustains and 
is sustained by – are dissolved in an affirmation of unbound energetic flux. In a way that 
bears a striking resonance with Bataille, both Laplanche and Bersani theorize this self-
undoing or self-shattering in a manner that might be described as world-affirming, a 
mode of correspondence or communication beyond otherness as both cause and effect of 
discursivity. I will revisit this shortly, but for now what I wish to clarify is the vague seam 
along which this investigation is positioned, where the fringes of psychoanalytic ontology 
might be juxtaposed with (a)theology.  
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Let us take for example how thirteenth century poet and mystic Hadewijch of 
Antwerp describes a vision of Christ coming down from the altar in the form of a man who 
approaches and embraces her:  
…for a short while, I had the strength to bear this; but soon, after a short 
time, I lost that manly beauty outwardly in the sight of his form. I saw him 
completely come to nought and so fade and all at once dissolve that I could 
no longer recognize or perceive him outside me, and I could no longer 
distinguish him within me. Then it was to me as if we were one without 
difference.22  
In the dissolution of the meditative “object,” the vision itself is negated or overcome. 
Reframed in terms of the loss of distinction and/or individuated forms, it would appear 
that masochism, specifically primary masochism, offers an alternative paradigm that 
allows us to approximate the fraught ontology of mysticism as one of non-differentiation.  
And yet, a state without difference is inaccessible to a discursive or anthropo-/ 
egocentric mode of inquiries. Hence the paradoxical difficulties that such experiences 
pose within psychoanalytic questioning. But I believe that positing the pursuit of ‘oceanic’ 
states as functions of a drive whose satisfaction is both given and mutilated by the 
impossibility of its closure, renders them remotely accessible to analysis in a way that also 
acknowledges or allocates for their unfeasibility. Interpreting the death drive as the 
disintegrative urge embedded in subjectivity that keeps it mobile gives us a means to re-
interpret the “passive suffering” of mysticism or masochism as a situation of ontological 
uncertainty that weaves together questions of erotics, ethics, and aesthetics.23 Whereas 
ego psychology asserts essentialist notions of subjective identity, it would appear that 
 
22 Hadewijch, vision 7, from Hadewijch: The Complete Works, Trans. Columba Hart Bynum, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 280-1. Also quoted in Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, p. 120.  
23 See Noyes, The Mastery of Submission. Noyes contests the association between masochism and death: 
“masochism is not about death,” he writes; “it is about nomadic disappearances” (p. 217). Here I am 
arguing that the two are the same.   
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mysticism and (sado)masochism, both as theoretical constructs and practices, work 
against established models of subjectivity, collapsing the socially-sanctioned identities 
they subversively deploy as means rather than ends.  
Addressing to some extent the issue posed by the unstable subject, Roy Baumeister 
identifies several aspects that render masochism paradoxical from the perspective of 
social psychology. The enjoyment of suffering paired with the relinquishing of control, he 
maintains, poses a challenge to the pleasure-seeking self and its narcissistic tendency to 
maintain positive (or at least positivist) perception or evaluation of its being. Interpreting 
masochism as systematic attempt to eradicate the main features of the self, Baumeister’s 
main concern is why, and his suggestion is that one would engage in masochism to escape 
the burdens of self-awareness. I would modify this assessment slightly or at least present 
an alternative as it emerges in psychoanalytic literature: to escape the limits to awareness 
imposed by the self as the primary mode of interface with the external world and 
organizing principle of discursivity.  
According to Baumeister, sadomasochism emerges in Western culture alongside 
modern subjectivity, the increasing regulation of subjectitive experience coinciding with 
the pleasure dervived in subverting those codes. Prior to the 17th century, Baumeister 
claims, we find only isolated cases of sadomasochism. And although not a familiar feature 
of the sexual landscape until the 1700s, by the 19th century sadomasochistic tendencies 
had been isolated as identifiable perversion(s).24 Baumeister’s argument, which to some 
extent also involves the locating of an emergent subject, hinges on the increasing pleasure 
such a subject takes in his/her temporary disappearance as the experience of external 
pressures or internal tensions increase. But again, I do not wish to “locate” such a subject 
so much as call attention to the complications that invariably arise when we attempt to 
 
24 Roy Baumeister, Masochism and the Self, (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1989).  
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apprehend a subject whose active-passive engagement with its own disappearance places 
it just beyond theoretical reach.  
If we approach this premise psychoanalytically, Baumeister’s position reflects a 
reading that is in line with the reduction of tensions as a primary psychic aim. But how is 
this reconciled with the extremes of excitement and repulsion that these proclivities seek 
out? We are back again at the question of the economic paradox that characterizes Freud’s 
formulation of the death drive. As discussed in Chapter 1, the complete reduction of 
tension (i.e. the “zero” or Nirvana principle) can only coincide with the drastic increase in 
tension of primary masochism if we imagine a situation wherein self-undoing is not 
achieved through diminution but rather through ecstatic release. Now, working with a 
view of the death drive as aimed toward a situation of disintegration rather than 
destruction, such a release leaves the subject not eliminated or minimized but mediated 
by a oneness into which it dissolves. But the subject, in so far as it is primarily a discursive 
entity, cannot survive a situation of non-differentiation and is lost in the totality that 
engulfs it. Yet, having been only a discursive entity – substance or being immortalized 
(but also alienated) as an idea or essence – what is “lost” except the ability to speak of 
loss?  
This, I believe, is what is at stake in the discussion of masochism and, by 
association, mysticism. And yet a position which emphasizes these practices/tendencies 
as sublimations of a repressed sexual instinct occludes this possibility, which cannot be 
disentangled from the paradoxical expression of the death drive. We see this 
interpretation fold into strange shapes in Lacan, Laplanche, and especially in the work of 
Bersani – as well as in the recent work of a number of medieval scholars. The effects or 
implications of such a view is, however, rendered most visible in Freud’s understanding 
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of masochism and the manner in which it shifts considerably with the introduction of the 
death drive in 1920.  
 
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
Freud initially approached masochism as a perversion of secondary formation, but it 
gradually came to occupy a central position in his theory. In “Three Essays…,” for 
instance, masochism appears only as a sexual proclivity and Freud, giving primacy to the 
sadistic impulse, initially doubts that masochism “can ever occur as a primary 
phenomenon.”25 And yet, he also suggests that the two expressions are the active and 
passive forms of the same tendency: “[a] sadist is always at the same time a masochist.”26 
Even in these early essays, masochism seems to correspond to a difficulty of positioning, 
a difficulty which is exacerbated in subsequent texts, most notably “Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes,” and which culminates (though inconclusively) in Freud’s positing of a 
primary masochism as the most radical expression of the most primal drive.27  
Though masochism is usually discussed in relation to its sadistic counterpart, we 
see that the latter is less problematic from an instinctual point of view. Representing an 
element of aggressiveness characteristic of Freud’s view of (masculine) sexuality that is 
oriented toward the external world, sadism it would appear maintains the primacy of the 
pleasure principle as well as the desire for mastery. Masochism, however, presents a 
 
25 Freud (1905), “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” SE VII, pp. 123-246; p. 158.  
26 ibid, p. 159.   
27 See also Jens De Vleminck’s “Sadism and Masochism on the Procrustean Bed of Hysteria: From 
Psychopathia Sexualis to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” in Psychoanalysis and History, Vol. 
19, 3 (2017): 379–406. Here De Vleminck suggests that the difficulty Freud encounters in positioning 
sadism and masochism stems from an insistence to relate these proclivities to sexuality (and, by 
association to hysteria or sexual inversion) rather than to an innate tendency for aggressiveness. A close 
reading of Freud reveals this tendency as independent of the erotogenic zones but capable of eroticizing 
other parts of the body, such as the eyes (i.e. scopophilia) and the skin (i.e. contrectation). However, as De 
Vleminck argues, this transforms the underlying non-specificity of aggression (or the death drive) and its 
sources of pleasure into particular, “perverse” reaction formations.  
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deconstruction of Freud’s initial view of the self as predominantly pleasure-seeking, and 
as such required a new understanding of drive. In practice, sadism might be given as the 
inverse or counterpart of masochism,28 but psychically it appears that masochism is in 
dialectic relation to narcissism, a tendency whose mechanisms are also at odds with its 
aim and whose expression is also given to paradoxes because of the speculative nature of 
the ego.  
In The Shattering of the Self, Cynthia Marshall identifies Freud’s struggles with 
the concept of sadomasochism, describing the concept as “the barbarian within the gates 
of psychoanalysis.”29 Here Marshall provides a historical analysis of the forms of literary 
expression and enjoyment of the early moderns. In that sense, Marshall’s work reflects a 
very different project than that which is undertaken here. Nevertheless, it follows a similar 
line of questioning by centralizing the notion of masochism not as an isolated perversion 
but rather as a paradoxical psychic structure indicative of the fundamental instability of 
subjectivity itself. Like the concept of narcissism, which was also radically altered by the 
introduction of the death drive, masochism troubles the established models of self-as-
whole, confirming what such models imply but do not embrace: the contradictory, self-
canceling nature of subjectivity.30  
As Bersani also identifies, the issue with Freud’s conception of masochism, the 
issue he encounters in each of the three essays and that will carry through the evolution 
of the drive theory is the inability to reconcile the derivation of pleasure from 
 
28 In a 1967 essay, Deleuze offers, through a close examination of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s erotic 
literature, an interpretation of masochism beyond its dialectical opposition with sadism, which he 
describes as an “etiological fallacy” (p. 128). Here he suggests that the notion of masochism as sadism 
turned toward the self is inadequate and that, rather, sadism is characterized by an apathy that is not 
quite the complement of masochistic “coldness.” Thus, the disavowing masochist seeks not the negating 
sadist, but an inverted masochistic complement. See Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty” in Masochism, 
Trans. Jean McNeil and Aude Willm, (New York: Zone Books, 1991).  
29 Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, p. 7.  
30 ibid, pp. 40-41.  
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unpleasurable increases in tension. If pleasure is not the ultimate goal, then what? What 
is the first and foremost motivation/impulse if not to attain satisfaction? Given the 
shifting positions and instinctual reversals that Freud puts forth in “Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes” – the very mechanisms that, as per Freud, allow us to account for 
masochism – the introduction of another drive is a logical necessity.  
Just prior to Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud publishes a paper that 
establishes the primacy of masochism, if not yet in the economy of instincts then at least 
in his thinking. In “A Child is Being Beaten,” the 1919 paper notoriously based on the 
analysis of his daughter Anna, Freud proposes a sequence for the child’s beating fantasies. 
Here too he grounds masochism in something like sadism, though the child producing 
the fantasy does not inflict the beating herself. What I believe is especially relevant, 
however, is that in neither of the two conscious stages of this sequence, nor is she the one 
receiving the beating.  
Initially, Freud suggests, there is a proto-fantasy, wherein the identity of the one 
who does the beating remains obscure – perhaps it is irrelevant to the masochist – but 
Freud says we might characterize him as “the father.” The child being beaten, on the other 
hand, is another – a sibling or classmate for instance. Designated by Freud as the first 
phase, this episode and its partial nature can be summarized as: my father is beating the 
child whom I hate. This is followed by a second phase “of an unmistakably masochistic 
character” that, rather significantly, Freud writes is never remembered. It is in this 
repressed stage that the wish to be beaten arises and acquires a sexual charge. The second 
and only unconscious stage, identified by Freud under the phrase I am being beaten by 
my father, then gives way to the vague construction a child is being beaten, the phase of 
the fantasy that supposedly affords pleasure. Whereas in the first stage the child “absents” 
herself from the beating fantasy, “replacing” herself with a “hated child” that may or may 
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not be the idea of her own self, the second is charged with the repressed wish that although 
“forgotten,” gives way to the third stage in which the child enjoys the fantasy by replacing 
herself again with an anonymous child. In this way, the previous masochistic phase (i.e. I 
am being beaten) and the unconscious or intolerable masochistic pleasure associated 
with it is overwritten. Nevertheless, according to Freud, the repressed wish arising in this 
intermediate stage (1) binds together ambivalent feelings of excitement and repugnance, 
and consequently (2) affords the motive and the conscious pleasure or masturbatory 
satisfaction derived from the final formulation.  
While Freud still does not prioritize the masochistic wish here, I believe this 
sequence does lay bare the deeper issue of masochism: the masochistic wish is fulfilled 
through the absence or anonymization of the subject producing the fantasy. Or, in other 
words, the masochistic wish is not fulfilled by the one in whom the fantasy originates. We 
see this in the way the third stage translates the masochistic wish into consciousness 
through the replacement or erasure of the desiring subject: the third stage involves two 
children, the one being beaten and the one producing the fantasy, and they are not 
reducible to one another. The child being beaten is never the one producing the fantasy,31 
Freud writes, and the implications of this are two-fold: (1) by ostensibly “erasing” its 
desiring subject, masochism performs a “de-objectifying function,” scattering narcissistic 
investments in a process that, according to André Green, is mediated by the death drive 
as an unbinding principle,32 and yet (2) the subject also appears to remain present as a 
spectator of that very erasure. The latter might be read as a form of censorship or a means 
of disavowing the full nature of the underlying desire. Or, on the other hand, it might be 
that the transformation of the masochistic fantasy into a spectacle defends against the 
 
31 Freud (1919a), “A Child is Being Beaten,” SE XVII, pp. 175-204; p. 184.  
32 Green, Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, p. 65.  
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outright loss of self by providing a secondary position from which to observe said loss. We 
will consider the role of dramatization in the masochistic imaginary more closely in the 
pages to follow and particularly in the following chapter. In the present discussion, 
however, I wish to stay with the ambiguities of a self-cancelling subject as opened up by 
Freud’s texts.  
In the attempt to “remove the amnesia” that conceals the masochistic wish, Freud 
constructs this sequence in which the beating fantasy is not the initial manifestation of a 
perversion but the result of a series of substitutions concealing a core repression, “a 
feeling of mixed character.” Freud only identifies the second stage as masochistic, but 
perhaps the third reflects a “completion” of sorts, in which case we might conceptualize 
the first stage as providing the masochistic motivation: hatred of one’s self or, rather, the 
self (fictive, inadequate, etc.) with which the masochist feels obligated to identify. The 
repression of the incestuous object-choice and the accompanying feelings of guilt arising 
from the persistence of the wish in the unconscious do indeed suggest masochism, but I 
would argue that this corresponds more so to the (negative) narcissistic formation of 
moral masochism. Emphasizing the anonymization or self-erasure that occurs in the third 
phase as a function of the masochistic wish itself rather than its repression, however, 
produces a very different reading. Does this suggest a portion of libido capable of 
surpassing its source? Might the unconscious or unrepresentable core of the fantasy 
correspond to the remainder associated with the destructive instinct? Perhaps, but 
without the notion of the death drive, not yet introduced at this point, these 
interpretations are foreclosed. Or, as Freud’s masochistic analysand expresses, “I know 
nothing more about it: a child is being beaten.” The following year Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is published and when Freud revisits the topic of masochism in 1924, we find 
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the concept dramatically altered; it seems very likely that these differences can be 
attributed to the introduction of the death drive.  
In “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924), Freud tackles the notion of 
primary masochism that had been mentioned in Beyond… as one of the modalities of the 
death drive (along with the zero and constancy principles), if not its most radical 
expression. Now no longer an inversion of sadism, masochism becomes a primary 
phenomena, the mechanism that upholds the aims of the death drive as the very first 
instinct. As Bersani indicates, the difficulty with this concept lies in reconciling the self-
contradictory nature of an instinct that strives for unpleasure. But the final drive theory, 
which posits the complex relation between life and death in place of the distinction of 
pleasure and unpleasure, allows us to conceptualize the way these “oppositions” double 
one another.  
“The Economic Problem” revisits a possibility that Freud suggests in Beyond…, 
proposing that the Nirvana principle undergoes a change in living organisms by which it 
becomes a pleasure principle that strives towards zero but never arriving, “zero” referring 
here to the most conservative form of the death drive: the return to inorganic life. The 
Nirvana Principle would thus express the trend of the death instinct whereby deathly 
satisfaction is postponed or deferred by being pressed into the service of Eros through the 
demands of the pleasure principle-driven libido. Like the relationship between the reality 
and pleasure principles that Freud discusses in the 1911 paper on “Formulations on the 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning,” the pleasure principle and its excessive 
counterpart are not in opposition; each safeguards the other, one furnishing the means 
and the other the first and final goal. The death drive then is perpetuated through the life 
drives and furnishes the unattainable wish that keeps the pleasure principle seeking a 
temporary or incomplete satisfaction.  
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So, what is the “problem” Freud perceives? If, as Freud posits in “Instincts and 
their Vicissitudes,” pleasure equates to a reduction of tensions while the reduction of 
tension to zero (i.e. Nirvana principle) equates to death then logically (1) unpleasure 
would coincide with a heightening of tension, and (2) the ultimate aim of the pleasure 
principle would be death. The former presents a more manifest issue in that there exist 
pleasurable increases in tension and unpleasurable decreases in tension, particularly in 
relation to sexual excitation. But the fundamental “problem” that Freud identifies in 
giving masochism primacy is that it insinuates that the underlying aim of every desire is 
not to attain its object, but to extinguish desire itself. That is to say, if unpleasure can also 
be an aim, indeed if it is the aim of the drive which precedes and overrides the pleasure 
principle, then the other drives would be driven not to be. Rather, they would reflect the 
cathexis or sublimation of a drive for non-existence. We see this to some extent in “A Child 
Is Being Beaten,” where the original wish is obscured (but also realized) through its 
attachment to another. Throughout his work, but most notably in The Freudian Body, 
Bersani develops this idea: masochism does not pose a challenge to the primacy of the 
pleasure principle – it sends the pleasure principle into paralysis.  
To escape or bypass this paradoxical situation, Freud proposes that we not think 
of the axis of life-death quantitatively but rather qualitatively, and in the place of the 
increasing or decreasing of pleasure or unpleasure he offers the functions of binding and 
unbinding. Libidinal pleaure, Freud explains, binds things together in increasing 
complexity (i.e. Eros), which incidentally corresponds to an increase in tension. Psychic 
pain on the other hand is experienced at unbinding, which ultimately leads the individual 
back to a question of binding. Shortly we will consider if such a collapse of existing psychic 
architecture is the aim and enjoyment of jouissance. For the time being however, I wish 
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to focus on the way in which the concepts of the death drive and a primary form of 
masochism evolve concurrently within the Freudian framework.  
In “The Economic Problem” Freud distinguishes three types of masochism: a 
feminine form associated with passivity; a moral form expressed through guilt and self-
punishing; and erotogenic masochism, which Freud describes not so much as type of its 
own but as the basis of the other two expressions. Of the three, moral masochism would 
appear most closely bound to a narcissistic trend. Green, for instance, describes how 
moral (or intellectual) masochism produces the expression of what he terms “negative 
narcissism,” a concept explored in greater detail in earlier chapters. To summarize here 
however, this is masochism that appears loosened from its connection to sexuality, 
wherein only an unconscious sense of guilt or need for punishment persists. This situation 
maintains the tension between the superego and an ego that fails to live up to the ego 
ideal, but it does so in the negative – each object or other absorbed as an absence or loss. 
In other words, moral masochism maintains the architecture in an inverted form, seeking 
affirmation not through approval but through punishment, pain, or loss. Freud suggests 
that this form of masochism might reflect a sexualization of morality, whereas Green 
reads this as a possible fusion the instincts, an expression of life under the command of a 
death drive that operates as a negating force.33 But again, here we are more invested in a 
view of the death drive that goes beyond the discourse of negativity, and we find support 
for this in erotogenic masochism, which seeks to collapse the psychic architecture 
entirely.  
The moral or feminine expressions of primary masochism, Freud explains, retain 
a libidinal component: “even the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place 
 
33 Green, Life Narcissism/Death Narcissism, pp. 210-222.  
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without libidinal satisfaction.”34 In other words, these two forms cannot seek the total 
destruction of the self without which there be no moral or subjective element to afford 
libidinal satisfaction. Both thus reflect a mode of postponement that prolongs masochistic 
pleasure under the operation of an internalized father, according to Freud, or as per 
Green’s analysis, a dead mother. Overlapping these approaches allows us to see that the 
function of negation still maintains an egoic structure, though it does so in an inverted 
form: in Freud, the evolved forms of masochism maintain the psychic structures 
responsible for guilt or self-punishing, thus allowing the ego to experience the “perverse” 
satisfaction that stems from these functions; in Green’s negative narcissism, the ego 
persists as an expanding vacuity. Both reveal that process of binding are still in place even 
though they occur in the negative. Primary masochism, however, would seem to suggest 
the possibility of a situation of unboundedness as well.  
According to Freud, primary or erotogenic masochism reflects the libidinal 
component of the destructive instinct that, unlike the will to power or instinct for mastery 
which is directed outwards in sadism, remains inside the organism where it is placed in 
the service of sexual excitation. Freud describes this as a taming of the death instinct by 
the libido,35 but it could indicate what Beyond… implicitly signals and what we have been 
exploring in the preceding pages: that the death drive relies on the life drives to achieve 
expression. As “A Child is Beaten” also indicates, we cannot conceptually isolate a drive 
which functions by cancelling its subject. Freud addresses this issue explicitly in the 1924 
paper on masochism, clarifying that we never deal with the life and death instincts 
independently, only with mixtures of them in different amounts.36 Likewise, in “Thoughts 
for the Times on War and Death,” the 1915 paper wherein Freud explicitly tackles the 
 
34 Freud (1924), “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” SE XIX, pp. 155-170; p. 170.  
35 ibid, p. 164.  
36 ibid.  
 181 
attitude towards death, he specifies that even when we imagine our own death, we are still 
present as spectators; “no one believes in his own death,” he writes.37 But the paradoxes 
we have been considering thus far, and specifically their reuptake in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, would suggest a portion of the death that resists being bound up with the 
work of the life drives in the form of libido. It is that portion which concerns us here, in 
the present discussion of masochism but also in this work as a whole.  
Freud, keeping to the Oedipal masterplot, posits the masochistic fantasy as a 
regressive anal-sadistic distortion of the desire for a sexual relation with the father. This 
view, most present in the 1919 paper and persisting under the heading of feminine 
masochism in “The Economic Problem,” submits masochism to the sexual drive, 
rendering the masochistic tendency secondary to libidinal desire, despite the fact that 
Freud is arguing now for its primacy. Like moral masochism, this form retains and is 
identified by the persistence of a subjective component. And yet, in positing feminine and 
moral masochism as manifestations of erotogenic masochism, Freud implicitly suggests 
that both passivity and self-punishing reflect modes of accommodating for a death drive 
in a libidinal economy. The existence of a primary masochism that gives way to these 
forms, however, implies that while the death drive must be pressed into the service of 
Eros, this relationship is perhaps bi-directional, libidinal satisfaction owing to and 
amplified by its ghostly core. “[P]erhaps we may say in terms recalling the prophecy made 
by the Three Witches to Banquo: ‘Not clearly sexual, not in itself sadistic, but yet the stuff 
from which both will later come.”38  
 
37 Freud (1915c), “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” SE XIV, pp. 273-300; p. 298. This is also 
discussed at length in Razinsky’s 2009 article, “How to Look Death in the Eyes,” which compares Freud 
and Bataille vis-à-vis their attitudes toward death.    
38 Freud (1919a), “A Child is Being Beaten,” p. 187.   
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Observed from this perspective, religiosity and, more specifically masochistic 
spiritual practices, might also be related to this primordial drive: sublimations of an 
impulse preceding sexual desire, attempts at psychic death or dissolution rather than 
pleasure or mastery. For Lacan, the two are mutually inclusive under the traces of 
jouissance. 
 
THE EROTICS OF EROSION  
How do we conceptualize the being – or enjoying – that takes place in excess or absence 
of subjectivity? Laplanche and Bersani suggest that the notion of primary masochism is 
highly demonstrative in this regard: destablizing both the notion of the libido-driven 
subject and the phallic authority around which (oedipal) organization takes place, 
primary masochism signals the deep fissure in a tenuous ego characterized by a 
simultaneous demand for and resistance to being. As a psychic phenomena which 
heightens this tension, primary masochism lays bare the ontological struggle that 
undergirds subjective self-positioning. In other words, through the interplay of a self-
destructive wish and its multifarious sublimations, primary masochism reveals and revels 
in the strained relation of subjectivity to itself: if it is only in between, in the space of 
desire and fantasy, that a subject exists – even then as a barred question mark – then in 
jouissance, the loss of subjectivity coincides with its fullest expression.   
 Freud preemptorily alludes to such a possibility when, in “Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes,” he considers the “pleasurable unpleasure” of increased sexual tension as 
well as the effect of mimetic representations of pain. However, without Lacan’s 
introduction of the symbolic “third term,” we cannot quite account for “pleasure” and 
“unpleasure” as experiences mediated by the norms of representation. Nor can we 
account for masochism as the very troubling of those norms. Considering masochism as 
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a dramatization of the subject’s difficult relationship to subjectivity, Bersani draws 
together Freud’s original (but consistently evolving) formulation of the self-destructive 
tendency and its implications in the representational domain. In this reading, the 
Freudian conceptualization of primary masochism is broadened as that which is 
intolerable to the structured self.39 “[P]leasurable unpleasureable tension,” Bersani 
explains, “occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensations is exceeded, and when the 
organization of the self is momentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes 
somehow ‘beyond’ those compatible with psychic organization.”40 In this way, masochism 
extends beyond an enjoyment of the “unenjoyable,” codified instead as an attack on the 
imaginary “wholeness” which undergirds the symbolic structure. That is, if the subject is 
mediated symbolically, then masochistic (self-)destructiveness must entail a textual or 
discursive component. According to Bersani, this component can be “read” not as a 
definitive destruction but as the distress or disfigurement resulting when the self-
referentiality of subjectivity is simultaneously revealed and challenged. Masochism, in 
this interpretation, does not seek “new” pains but rather the means of savoring the 
narcissistic wounds that language conceals: masochistic jouissance is engendered by the 
symbolic structures it protests, finding its expression as a failure of mastery or, perhaps, 
a “mastery” of failure.  
Bersani suggests that masochism presents itself as problem of language even in 
Freud’s work, an assessment that finds support in a number of interventions on the 
subject.41 Drawing from Civilization and its Discontents, we could attribute structural 
inconsistencies and textual tensions to the inevitable frustration of a socialized subject – 
 
39 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 38.  
40 ibid.   
41 For a detailed discussion of the role of masochism in post-modern and post-structural thought, refer to 
Noyes, The Mastery of Submission, pp. 198-222.  
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a frustration which, in Freud’s view, results more so from “a structural complexity within 
the human constitution” than from the demands of civilization as such. 42 Or, approaching 
this tension as a function of the vicissitudes of instinctual life, we can examine the about-
turns involved in Freud’s initial attempt at accommodating masochism as a function of 
fantasied identification. Presented as a dynamic of passivity versus activity, masochistic 
“identification” deflects the underlying ontological crisis, cutting the ego into an object 
submitted to (self-)punishment by an extraneous subject.43 Pairing this with Freud’s 
interpretation of sadism, we find another complication: “while these pains are being 
inflicted on other people, they are enjoyed masochistically by the subject through his 
identification of himself with the suffering object.”44 In other words, the sadomasochistic 
dynamic is made possible by a splitting of instinctual components followed by their (re-) 
amalgamation across a subjective divide. This reiterates not only the deceptiveness of the 
unitary ego, but also of the perception of discrete ontological divisions between subjects.  
Laplanche suggests that Freud overlooks the most available explanation for 
masochism: the internalization of the entire scene.45 If the subject divided against itself 
causes pain with one agency in order to produce pleasure for another, this internalization 
supposes a split but highly-aware consciousness. Here Laplanche intervenes: “[t]he 
subject is masochistic only insofar as he derives enjoyment precisely there where he 
suffers, and not insofar as he suffers in one place in order to derive enjoyment in 
 
42 Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, p. 29. Of course, Foucault complicates this view though his 
genealogy of sexuality as a “technology,” arguing that the proliferation of discourse around sexual 
proclivities and practices also “satisfied” a demand, that of transforming desire into discourse. As he 
writes in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley (London: Vintage 
Books, 1990): “we demand that sex speak the truth (but, since it is the secret and is oblivious to its own 
nature, we reserve for ourselves the function of telling the truth of its truth, revealed and deciphered at 
last), and we demand that it tell us our truth, or rather, the deeply buried truth of that truth about 
ourselves which we think we possess in our immediate consciousness” (p. 69).  
43 It is worth mentioning that Freud posits this dynamic prior to introducing the theory of the superego as 
critical agency.  
44 Freud (1915a) “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” SE XIV, p. 129.  
45 Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, p. 104.  
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another.”46 That is, pain is not endured in order to be able to derive pleasure. The 
masochist derives pleasure from pain itself, from the dramatization of violence or trauma 
that supplants the spectacle of subjectivity.  
Reading Freud’s lifelong work as an attempt to track down the enduring 
elusiveness of the unconscious in spite of the instabilities and impossibilities arising 
therefrom, Laplanche aims to steady the Freudian edifice by accommodating its more 
rebellious elements. In so far as sexuality is concerned, he presents libido as the buttress 
of deficient self-preservation, suggesting that sexuality is inherently traumatic and, thus, 
that masochism is always-already primary. Of the “other” instinctual components, 
Laplanche presents an interpretation similar to that undertaken here thus far: the death 
drive does not refer to biological death but to a psychic unbinding that jeopardizes the 
binding capacity of the ego. Overlapping these interpretations, Laplanche deduces that 
sexuality, originally classed by Freud under the life drives which seek to “maintain, 
preserve, and even augment cohesion,”47 must in fact operate according to a principle of 
unbinding, thus corresponding to the death drive instead.48 This establishes a link 
between sexuality and the suffering position in what Laplache designates as (self-) 
ébranlement. Though generally appearing as “self-shattering,” this translation overlooks 
a key element of the French term, which refers also to “shaking” and thus carries with it a 
 
46 ibid; emphasis in original.  
47 ibid, p. 123.  
48 In Giving an Account of Oneself, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), Judith Butler compares 
the accounts of subject formation in Lacan and Laplache, arguing that life is always already interrupted or 
dispossesed by the demand for narrative reconstruction, and that psychoanalysis articulates the fear that 
the absence of narrative threatens life with the risk of death. “But this death,” she writes, “if it is a death, is 
only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy 
of impossible mastery” (p. 65). In Gender Trouble, (New York: Routledge, 2006), she emphasizes the 
association of this “certain kind of death” to sexuality, stating: “Let’s face it. We are undone by each other. 
And if not, we are missing something […] sexuality is [not] a possession, but rather, a mode of being 
dispossessed” (p. 24). 
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certain convulsiveness, a “trembling” like that of the ontological oscillations discussed in 
the previous chapter.    
Drawing from Laplanche’s reading of Freud, Bersani theorizes an ego formed in 
response to the desire for dissolution and constituted by the manners in which that wish 
finds expression as desire. Here masochism is not (exclusively) a form of self-punishment, 
but rather an “adaptive mechanism.”49 In Culture of Redemption as well as The Freudian 
Body, Bersani considers how masochism embodies the desire for dissolution, as the 
ontological ground of all sexual activity and, more generally, as the instabilities or 
slippages that disrupt all manners of formalism. According to Bersani, (sado)masochism 
is a melodramatic (or metadramatic) performance that makes visible the struggle 
between the undefined energy of thought and the injunction to define its terms. This being 
the essence of desire in its seeking of the unattainable objet a, pleasure and “satisfaction” 
are intimately linked, in origin, to the masochistic tendency.50 But Bersani presses this 
even further, considering the aesthetic field itself as a replication or elaboration of 
masochistic tension: though its “anonymization” of the subject, masochism functions as 
a nonreferential substratum of both sex- and textuality.    
Citing the reversals that occur in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Bersani interprets 
masochism as the troubling of the norms of representation and the position of authority 
on which language depends, extending its “aesthetic” to the linguistic domain where it 
manifests as a textual violence or distress revealing the paradoxical core of pleasure itself. 
Sexuality and self-preservation, he explains, operate in the service of a death drive which 
they sustain and postpone, aimed at always-partial satisfaction of an aim-inhibited wish. 
However, more central to Bersani’s argument is the manner in which Freud’s formulation 
 
49 Marshall, The Shattering of the Self, p. 10.  
50 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 41.  
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implies that the libidinal instincts exist as a “pale copy” of the death instincts from which 
they derive.51 However, the dualism between the clases of instincts collapses as death 
settles into the core of sexuality, where that which cannot be “completed” is 
(compulsively) repeated in sublimated forms. Masochism, Bersani argues, zeroes in on 
this distressing dynamic and takes pleasure in its dilemmas: as an undifferentiated sexual 
energy independent of the erotogenic zones, masochism enables the subject to exist in the 
gap between self-shattering experience and resistant and/or defensive ego structures. In 
Bersani’s view, it is a psychic strategy which partially defeats a dysfunctional process by 
revealing and putting in play its dysfunctionality.  
As a threat to – or mockery of – the self-referentiality of structural organization, 
the desire for or deployment of violence is neither anecdotal nor pathological. Rather it is 
intrinsic to a wide sphere of human activities which aims to challenge the ontological 
integrity of a structured self. Bataille calls this eroticism, which he distinguishes from 
sexuality. To apply Bersani’s terminology, eroticism, according to Bataille, is sexuality 
that derives from masochism: it manifests a desire for self-ruination and the pleasure of 
self-annulment that occurs through “nonreferential use of libidinal energy.”52 What 
makes Bersani’s interpretation more radical is that he does not isolate eroticism as a 
special category within sexuality but argues that the self-destructiveness of eroticism is 
the very foundation of all sexual life: “sexuality,” Bersani writes, “could be thought of as a 
tautology for masochism.”53  
 
51 ibid, p. 63.  
52 ibid. In her work on male masochism as a form of “deviant” masculinity, Kaja Silverman takes this 
further, arguing that a dissolved subject superceeds the unified one by magnifying the dislocations on 
which identity is based. Through a refusal of subjective “suturing,” masochism troubles the status of 
mastery and thus operates as a subversive tool. The masochistic act of surrender, she argues, loosens 
power’s grip on the subject through a process that might be described as “de-oedipalization.” Masochism, 
in her interpretation, corresponds to the polymorphous “infantile” pleasure of a not-quite differentiated 
identity. See Male Subjectivity at the Margins, (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 185-214.  
53 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 39.  
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Freud tells us that “the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it”54 but as 
Bersani notes, “nothing is less certain in Freud than that first object to which we remain 
remarkably faithful.”55 Given that the psychoanalytic model of the subject that Freud puts 
forth is neither autonomous nor self-identical – as discussed in Chapter 2 – then the 
dissolution of its perceived unity (under the auspices of masochism) might help to 
account for the “origin” that endlessly eludes Freud. Bersani elaborates: “the first psychic 
totality would thus be constituted by a desire to shatter totality. The ego, at its origin, 
would be nothing more than a kind of passionate inference necessitated by the anticipated 
pleasure of its own dismantling.”56 Masochism, therefore, might be conceived of as the 
performance of the subject’s uneasy relation to subjectivity, a convulsive “articulation” of 
the paradoxical tension between subjectivity and its highest expression as violence 
towards itself. The choice the subject faces, Bersani writes, is not between violence and 
non-violence. Rather, “we are implicated in violence from the beginning; our choice […] 
is rather between the psychic dislocations of mobile desire and a destructive fixation.”57  
Interpreting the “dislocations” in relation to the objectifying transformations of 
language, we find that the “destructive fixation” also has textual component: if textuality 
(and, in turn, subjectivity) subsists on its always being in doubt or question, moments of 
textual “failure” call out from an underlying heterogeneity just as the parapraxis calls out 
from the unconscious. Bersani, therefore, claims that “[p]sychoanalytic truth can be 
analyzed – and verified – only as a textual distress.”58 This is not because “everything is 
text” or because “the unconscious is structured like a language,” but because of an 
 
54 Freud (1905), Three essays on the theory of sexuality, SEVII; p. 222.  
55 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 35.  
56 Bersani, The Culture of Redemption, p. 38; emphasis in original.  
57 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 70.  
58 Ibid, p. 90.  
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“extratextual truth”59 which presents as text folding back on itself, returning to its own 
absent origin. In attempting to expose the fact of self-referentiality that the individual 
must deny in order to achieve status as thinking subject, masochism results in a disturbed 
textuality that “problematizes its own formalizing and structuralizing aspirations.”60 
Other distressing transformations of form will be considered in the following chapter, 
extending this discussion to the visual domain. Here however I wish to focus on 
masochism as manifested in textual violence and, more specifically, on how any attempt 
to advance a theory of the death drive causes such violence to erupt. In these instances, 
the text performs what cannot be explicitly expressed, namely that the adherence of 
psychoanalysis to its subject depends on a sustained theoretical instability.61  
This is the critical hinge on which Bersani’s astheticization of Freud pivots: as in 
masochism, the “authenticity” of psychoanalytic theory is found in a situation of 
theoretical collapse.62 Or, as Bersani writes, “the truth of a theory of desire cannot be 
dissociated from some recklessly self-defeating moves in the performance of the 
theory,”63 and masochism, in turn, signals the “the secretive and pleasurable 
phenomenon of a self-destroying intelligence.”64 The pleasure of masochism, then, is the 
pleasure of a “dissolved identity” as the site where subjective identity is both negotiated 
and dismantled – a site of variability and plurality by which the subject questions himself 
without mediation by structuring operations or the symbolically inscribed Other. In other 
words, the mediator in masochism is a vanishing one. For instance, let us consider the 
following assessment by Freud:  
 
59 Ibid.  
60 ibid, p. 5.  
61 ibid, p. 11.  
62 ibid, p. 3.  
63 ibid, p. 10.  
64 ibid, p. 12.  
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Even where [the death drive] emerges without any sexual purpose, in the 
blindest fury of destructiveness, we cannot fail to recognize that the 
satisfaction of the instinct is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree 
of narcissistic enjoyment, owing to its presenting the ego with a fulfilment 
of the latter’s old wishes for omnipotence.65  
Here we see a collapse of narcissistic and destructive enjoyment, a breaking down of the 
boundaries that separate these instinctual components and their conceptualization as 
dualistic. Freud’s text thus expresses the difficulty of trying to sustain oppositions that are 
always-already folded into one another.  
In Bersani’s view, this evokes psychoanalytic questioning as a masochistic 
performance always and never “culminating” in that which unthinkable to formalized 
thought, substantiating “a certain unreadability that has much less to do with a hidden 
and profound sense than with a dissolution of sense in a voice which continuously refuses 
to adhere to its statements.”66 In the context of masochism, the terms available to us (e.g. 
language, desire, pleasure) and the tensions that sustain them, are dissolved in the 
possibility of what Bersani describes as “an eroticized, de-narrativized, and mobile 
consciousness.”67 The result is an interpretive suspension, the theoretical collapse of the 
narrative and non-narrative that spills over into discursivity, sexuality, and aesthetics as 
the ontological distress evoked when the act of knowing itself is problematized. Curiously, 
Bersani describes this as a case of “oceanic textuality.”68   
[S]uddenly, aggressiveness is beginning to sound bizarrely like – of all 
things – the oceanic feeling, which, as we have seen, was an ecstatic sense 
of oneness with the universe, a breaking down of the boundaries between 
 
65 Freud (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, SE XXI, pp. 120-122.  
66 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 27.  
67 ibid, p. 64.  
68 ibid, p. 20.  
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the ego and the world traceable to the ‘limitless narcissism’ of infancy. Like 
the oceanic feeling, aggressiveness includes an intense erotic pleasure.69  
In the notion of the ‘oceanic,’ the collapse of the narcissistic fantasy and the desire for 
destructiveness is not conceptualized as a binary negation. Actually, insofar as the  “loss” 
that masochism entails is none other than that of the subject as mediator maintaining 
these separations, the desired self-shattering – or ontologically speaking, self-shaking – 
might correspond instead to a “re-discovering of the self outside of the self,” a means of 
“reaching towards one’s ‘form’ elsewhere.”70 And this, I believe, bears a striking 
resemblance to the non-savior of mysticism. 
 
INNER EXPERIENCE  
At the height of the Second World War, two decades after having renounced Catholicism 
and his aspirations of entering the priesthood, Bataille published a three-part treatise on 
the absence of God: La Somme Athéologique, a feverish first-person account of religious 
experience.71 In the first volume, Inner Experience, he writes of the transcendent God as 
that which kills the thing, similar in that respect to Lacan’s elaboration of the symbolic. 
Just as the submission to discursive life alienates what is Real in the individual, worship 
turns God into a discontinuous being: “[i]nstead of the inconceivable unknown – wildly 
free before me, leaving me wild and free before it – there would be a dead object and the 
thing of the theologian…”72 This, according to Bataille, subjugates not only the unknown 
but also the one who seeks it, thus reifying a categorical hierarchy and the demand for 
subservience. In turn, Bataille calls for a practice to replace the worship of a dead God: 
 
69 ibid, p. 19.  
70 See Tim Dean, Hal Foster, and Kaja Silverman, “A conversation with Leo Bersani” in October, 82 (Fall 
1997): 3-16; p. 15 
71 See Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, pp. 21-4, 32-5.  
72 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 4.  
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the constant and necessarily repetitious sacrifice of God, the negation of the 
transcendental through mystical (or erotic) activity that annuls any possible 
categorization by subsuming all into an unthinkable totality.  
Inner Experience and Guilty, the third installation of La Somme, engage closely 
(and at times critically) with the mystic tradition and the vertiginous reversals whereby 
the mystic “becomes all” such that neither mystic nor God exist as such. The “divine 
experience” that Bataille thus elaborates is an experience of the whole attained in the 
absence or negation of “God” and “self”: “instead of me eager to be me, there would be 
with respect to me only nothingness, as if I were dead.”73 But without the self as center of 
experience or symbolic anchor, such a negation is all-inclusive – it cannot be explained 
or possessed, only grasped momentarily as the moment of slipping away. Self-
renunciation thus clears the path for a fusion with the all, but “in fusion neither ipse nor 
the whole subsist. It is the annihilation of everything which is not the ultimate ‘unknown,’ 
the abyss into which one has sunk.”74   
Throughout his work, Bataille posits ipse – the “actual” – in place of “I,” and this 
speaks to the complications discussed above in relation to masochism. According to 
Bataille, “I” is the domesticated appearance of ipse – another “pale copy.”75 Ipse, on the 
other hand, is a rebellious referent for the paradoxical qualities of the narcissistic ego 
mentioned thus far, as well as the dangerous recognition of the “I” as a middle term 
between impossibilities. However, as that which slips away from discursive intelligence, 
ipse can only be restored through its own renunciation, through a becoming-unknown to 
itself which renders it commensurate to the unknown that “I” opposes: “two terms merge 
in a single wrenching, barely differing from a void – not able to be distinguished from it 
 
73 ibid, p. 69.  
74 ibid, pp. 115-116.  
75 ibid.  
 193 
by anything that I can grasp – nevertheless differing from it more than does the world of 
a thousand colors.”76 We might say then that in the desire to surpass limited existence, 
narcissistic longing converges with narcissistic insufficiency, and this is the battle – the 
bataille – of ipse, which desires “to become everything and can only become it by dying.”77  
 In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the experience of God takes place in relation to 
an unlimited beyond that transcends individual experience. Bataille does not alter this 
structure very perceptibly, and yet he destabilizes it completely, replacing the notion of a 
transcendent “beyond” with the vast field of the “impossible” whose existence both binds 
and unravels individual experience, the unspeakable or unassimilable that is glimpsed in 
the moment of transgression. The sacred, in this interpretation, is not given or accessed 
through ritual piety but through (self-)sacrifice: “death, delivering me from a world which 
kills me, encloses as a matter of fact this real world in the unreality of a self-that-dies.”78 
In place of moral heroism or obedience to an eternal father and his Law, Bataille elevates 
willful expenditure to the point of self-ruination. Psychoanalytically-speaking, this 
corresponds to a deposing of oedipal narratives by the death instinct. But in Bataille’s 
view, this “blind destructiveness” is not driven by innate aggression. Rather, it expresses 
nostalgia for a lost continuity, a desire for fusion with the “origin” that functions in 
discontinuous life as a nameless object of mourning. 
As Derrida explains, this is an expenditure without reserve, a “writing beyond the 
book” or a writing of the origin via the traces of its disappearance – “a lost writing of the 
origin.”79 Thus, the title of Inner Experience is both misleading and appropriate for what 
Bataille attempts to express is neither an “experience” nor something that can be posited 
 
76 ibid, p. 125.  
77 ibid, pp. 87-88.  
78 ibid, p. 74.  
79 Derrida, “Ellipsis” in Writing and Difference, pp. 294-300; pp. 294-5.   
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as “inner,” but rather the radical continuity in which these distinctions fail. Indeed, the 
continuity of which Bataille writes is a rupture of the very structure of recognition as a 
function of otherness, that which cannot be completed or revealed by consciousness and 
thus exists only insofar as discursive awareness about it does not. Long before it is 
designated as such, Bataille’s thinking bears the proto-traces of libidinal materialism.  
Life is never situated at a particular point: it passes rapidly from one point 
to another (or from multiple points to other points), like a current… Thus, 
there where you would like to grasp your timeless substance, you encounter 
only a slipping, only the poorly coordinated play of your perishable 
elements.80  
In this non-teleological philosophy, communication with the all implies a risk that 
exceeds any possible perception by the limited self. To the extent that it demands 
renunciation of attachment to that self and its discursive utility, such communication 
cannot be without an element of sacrifice, and it is precisely sacrifice which reintroduces 
the sacred into existence as that which is radically other to the ego and its desire for 
mastery. Indeed, therein lies what Bataille – and scholars of feminist theology after him 
– identify as the subversive element of mystical events and encounters: forgoing 
autonomy displaces power, mastery, and/or utility as the key terms of existence, replacing 
hierarchical thinking with anguish, fascination, and ecstasy at the improbability and 
precarity of being. Or, as Foucault writes, the sacrifice of the self – a feature of the 
abundantly contradictory hermeneutics of early Christianity – is “the condition for the 
opening of the self as a field of indefinite interpretation.”81  
 
80 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 94.  
81 Foucault, About the Beginning to the Hermaneutics of the Self: Lectures at Dartmouth College (1980), 
Trans. Graham Burchell, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), pp. 75-76. 
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In “A Preface to Transgression,” originally published in Critique as “Hommage à 
Georges Bataille” in the wake of his death, Foucault acknowledges the debt that theories 
of subjective dissolution or denial have to Bataille, his work exemplifying that such 
theories resist narrative closure by necessity – they reflect the unrest evoked by their own 
impossibility. According to Foucault, what Bataille puts forth is not a philosophical 
language, but “desperate and relentless attack”82 on the philosophical subject though “the 
non-dialectical language of the limit which only arises in transgressing the one who 
speaks.”83  If the establishment of limits renders “denatured” or meager forms of the 
sexual or spiritual, transgression disrupts these forms, exposing them as functions of a 
subjectivity that is operable as long as it serves as its own limit. “[T]ransgression,” 
Foucault writes, “forces the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, to find 
itself in what it excludes (perhaps, to be more exact, to recognize itself for the first time), 
to experience in its positive truth its downward fall.”84  
Following Bataille’s reasoning, Foucault links eroticism to the death of God on the 
grounds that both derive their force through the disclosure their own secret: excessive 
expenditure amounts to nothing.85 Both lead into an ontological void,86 thinkable only as 
the entanglement of thought. “What indeed is the meaning of the death of God,” Foucault 
asks, “if not a strange solidarity between the stunning realization of his non-existence and 
the act that kills him?”87 Perhaps the same could be said of mystical self-denial and 
masochistic self-shattering as experiences of cancellation that foreground the reciprocal 
 
82 Foucault, “Preface to a Transgression” in Lanaguage, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews, Ed. Trans. Donald Buchard, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 29-52; p. 43.  
83 ibid, p. 44.   
84 ibid, p. 34; my italics.  
85 ibid, p. 32.  
86 Foucault elaborates this as follows: “Transgression contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being 
– affirms the limitless into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence for the first time. But 
correspondingly, this affirmation conatins nothing postive: no content can bind it, since, by definition, no 
limit can possibly restrict it” (ibid, pp. 35-36). 
87 ibid, p. 32.  
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reliance of sovereignty and psychic death. The excessiveness of transgression then 
equates to the surpassing of the self and its symbolic limits, an outpouring via which the 
source returns to itself. The force of transgression lies less in the act itself and more so in 
the renunciation of the “I” that restores ipse to its inherent precarity, its non-savior. In a 
process that resonates with the reading of masochism above, by (temporarily) suspending 
or nullifying the structures that confer on the “I” its perceived unity, transgression opens 
up into the limitless domain where the divine or sacred functions. The transgressive 
experience, therefore, is more than a mere challenging of authority. It is the challenging 
of a self that is only permissible as co-signer of the Other’s phantasmatic desire, the 
“destructive” inclination to negate these terms by exceeding them. 
As previously mentioned, Bataille draws these paradoxical “formulas” from the 
traditions of Christian and non-Western mysticism, as well as his reading of Nietzsche, 
elaborated in the second volume of La Somme Athéologique. His emphasis on the 
experiential reflects a refusal to objectify subjective rupture. Instead, Bataille exposes the 
contradictions in scientific and objective language in order to engender in the reader the 
experience of his own contradiction in the unassimilable interplay between the general 
and the particular.88 For instance, he writes, “[y]ou shouldn’t doubt it any longer for an 
instant: you haven’t understood a word of Nietzsche’s work without living that dazzling 
dissolution into totality. Beyond that, this philosophy is just a maze of contradictions.”89 
This assessment gives us a sense of how to approach Bataille’s own texts, as well as the 
mystical writings to which he returns throughout his work.90  
 
88 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 38.  
89 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. xxxi. 
90 For more of Bataille’s writings on Christian mysticsm, particularly in relation to sexuality, see Erotism, 
pp. 117-128, 221-264. 
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Still, Bataille is ambivalent to the term mysticism as its accommodation in 
Christian discourses is not in line with what he seeks to express:  
By inner experience I understand that which one usually calls mystical 
experience: states of ecstasy, or rapture, at least of mediated emotion. But I 
am thinking less of confessional experience, to which one has had to adhere 
up to now, than of an experience laid bare, free of attachments, even of 
origin… This is why I don’t like the word mystical.91 
Though his elaboration of inner experience, Bataille envisions a “mysticism” without 
expiatory or salvific aims. However, such an experience – opposed as it is to narrative 
formalism – cannot be appropriated by any particular discourse without being 
fundamentally diminished.92 Bataille thus claims that “inner experience” is truer to the 
spirit of mystical practice than institutional interpretations that manipulate the mystical 
encounter with God to suit dogmatic purposes. 
In Sensible Ecstasy, Amy Hollywood offers a compelling analysis of Bataille’s 
conflicted engagement with the mystical tradition, considering how Bataille’s oeuvre 
(textually) replicates mystical ecstasy while charging such experiences with a sovereign 
subversiveness denied in ideologically-fixed and flattened interpretations. This 
attentiveness to the exigencies of late-medieval mysticism was not, however, limited to 
Bataille, and so Hollywood extends her analysis to the work of Beauvior, Lacan, and 
Irigaray, wherein questions of sexual difference are foregrounded. The writings and 
practices of late-medieval mystics, she argues, allow these 20th-century intellectuals to 
articulate or at least to approach – in Bataille’s case, to experience – certain theoretical 
“blind spots” (e.g. feminine desire, jouissance, and psychosis). In that regard, there are 
 
91 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 3.  
92 In The Sex Lives of Saints, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Virginia Burrus 
offers a literary interpretation of mystical and hagiographical writings as “transgressive” texts, indicative 
of an exuberant “counter-eroticism” whereby asceticism, spiritual submission, and mystical rapture 
suggest acts of defiance against the Christian tradition and its sexual ethic.  
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many similarities between the thematics of Hollywood’s work and those of the present 
investigation. Most notably, she makes several allusions to Freud – to the association 
between the death drive and his late theory of primary masochism as indicative of a drive 
to escape subjectivity – and, in turn, the possibility of reading ecstasy in those terms.93 
Hollywood’s project, however, focuses less on metapsychology (and its impossibilities) 
per se and more so on establishing mysticism as a mode of thought that exceeds restrictive 
oppositions and thus allows a means of contemplating the more paradoxical facets of 
subjective understanding. These two lines of inquiry, in my view, are deeply intertwined, 
and so her consideration of masochistic desires, lacerated subjectivities, and anomalous 
textualities as indicative of an “ethical compulsion to confront the real”94 is of significant 
relevance here, enabling us to (1) conceptualize a perimeter, albeit tremulous, around 
death as the inaccessible, inarticulable center of thought, (2) incorporate mysticism as a 
means of approximating this center precisely because – like masochism – it dissolves the 
formal structures of subject-object thinking.   
For instance, Hollywood considers how Bataille’s reading of 13th-century 
Franciscan tertiary Angela of Foligno conditions his writings on ecstasy or, rather, how 
his (non-)understanding of her visions is performed by the textual liminality of his 
contemplations. Her Book of Visions offers an account of the movements or 
transformations of thought that lead to ecstasy, and in Guilty, Bataille reproduces large 
portions of her text, often verbatim, so as to repeat these transformations, transcribing 
 
93 In Sensible Ecstasy, Hollywood clearly maps out the theoretical associations being traced here. She 
explains:  “Bataille’s account of ecstasy might be understood in light of Lacan’s theory of jouissance and 
its deployment by Jean Laplanche and Leo Bersani. One can thus read ecstasy in terms of Freud’s late 
account of primary masochism, as a self-shattering that lies beyond the pleasure principle and yet is itself 
desired” (p. 85).   
94 ibid.  
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her words in order to bring himself to the moment where subjective dispersal opens up 
into the unknown (i.e. death). Angela writes:  
One time my soul was elevated and I saw God in a clarity and fullness that I 
had never known to that point in such a full way… And then after that I saw 
him in a darkness, for his is good so great that he cannot be thought or 
understood. And nothing of that which can be thought or understood attains 
or approaches him.95  
Of course it is not the “greatness” of God that compels Bataille, but rather Angela’s 
frequent references to darkness, to the all-engulfing unknowing of the abyss. For 
instance: 
When I am in that darkness I do not remember anything about anything 
human, or the God-man, or anything which has a form. Nonetheless, I see 
all and I see nothing. And what I have spoken of withdraws and stays with 
me, I see the God-man. He draws my soul with great gentleness and he 
sometimes says to me; ‘You are I and I am you.’ […] The soul is alive in that 
vision concerning the God-man. The vision with darkness, however, draws 
me so much more that there is no comparison.96  
In the movement from an object-centered relationship to Christ to the experience of the 
all as an abyss – what Angela refers to as “the twenty-sixth transformation of the soul” – 
Bataille reads the inextricability of divinity and an experience of nothingness. This might 
be one’s own nothingness or that of God, but in a darkness without forms such a 
distinction becomes irrelevant, if not impossible. Still, it seems that it is precisely this 
dissolute unknowing which confers an experience of unity with God. For Bataille, the non-
viability of these unbearable movements of thought accounts for the ecstatic core of 
mysticism as the experience of that which is “impossible” and “unknowable,” yet deeply 
 
95 Angela of Foligno, Complete Works, Trans. Paul Lachance, (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), p. 202.  
96 Angela of Foligno, Complete Works, p. 205.   
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and affectively is. And, perhaps more seditiously, Bataille considers that as such, the 
mystical experience deconstructs God as a projection of human desire by revealing the 
contradictions of that desire, namely that its fulfillment takes the form of a collapse.97 
This “transformation” allows us to establish a connection between mysticism and 
masochism that bypasses the logic of repressed sexuality in favor of a non-savior evoked 
through and manifested as ontological crisis: mystical “inner experience” and masochistic 
desire lay bare the inadequacies and limits of their containing structures and, in doing so, 
derive a paradoxical enjoyment that is incommensurate with the forms available within 
those structures.98 Much like Bersani suggests of masochism – and psychoanalytic 
inquiry in general – the adherence of inner experience to its disappearing subject also 
hinges on a certain precariousness of thought.   
By emphasizing the manner in which mystic engagement with the divine is also a 
problemmatization of surrounding discourses about divinity, Bataille presents an 
(a)theology that is not a return to Christianity but, as Hollywood writes, “a generalization 
of its logic and a rejection of the dualism by which it attempts to negate […] the violence 
necessary to its instantiation.”99 This is made possible through a renunciation of 
(redemptive) narrative in favor of the specificity (i.e. contingency) of the real as embodied 
in suffering. The resulting scenario – one of “guilt without redemption, anguish without 
salvation”100 – may strike us as rather bleak, but perhaps reflects an ethical position, 
however conflicted, in the form of what Hollywood describes as “a compulsion to see the 
 
97 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 67.  
98 A similar case is made by Niklaus Largier with In Praise of the Whip: A Cultural History of Arousal, 
Trans. Graham Harman, (New York: Zone Books, 2007). Here he explores how religious and erotic 
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the ecclesiastic discourse of piety as well as the boundaries of sexuality.  
99 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 57.  
100 ibid, p. 83.  
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speechless body.”101 That is, the refusal to turn experience into a signifier or to reduce it 
to its “use value” such when it so thoroughly rejects discursive meaning. However, like a 
mystical theology in which the very concept of God (as understood by the Christian West) 
is subverted by the non-savior through which the divine is experienced, this compulsion 
cannot avoid its own crisis. The obscure doublings that arise in mystical writings, as well 
as their fragmented reflection in Bataille’s texts, seem to be symptomatic of this: even the 
self-shattering experience of the limit “require[s] a lingering subjectivity […] if that 
dissolution is to be lived and communicated.”102 Hence the desire for dramatization or, 
more generally, for modes of self-interrogating representation that, though the 
disturbance of narrativization, communicate a psychical or textual experience of 
ébranlement rather than negating the possibility of communication altogether.103 But 
how to write without an object or a subject, without an end and a ‘why?’  
Here we might say that textual chaos or “failure” evokes experience by 
foregrounding the contradictions of a subjectivity which attempts aimlessly to exceed 
itself. This is not far from Hollywood’s defense of Bataille’s ethico-aesthetic: in “turn[ing] 
to writing as the site of self-laceration and dissolution” he does not glorify suffering but 
rather attempts to communicate suffering through its “textual effects.”104 And yet, 
Bataille’s meditation on the speechless body, his attempts to communicate the 
unassimilable – rather than to simply to produce a narrative about it – can only be 
translated textually through the risking of language itself. For instance, according to 
 
101 ibid.  
102 ibid, p. 57.  
103 In “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” (The Bataille Reader, pp. 279-295) Bataille expresses the importance 
of dramatization – of the “subterfuge” of the spectacle – to any knowledge that we might have of death. 
He states: “at all costs, man must live at the moment that he really dies, or he must live with the 
impression of really dying. […] This difficulty proclaims the necessity of spectacle, or of representation in 
general, without the practice of which it would be possible for us to remain alien and ignorant in respect 
to death, just as beasts apparently are” (p. 287).   
104 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 58.  
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Hollywood, the “antigeneric” nature of Bataille’s episodically poetic, pornographic, and 
(anti-)philosophical writing is a mode of communication in that it exceeds distinction on 
the basis of style or genre. Fragments from letters and journal entries mix with 
confessions and theoretical reflections and create a flux between experience and writing, 
a flux which Hollywood likens to the “immediate outpourings”105 found in Angela’s Book 
of Visions or Mechthild of Magdeburg’s Flowing Light of the Godhead.106 But refusal of 
convention is not the only manner in which Bataille places language en jeu. This is also, 
in part, accomplished through his choice of subject matter – the erotic, mystical, and 
sacrificial – and the manner in which these categories collapse in his writing. His 
contemplations of “impossible” texts, like his life-long meditation on the image of the 
Dionysus chinois, reflect an attempt to communicate realities that exceed limited or 
discontinuous understanding, to “force the onlooker/reader to recognize (to remember) 
the anguishing catastrophic real hidden by narrative memory and the illusions of 
wholeness and unity on which it depends.”107 Mostly, however, Bataille risks language 
through the self-defeating moves of his writing, which in its attempt to sustain its 
contradictions performs a contestation of itself. In deliberately throwing itself, its writer, 
and its reader into question this body of text elicits an inner experience that reaches 
beyond the level of signifiers in that, on that level, it ceaselessly enacts the very crisis of 
signification. Or, as noted by Hollywood,“[b]y exacerbating the paradoxes of writing a 
desire without object and without aim, Bataille creates a performative text in which inner 
 
105 ibid, p. 102.  
106 In some ways, this is comparable to Julia Kristeva’s Teresa, My Love, Trans. Lorna Scott Fox, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2015), an uneasy work of “fiction” in which semi-autobiography merges 
with the life and writings of Saint Teresa of Avila. This text is as “confessional” as the Spanish mystics own 
writings and, simultaneously, a psychoanalytic exploration of desire and faith as well as a devotional 
missive – at times a love letter – to the saint herself.  
107 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 82.  
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experience is (for him and perhaps for the reader who thinks the contradictions of his 
text) ‘realized.’”108  
Through a textualized ambivalence that refuses even the more apophatic forms of 
narrative closure, Bataille (re)creates in writing the laceration of the subject as the means 
of communicating a convulsive ecstasy in the face of the contingency of existence. In this 
view, masochistic or mystic self-denial is not a denial of pleasure but of the self as the 
primary locus of pleasurable experience, not the absence of eroticism but its presence as 
exuberant excess or loss of self. This is not far from Bersani’s formulation of masochism. 
And indeed, when we consider that mysticism culminates in an experience of anonymity 
or spiritual cancellation, we find resonances with Freud’s formulation as well: just as the 
child being beaten is never the one producing the masochistic fantasy, mystical 
experience cannot be simply traced back to the mystic. Both signal a situation without the 
possibility of closure or completion because the critical moment involves self-annulment 
and structural collapse, the two being mutually indissociable. Referring back to the 
previous chapter, as well as Bersani’s reading of Freud, it seems that instances of textual 
distress seem to gather around death and dissolution as the unthinkable aims that lie 
beyond the pleasure principle. 
“The libertine is closer to the saint than the man without desire,”109 Bataille writes, 
drawing the erotic and the mystical together as analogous expressions of an inexorable 
impulse to self-abandon that requires, at least to some extent, the very particularity it 
seeks to elude. In its culmination, there is only the nihil incognitum – “unknown 
nothingness” – that Angela of Foligno reportedly called out to with her final words.110 In 
its compulsive repetition however, this impulse perpetuates itself as a radical questioning 
 
108 ibid, p. 108.  
109 Bataille, Erotism, p. 122n. 1. 
110 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 104. 
 204 
of subjectivity and discursive self-positioning that manifests in and as ontological 
rupture. Establishing a correspondence between mysticism and masochism in terms of 
their resistance to formalization advances an interpretation of the death drive as a 
destabilizing force that exerts itself against narrativization and textuality, both of which 
it deeply disrupts in order to reveal the Real concealed behind a veil of signifiers. But, 
because it implicates the disappearance or dissolution of its own subject, such a theory 
appears only be textually affirmed or “realized” through a traumatization of writing itself.
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5. 
VIOLENT REPRESENTATION AND THE EROTIC IMAGINARY 
 
 
 
 I laugh when I think that my eyes persist in demanding objects that do not destroy them. 
– Georges Bataille, “La pratique de la joie devant la mort”  
 
 
 
 
Leo Bersani describes psychoanalysis as the study of the difficult relationship between 
language and the body.1 This has been discussed in relation to the narcissistic fantasy of 
the I-as-gestalt and the contradiction bound up therein: for all of its willed autonomy, 
omnipotence or coherence, the ego or “I” necessitates an other – either as a separate entity 
or as a spectral image. Reflecting on how the gestalted image conceals a foundational 
lack,2 we traced out the trajectory of the “I” as the discursive entity in the difficult 
relationship Bersani alludes to. But what of the body itself?  
 
1 Bersani, The Freudian Body, p. 34.  
2 This is in reference to Lacan’s main point in “The Subversion of the Subject in the Dialectic of Desire,” as 
discussed in Chapter 2: the subject sacrifices jouissance in order to participate in the symbolic where he 
finds it as its inverse in the form of desire; if participation in the symbolic is on the condition of this lack 
or loss, then (‘Other’) jouissance equates to the fullness that lies beyond the taboo, the prohibition, the 
interdit.  
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If language cannot be easily mapped onto the body, or if the vulnerability of the 
body is incompatible with the symbolic demand of integrity, ostensibly we are left with 
the body as its own means of representation. What “linguistic activity” is it capable of and 
under what conditions? In this chapter, I consider through the alternative symbolic of the 
wound the paradoxical manner in which an aesthetic of laceration or fragmentation offers 
an escape from the egocentrism that mediates, dissects, and objectifies embodied 
experience as a separation from the whole. Such an aesthetic, I maintain, has no “object” 
as its goal. Rather, it reflects an uneasy overlay of representation and referent, specifically 
the uncertainty, vulnerability, and impermanence of the body that otherwise operates to 
set the boundaries of individual subjectivity.  
As Freud writes, “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego.”3 It would follow then 
that a threat to its form is also a threat to its content. In turn, aesthetic practices that 
foreground the lack of bodily integrity reintroduce into representation its own excesses or 
inadequacies, destabilizing the objectifying transformations which representation 
undertakes and facilitates.4 That is, the body in pain (or ecstasy) may be represented but 
because of the difficulty of its referent, it is a representation that simultaneously asserts 
its resistance against discourse. Such images, I argue, recall or restore the r/Real 
appearance of a subject as an inaccessible, fundamentally fragmented entity, and in 
scattering the subject, they also challenge the symbolic structure that the individual 
accesses on the condition of subjectivity.  
But the loss of self, be it experienced or perceived, cannot be confined or ascribed 
to any self-identical subject, least of all the one whose jouissance or sovereignty is in 
 
3 Freud (1923), The Ego and the Id, SE XIX, pp. 3-63; p. 26.   
4 See Rina Arya’s “The fragmented body as index of abjection” and Ernst von Alphen’s “Skin, body, self: 
the question of the abject in the work of Francis Bacon,” both in Abject Visions: Power of Horror in Art 
and Visual Culture, Ed. Rina Arya and Nicholas Chare, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 
pp. 105-129.  
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question. Rather it overflows as mutual contingency, a merger of experiencing and 
perceiving, a breakdown of viewed and viewer through the refusal of integrated form(s) 
which sustain them as separate entities. In short, such images extend beyond the frame 
to a deep, engulfing questioning of the entire enterprise of subjectivity: without the 
“proper” imaginary contours or the intact skin of the symbolic, there is neither 
containment nor constriction. The result is an aesthetic situation in which identification 
is not possible. Nevertheless, or rather precisely for this reason, a communication takes 
place.  
The aim of this chapter will be to explore such aesthetic situations as means of 
representing the “unrepresentable” precisely as that which exceeds or overflows the 
frame. Through a consideration of certain visual artifacts and the violent doubling they 
effect in both the viewer and the viewed, I suggest an aesthetic of the death drive that 
operates by challenging the validity of the gaze itself. Experiences of pain and ecstasy that 
break with the possibility of subjective positioning are examined in terms of their 
inaccessibility, as deeply “interior” corporeal experiences without recourse to external 
counterpoints. Yet, somehow, they appear capable of conveying their content through the 
corresponding unsettling they provoke in the onlooker, an unsettling that, as I have been 
arguing thus far, both results from and refers back to an event of ontological crisis:  
situation wherein distinctions – and in particular the distinction between “interior” and 
“exterior” – are dissolved through the loss of the subject that meditates them. 
Incidentally, this is also the case of mystical non-savior, an inner experience of 
unboundedness beyond the limits and separations of subjectivity, that, as Lacan 
demonstrates, cannot be approached theoretically without an element of self-subversion. 
After tracing these inescapable contradictions, we will consider the body in 
extremis and, arguably, beyond, eliminating piecemeal the functions that contain and 
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organize subjective experience. Reading scenes of mutilation through Didier Anzieu’s 
notion of the ‘skin-ego’ and the Deleuze and Guattari’s “body without organs,” we 
gradually peel away and dissemble the bodily integrity on which psychic integrity leans. 
But, the consequence of this, at least as I hope to convey it, is a total experience of disarray 
and disorder. By (re)introducing into semblance its own impossibilities, this manifold but 
evasive aesthetic sabotages not only the forms that it manipulates, fragments or liquefies, 
but the very functions of containment or closure that render discrete forms to begin with 
and establish them as viable determinants of separation. As I have been insisting, what 
lies beyond such determinants can only be approached asymptotically, and in these final 
pages we “see” where such attempts, be they aesthetic or textual, lead: in an encounter 
with formlessness that tears out the eye – or “I” – itself, all the tributaries of this 
investigation flow into a situation of heterogeneity (un)defined by its radical otherness to 
subjective thought.  
 
PAIN AND DIS/CONTINUITY 
As discussed under the auspices of masochism, pain marks a limit of self-identification as 
a function of difference and, as such, it also marks a limit of intersubjective 
communication. Thus, sexualized or not, pain falls under the domain of the erotic – an 
experience that restores one to the realm of immanence, to the realm of lost intimacy that 
is fragmented in discontinuous existence.5 Discourse is intrinsic to this discontinuous 
existence in which the self is perceived as a separate entity and center of meaning: in the 
logic of the restricted economy, discourse and discontinuity sustain one another as the 
preservation of the individual self. Transgression then is all that which sacrifices this 
restricted vision, liberating the forces uneasily contained by crystallized forms. But this 
 
5 In reference to Bataille, Theory of Religion, pp. 30-38.  
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violent exuberance comes at the expense of the separations and differences that maintain 
the boundaries of the self: the shattering of forms is also a shattering of the speaking 
subject.    
Elaine Scarry, though not operating under the same Bataillian vocabulary, offers a 
comprehensive examination of this topic. In The Body in Pain, she explains that what 
pain communicates it does so as its incommunicability.  
Vaguely alarming yet unreal, laden with consequence yet evaporating before 
the mind because not available to sensory confirmation, unseeable classes 
of objects such as subterranean plates, Seyfert galaxies, and the pains 
occurring in other people’s bodies flicker before the mind, then disappear… 
pain comes unshareably into our midst as at once that which cannot be 
denied and that which cannot be confirmed.6  
This resistance to language, Scarry explains, is not an “accidental attribute” of pain. 
Rather, it is essential to what pain is: an interior state with no external counterpoint. 
Unlike other affects which are accompanied by or seek affirmation through objects in the 
external world, the only “object” of pain is the body that experiences it and which, owing 
to that experience, cannot be stabilized as an object at all. By Scarry’s account, “physical 
pain – unlike any other state of consciousness – has no referential content. It is not of or 
for anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other 
phenomenon, resists objectification in language.”7  
 The injured body then does not speak or, rather, it communicates wordlessly. But 
because of its silence we speak for it, over it.8 Scarry reads this tendency through the 
 
6 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), p. 5. 
7 ibid, p. 5.   
8 Pain, Scarry argues, is not grasped as such but rather through its attributes or as an effect. We might, for 
example, attempt to give it a size or shape or form. Likewise, we might describe a pain as “sharp” or 
“stabbing” even if there is no knife. Scarry describes this – the locating of pain in a real or metaphorical 
object as opposed to in the experience of perceptual confusion – as a misidentification, a means of 
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trepidatious relationship between torture and interrogation.9 We might however discern 
a similar clamor around the mystical (and masochistic) expressions discussed in the 
previous chapter, namely the reuptake of ecstatic experiences, martyred bodies, and self-
mortifying practices within institutional discourses, clerical as well as clinical. Of this 
particular subject matter, Scarry writes:  
The self-flagellation of the religious ascetic, for example, is not (as is often 
asserted) an act of denying the body, eliminating its claims from attention, 
but a way of so emphasizing the body that the contents of the world are 
cancelled, and the path is clear for the entry of an unworldly, content-less 
force.  
Having hitherto considered this “content-less force” in relation to the unbound energetic 
flux of Bataille’s general economy as well as the osmotic diffusion of the “oceanic,” here I 
too wish to emphasize the body, examining how its representation is deployed in religious 
devotion in a manner that is simultaneously effective and subversive. We find a difficult 
dynamic between the corporeal and the transcendent, which in all its attempts to exclude 
the immanence of the body, finds itself constrained to it. Described by Scarry as 
“language-destroying” and, specifically in the case of mysticism, “path-clearing,” physical 
pain “empt[ies] the body of cultural content.”10 Nevertheless, it conveys the certainty of 
its material existence. We are thus faced with the crisis of substantiation that takes place 
when the extremes of the material and immaterial are laid edge to edge. This will be 
placed in a Lacanian context shortly, but for the present discussion it suffices to say that 
in the derealization of verbal meaning, the metaphysical is coupled with the physical at 
the expense of the subjectivity that otherwise functions as intermediary.   
 
maintaining an external counterpoint, an attempt to rescue what is lost in pain through its re-signification 
as by or for something. 
9 ibid, pp. 27-59.  
10 ibid, p. 118.  
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It would follow then that the manipulation of the flesh, in its capacity as self-
referential sign, allows us to challenge the boundedness that the body presumes. Much 
like the referent of the abject is not the source of filth or contamination in general but 
rather its “out-of-placeness,” the fragmented body also signals something more archaic 
than the sum of its scattered parts. The challenging of the integrality of the body, I argue, 
recalls the early circumstances of the (proto-)ego in the pre-ambivalent fullness of the 
chora, and in the simultaneous but violently alternating desire for and refusal of this 
situation, we discern the force of the death drive.   
Death according to Bataille, is not only a source of anguish, but also that by which 
we ecstatically escape our limited senses of self. An experience “on the level of death” 
occurs in erotic encounters or in moments of extreme emotion, “jerk[ing] us out of our 
tenacious obsession with the lastingness of our discontinuous being.”11 Death, by this 
understanding, corresponds to a wounding of the closed form of the individual, which in 
turn elicits a sense of continuity with other ruptured beings, an alternative, non-
discursive mode of communication. “Divine ecstasy and its opposite, extreme horror”12 
become interchangeable, if not equivalent, both threatening the self-contained nature of 
the subject through the suggestion of an undifferentiated existence beyond prevailing 
discursive or aesthetic frameworks that privilege visible presence or coherence. It is 
through this lens that I wish to interpret the representations of mysticism and martyrdom 
in the Catholic aesthetic: the open body lends its truth but because it cannot be objectified 
the referent must be held steadily visible.13 
This interpretation is far removed from a reading of repression of erotic desire as 
the feature of Christian sanctity, of asceticism as sublimated sexuality. To repeat Bataille’s 
 
11 Bataille, Erotism, p. 16.  
12 ibid, p. 207.  
13 Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 125.  
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words: “[l]et me stress that in this work flights of Christian religious experience and bursts 
of erotic impulses are seen to be part and parcel of the same movement.”14 By this reading, 
mysticism, like eroticism, corresponds to an exuberant excess or overflowing that arises 
from the sacrifice of the integrality of individual form (i.e. a loss of self).15 Both gravitate 
around an ineffable “lost object” – death – and to the transgression of the limits set by 
discontinuous being. And yet, as Bataille explains, the mystical experience is one of 
enigmatic interiority, an anguished “voyage to the end to the possible.”16 How then to 
express or communicate its formless content? Here I suggest that perhaps certain forms 
of representation – those which challenge or rupture the integrality of form – are capable 
of a deliberate destruction that evokes the same violent alternation of affects, the same 
ontological mutilation that we have been exploring thus far in relation to death.  
Kristeva writes of the “erotic cult of the abject.”17 Considered alongside Bataille’s 
work on the subject of transgression, alongside the deployment of the fragmented body 
as a (non-)object of religious contemplation, we might also discern a sacred cult of the 
abject. Would such imply a distinction between the two? I wish to argue here that the 
sacred and the erotic are not in the least exclusive domains. Culturally and historically 
perhaps they have been constructed as such, but on the level of psychic energetics they 
seem to operate according to the same primordial principle: non-differentiation or, in 
other words, death. That is to say, what is perceived as erotic in religion or, as pertains to 
this chapter more specifically, religious iconography suggests the concomitance of erotic 
and sacred activity. Viewed through the Bataillian lens of this investigation, both appear 
indicative of a deep-seated desire to be lost in what lies beyond limited being, to 
 
14 Bataille, Erotism, pp. 246-7, 259-60.  
15 See Thomas Minguy, “Erotic Exuberance: Bataille’s Notion of Eroticism” in PhænEx, Issue 12, 1 (2017), 
pp. 34-52.  
16 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 7 
17 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 55.  
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experience a divine/transgressive mode of communication in excess of discursive 
representation. In the case of mysticism for instance, God ceases to function as a concept 
and becomes instead the pure experience of rapture beyond rational explanation. 
However, whereas mysticism seeks the absence of objects in the experience of the divine 
One, eroticism seeks the absence of difference through fusion or the surpassing of form. 
Or, as Thomas Minguy writes, “[m]ysticism finds sense in the night of reason, where 
eroticism experiences the absurdity of chance.”18 Nevertheless, it is not my intention to 
argue that the two are one in the same, rather that they are alternative modes of 
expression of the same primordial tendency: the paradoxical desire for dissolution which, 
by my understanding, falls under the impossible articulation of the death drive.  
We might therefore expand our impression of religious thinking to assimilate as 
religious the experiences, embodied or aesthetic, which entail “the overcoming of the 
representation of selfhood upon which all acts of perceiving are mistakenly predicated.”19 
The experience of the sacred, then, might be vaguely traced as a rare harmony with the 
non-being that is always-already a part of being – the desire for death that resides in us 
like a trace and is partially eased in formless reflections. If, as all of this circuitous 
reasoning would suggest, religious contemplation as outlet for the death drive relies on a 
proximity to disquieting forms, then we have cause to revisit the field of religion from a 
unique perspective, focusing on its abject, excessive, and transgressive elements as the 
wellsprings of religious potential, and identifying the culmination of religion in the 
ecstatic loss of self, which in addition to being the decisive condition of eroticism, is both 
 
18 Minguy (2017), p. 48.  
19 S. Romi Mukherjee, “Apophasis in Representation: Georges Bataille and the Aesthetics of the Negative” 
in Durkheim, the Durkheimians, and the Arts, Ed. Alexander Tristan Riley, William Watts Miller, and 
W.S.F. Pickering, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 223-257; p. 243. Mukherjee offers a thorough 
exposition of Bataille’s aphophatic aesthetic, considering the theoretical performativity of base matter, 
“blind spots,” sacrifice, and formlessness as ethico-aesthetic affirmations of the ineffable.  
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a retreat from religion and its most radical configuration.  
 
AESTHETICS OF UNCERTAINTY  
Freud opens his 1919 paper on “The Uncanny” with the following lines: “[i]t is rarely that 
a psycho-analyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics, even when 
aesthetics is understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty, but the theory of the 
qualities of feeling.”20 I include this stipulation here because it encapsulates to some 
extent the aim of this chapter, which intends less to analyze what is seen and more so 
what is effected by the seeing – a certain feeling that is only uneasily contained by the 
image, an ambiguity or ambivalence that is perhaps the very resistance to containment. 
Much like Freud in his elaboration of the unheimlich, what motivates this speculative 
venture into aesthetics is something “remote,” something otherwise “neglected,” that 
which does not evoke positive sense-impressions but rather feelings of repulsion and 
distress.  
These aesthetic concerns can be traced to the 18th century elaborations of the 
sublime by Edmund Burke (1756) and Immanuel Kant (1790), both of whom, despite their 
disagreement as to the source of the pleasure derived from the sublime, discern therein a 
crisis. For Kant, the sublime is to be found in an experience of “boundlessness” that 
surpasses the faculties of the mind, suggesting that the sublime is not something that we 
might attribute to the external world but rather to the manner in which it overwhelms 
reason and opens up other forms of contemplation.21 Burke, however, emphasizes the 
psychosomatic response to the sublime over its transcendental prospectives, identifying 
 
20 Freud (1919b), “The Uncanny,” SE XVII, pp. 217-256; p. 219.  
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique on the Power of Judgement, Ed. Paul Guyer, Trans. Eric Matthews, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); See also Kant’s 1764 essay Observations on the Feeling 
of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Trans. John Turner Goldthwait, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1960).  
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the aesthetic pleasure associated with the sublime in an overpowering and bewildering 
coupling of fear and attraction that brings the individual to a realization of his limitations. 
He writes:  
astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, 
with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with 
its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on 
that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, 
that, far from being produced by them, anticipates our reasonings and 
hurries us on by an irresistible force.22  
This is of course a cursory summary of a field of philosophical inquiry nearly as vast as 
the sublime itself and which extends well beyond the psychoanalytic frame of this project. 
The emphasis here is more so on what certain aesthetic maneuvers suggest about 
subjectivity and its limits rather than aesthetics per se.23 In that regard, the relevance of 
Burke’s Romanticism and Kantian Idealism lies in the manner that elements of the two 
converge in the Freudian uncanny, where they are compounded by the impression that 
perhaps what renders the sublime likewise terrible and unthinkable is, in fact, an 
obscurity which always-already resides within the subject. Freud’s venture into the 
aesthetics of the unsettling renders the ambivalent feelings of awe and dread not as a 
response to something foreign, but as indicators of a confrontation with the externalized 
forms (or lack thereof) in which unconscious fears and desires take shape.  
As an aesthetic category, the uncanny refers to that which is frightening, which 
arouses dread or horror, and yet feels strangely familiar. Borrowing from Schelling, Freud 
 
22 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful, Ed. J. T. Bouton, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 57.  
23 For more on the confluence of these discourses, see: Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays on 
Psychoanalysis and the Sublime, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), and James Kirwan, 
Sublimity: The Non-Rational and the Irrational in the History of Aesthetics, (New York: Routledge, 
2005).  
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defines the uncanny as “everything that ought to have remained… secret and hidden but 
has come to light.”24 And referencing Ernst Jentsch, he associates the feeling of 
uncanniness with a situation of “intellectual uncertainty.”25 But for Freud such a 
definition is incomplete as it does not evoke the disquieting or sinister quality of the 
uncanny as that which feels unfamiliar without necessarily being new or unknown. 
Consequently, Freud locates the main source for an experience of the uncanny in the 
return to a familiar that has been repressed. The uncanny then is not simply that which 
causes fright or alarm, but that which does so on the condition that is not agreeable with 
the narcissistic fantasy: it is the return of that which must not or cannot be identified with 
or incorporated.  
The repressed remainder of language – and subjectivity as its counterpart – 
returns in the guise of a reminder: something has been overwritten; something eerie but 
intimate has been concealed. If there is then as Jentsch suggests, a feeling of uncertainty 
associated with the uncanny, it is not clarified by Freud’s analysis but deepened or 
doubled. That is, said uncertainty relates not to the difficulty of positioning that which is 
designated as uncanny, but rather to a precariousness that is always-already internal. As 
such, the uncanny signals a primal repression. Unlike the irreconcilability of an 
individually-specific wish or desire, the material of the primal repression is that which is 
not compatible with subjectivity itself: it is the very first repression of the unrepresentable 
that allows the “I” to come into its individuated being as such, the all that must be buried 
alive to give desire its borrowed priority. Hence the primal dread epitomized by the Sand-
Man: the tearing out of the eyes, those sense organs which privilege presence over absence 
and thus establish the primacy of the phallus. What is feared then: the loss of the eyes as 
 
24 Freud (1919b), “The Uncanny,” SE XVII, pp. 217-256; p. 224.  
25 Ernst Jentsch (1906), “The Psychology of the Uncanny” quoted in Freud (1919b), SEXVII, p. 221.  
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a form of castration, or the loss of the “I” in the realization that the feared castration has 
already occurred?  
Describing the uncanny as the aesthetic quality of the “fateful and inescapable,”26 
Freud’s paper makes several references to the repetition compulsion, to the dominance in 
the unconscious of an impulse to overrule the pleasure principle that “lend[s] to certain 
aspects of the mind their daemonic character.”27 The uncanny then does not necessarily 
signal dread at an external object, but rather at the inclination revealed by the paradoxical 
fascination or arousal which accompanies and likely exacerbates that dread, the return or 
upsurge of something “old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from 
it only through the process of repression.”28 Given Freud’s formulation of death as the 
situation of non-existence that precedes life, what might be older-established than the 
original “absence” out of which life emerges? And, drawing from previous chapters that 
consider death as a structural impossibility, what could be more repressed than that 
which, structurally-speaking, cannot be thought without negating the thinking subject? 
Freud himself concedes, “many people experience the feeling in highest degree in relation 
to death.”29   
But we have been considering these forces in terms of the dialectic of their 
operation, that is, in terms of the mutual bi-directionality of their functioning. Therefore, 
if death triggers an experience of the uncanny, then we might invert the formulation, 
positing the possibility of an experience “on the level of death” as evoked by a proximity 
to secondary “objects” associated with the primal repression. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the persistent presence of death in life as absent and inaccessible origin, introduces into 
 
26 Freud (1919b), “The Uncanny,” SE XVII, p. 237.  
27 ibid, p. 238.  
28 ibid, p. 241.  
29 ibid.  
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the psychic economy an instability that in turn operates as the very motor of psychic life. 
We find a similarly difficult dynamic in “The Uncanny” as Freud traces out the linguistic 
usage of the term “uncanny” and its supposed antonym in form of the “homely” or 
“familiar”: so great is the ambivalence produced by the unheimlich that it eventually 
coincides with the heimlich. This is to some extent the same paradox that Freud touches 
upon in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” in relation to the quantitative mechanics of 
pleasure and unpleasure. As mentioned in previous chapters, the speculations on the 
death drive that eventually followed did not minimize this paradox. They did however 
accommodate for the paradoxical combination of affects, suggesting a “beyond” where 
pleasure coincides with unpleasure such that the two become indistinguishable, indeed 
inseparable. Still, as the visceral response to the uncanny suggests, the coincidence of 
opposing affects does not collapse the conflict but rather sustains it through violent 
alternations and re-doublings: ontological uncertainty is not a position in and of itself, 
rather that which communicates a certain impossibility of positioning as a situation of 
intense restlessness, of trembling.  
As Freud explains, closely related to the uncanny are concerns regarding the 
difficulty in distinguishing animate from inanimate, real from imagined, original from 
copy, repetition, or double: “[a] particularly favorable condition for awakening uncanny 
feelings is created when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, 
and when an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one.”30 This feared but 
familiar double might be another person or object (e.g. a doppelganger, a life-like doll, 
etc.) but, given the line of reasoning expounded thus far, perhaps it is none other than the 
individual himself – the stabilizing “I” that we accept and invest in as our self though one 
is not reducible to the other. In what reads like the situation of alienation that results from 
 
30 ibid, p. 233.  
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the precipitation of the “I” according to Lacan’s theory of the mirror-stage: “…the subject 
identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt as to which himself is, or 
substitutes the extraneous self for his own.”31 And as if foreshadowing Lacan’s tripartite 
schema, Freud explains that the uncanny is experienced when the distinction between 
real and imaginary has been effaced, when a symbol becomes the thing it symbolizes or 
when something regarded as imaginary appears in its reality.32   
The representation of the self under the sign of the “I” – like representation in 
general – supposedly serves as a triumph both over material decomposition and symbolic 
fragmentation: the individual dies (or is already dead), but the “I” is the immortalization 
of the individual as an idea. The locating of oneself in an external counterpoint then 
represents a situation of doubling intended as a “preservation against extinction,”33 
perhaps even as a defense against the psychic current that propels us in that direction. 
However, the double is the figure that results from a split: something which was once 
whole has been divided.34 Thus, the externalized representation that initially serves to 
prop up one’s narcissism, to assure one’s “immortality,” becomes the uncanny reminder 
of a foundational uncertainty. If, as Ernest Becker suggests, we construct a symbolic world 
of meaning to counteract the physical reality of death,35 then the uncanny is a memento 
mori, not necessarily as a reminder of the inevitability of death itself but of its 
memorialization in the psyche as the ever-deferred wish or aim: the primordially 
 
31 ibid, p. 234.  
32 ibid, p. 244.  
33 ibid, p. 235.  
34 See Elisabeth Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 25-32, 227-230. Here Bronfen considers the literary and artistic 
trope of the dead woman in its doubleness, indicative of a violence of representation but also betraying the 
irrevocability of death in the imagination. The representation of the dead feminine, she argues, is a 
gesture of substitution that represses the inarticulable (i.e. death and femininity) by transforming it into 
image, but simultaneously the means through which that repressed returns to be “enjoyed” in its 
disguised articulation.  
35 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, (New York: The Free Press, 1973).  
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repressed desire to “[regress] to a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply 
from the external world and from other people.”36  
What is the source of anxiety then: the uncanniness of death, which is frightening 
but strangely familiar, or our own uncanniness as revealed by our desire for death? In 
eroticism, desire – a function of life as a continued situation of lack – converges with its 
own extinction in the fullness of death, and this categorical collapse confronts the viewer 
with the questions he must deny or disavow if he is to maintain any sense of stable 
identity. As a condition of fullness, of non-differentiation, death forces us to consider if 
we have not been our own double all along, closer to non-existence than we are willing to 
accept but “animated” by language or subjectivity. If we consider this in relation to the 
death drive, the thought is one as provocative as it is paralyzing. “Horror,” Bataille writes, 
“is the response to something incompatible with the tranquil unity of the self, it challenges 
the fragile ordering of a composite existence, decomposes me.”37 For Bataille, this 
decomposition, this vertiginous declivity into non-self and non-form defines the spiritual, 
the mystical, suggesting that on the path towards death, between the Lacanian subject 
and Bataille’s notion of continuity, lies an experience of de-differentiation. If we are 
obliged to position the Kristevan abject, it might be on either or both sides of this same 
boundary.  
The object, Kristeva explains, allows a subject to coordinate his or her desires in 
the constitutive lack of the symbolic order, thus perpetuating meaning and intersubjective 
relations. The abject however, is that which “disturbs identity, system, order. What does 
not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.”38 
But, as Rina Arya points out, the term loses much of its force when it is used as a catch-
 
36 Freud (1919b), “The Uncanny,” SE XVII, p. 236.  
37 Bataille, Erotism, p. 72. 
38 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4.  
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all for all things disagreeable. As in transgression, what is at stake in abjection is not a 
peculiar quality of the filthy, gruesome, or disgusting that we might interpellate or classify 
according to some abject taxonomy, but a total feeling of ambiguity: a disarray of inside 
and outside or the confusion of “I” and “other” epitomized by the maternal body that 
Kristeva designates as the object of abject par excellence.39    
We see here how the concept intersects with death as a pre-Oedipal, pre-symbolic 
situation of non-differentiation as well as with the sacred as a mode of activity in pursuit 
of the ‘oceanic.’ As the absence or rather failure of certain borders or boundaries, the 
interval between the confrontation with the abject and its rejection or disavowal is 
essentially an experience of the unassimilable. That is, it signals an experience of mutual 
contingency – “in-between, ambiguous, composite” – that is incompatible with 
subjectivity as the insistence on ontological integrity. In that this experience precedes and 
exceeds individuated modes of knowing, its “signified” is only accessible to consciousness 
as the experience of its own limits or gaps.  
In this sense, the abject might be likened to the Freudian uncanny. Lechte, for 
instance, offers a definition that draws from Freud’s concept as well as the Batallian 
notion of non-savoir, describing the abject as “what one would prefer not to know about 
and which, in a sense, one cannot ‘know’ to the extent that knowledge privileges the 
object.”40 However Kristeva specifies that her term implies a greater degree of violence or 
convulsiveness, at least in comparison to the uncanny. She intervenes as follows, 
describing the abject as:   
 
 
39 ibid, pp. 101-2. The association between the maternal and the semiotic is a recurring theme throughout 
Kristeva’s work. Curiously, Freud (1919b) also associates the “maternal” with the uncanny on the basis of 
castration anxiety, suggesting that fears/fantasies of being buried alive are transformations of another 
“lascivious” fantasy– that of returning to intra-uterine existence, (SE XVII, p. 244).   
40 John Lechte, “Abjection, art and bare life” in Abject Visions, Ed. Rina Arya and Nicholas Chare, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 14-29; p. 15. 
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a vision that resists any representation if the latter is to coincide with the 
presumed identity of what is to be represented. The vision of the abject is, 
by definition, the sign of an impossible object, a boundary and a limit. A 
fantasy, if you wish, but one that […] prevents images from crystallizing as 
images of desire and/or nightmare and causes them to break out into 
sensation (suffering) and denial (horror)…41  
That is to say that it is not abject matter as such that evokes horror but rather the difficulty 
it poses to systemic thought and its stabilization of difference through the crystallization 
of forms. The “narcissistic crisis”42 presented by the abject, then, appears rooted in the 
experience of non-logical difference that escapes symbolization, synthesis, or 
objectification in discourse. And yet, we are continually drawn to the abject as if by 
compulsion. Kristeva accounts for this tendency by arguing that in the confrontation with 
abject lies the excessive pleasure of jouissance. “Jouissance alone causes the abject to 
exist as such,” she writes. “One does not know it, one does not desire it, one joys in it. 
Violently and painfully.”43 Incidentally, these are also features of mystical experience, 
hence Kristeva’s assessment that “[t]he mystic’s familiarity with abjection is a fount of 
infinite jouissance.”44  
We can also liken the uncanny/abject to the sacred whose “contradictory 
morphology” also holds together antithetical meanings: high and low, holy and cursed, 
consecrated and condemned. 45 Bataille’s notion of base materialism helps to make sense 
of the relation between these two concepts. Developed in the late 20s and early 30s, this 
 
41 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 154.  
42 ibid, p.14.  
43 ibid, p. 9.  
44 ibid, p. 127.  
45 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, Trans. Willard Trask, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc., 1959). Of the distinction between sacred and profane, Eliade writes, “[t]he threshold is the limit, the 
boundary, the frontier that distinguishes and opposes two worlds – and at the same time the paradoxical 
place where those worlds communicate” (p. 25). See also Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).  
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notion reflects what Benjamin Noys describes as “the systematic exploration of the non-
systematic”46 through an emphasis on excluded modalities that demonstrate the vector of 
influence of the lowest of forms. According to the contradictory logic of base materialism, 
whatever is elevated or ideal is actually dependent on base matter – specifically it’s 
exclusion – and because of this dependence the purity of the ideal is contaminated. As 
Bataille writes in “The Big Toe,” man can only claim “a head raised to the heavens and 
heavenly things… on the pretext that he has [a] foot in the mud.”47 But what is effected 
here is not an inversion or a privileging of “low” over “high.” Rather, as Noys suggests, 
this manner of thinking undercuts altogether the opposition of high and low by 
foregrounding the instability of a radical contingency which refuses to settle in thought. 
While this is similar to Kristeva’s boundary-disturbing formulation of abjection, Bataille’s 
peculiar materialism insists that base or transgressive elements do more than disrupt or 
disgust: they disappear. As that which escapes capture by knowledge, base materialism 
gestures towards the active flux of instability that ruins the closure of any discourse; it is 
the hinge that links and disrupts philosophical oppositions, and the hinge between 
changing states that sullies in advance the purity of those states.48 To juxtapose this 
interpretation with the terminology of previous chapters, base matter challenges 
dialectical synthesis through the introduction of a “third term” which is the embodiment 
of a contradiction, much like death whenever we attempt to think it.  
As with the “opposition” between the heimlich and unheimlich that eventually 
coincide with one another, Bataille’s base materialism suggests a similar relation between 
the “lowest” modalities of organic life and the “highest” transcendent forms. Thus, like 
the uncanny and the abject, Bataille’s base materialism arouses the intolerable 
 
46 Noys (2000), p. 500.  
47 Bataille, “The Big Toe” in Visions of Excess, pp. 20-23; p. 20.  
48 Noys (2000), pp. 508-9.  
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contradictions that define the sacred. But what does the overlap of these aesthetic 
categories suggest? It is difficult, impossible even, to say given that the prevailing features 
of this aesthetic domain are ambiguity and ambivalence, but perhaps the violent 
alternations evoked by these unstable concepts and their referents are the only way to 
signal that which is barely presentable, which is the very impossibility of its appearing or 
being thought yet nevertheless is there.  
 
ARROWS OF DESIRE 
For the remainder of this chapter, I propose we consider more closely visual artifacts that 
attempt to convey the “impossible” through the reconfiguration of the body in excessive 
or abject states. Drawing from the categories and strategies elaborated above, I would like 
to view representations of the body in its convulsiveness, baseness, or “formlessness” as 
indicative of the r/Realism of a fragile subjectivity prone to breakdown or dissolution. I 
begin by considering the complexity of mystical jouissance conveyed as bodily pleasure 
in ambivalently eroticized images and the exorbitant expressiveness of the baroque.  
As discussed, the mystical experience appears to amplify the reciprocity of 
“wholeness” and insufficiency. Lacan’s Seminar XX: Encore elaborates the closeness of 
these terms in terms of sexual difference, where despite claiming to loosen the 
“masculine” and “feminine” positions from gendered expectations and expressions, he 
too gets caught in essentialism. This seminar reflects Lacan’s attempt at illuminating the 
“dark continent” of feminine sexuality, calling for an understanding of femininity that is 
not conditioned by phallic signification. Insofar as femininity is confined to this logic – 
and that little, if anything, can be said outside of this logic – Lacan makes the infamous 
claim that “the Woman does not exist”:  
woman [la femme] can only be written with the [la] crossed through. There 
is no such thing as woman [la femme] since of her essence – I’ve already 
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risked the term, so why should I think twice about it? – of her essence she 
is not all [pas tout].49  
There is much to take issue with here – more than can be accommodated in these few 
pages – and indeed many have already done so.50 Still, given portions dedicated 
specifically to mysticism and (feminine) jouissance, specifically “God and the Jouissance 
of Woman” and “A Love Letter,” it would be neglectful to omit in this context. In fact, here 
we find Lacan most adjacent to Bataille: Bataille’s mystico-erotic cosmology, though 
unmentioned by Lacan, appears refigured in terms of the doubleness of language and the 
vicissitudes of signification as suggested by the feminine position and the body.  
 
 
Figure 1. Lacanian diagram of sexual difference. Here $ corresponds to the 
(barred) subject, A to the (big) Other, a to the object a, and f to the phallus. 
 
49 Lacan, Seminar XX: Encore, 1972-1973. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 
Trans. Bruce Fink, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (New York/London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998), p. 
68.  
50 Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Toril Moi, Nancy Chodorow, and Jessica Benjamin are but a few to have 
posed interventions to Lacan’s formulation of sexual difference, but I hesitate to enter into these debates. 
First, it falls beyond the scope of this project, or rather, would correspond to another project altogether, in 
which the cultural and symbolic construction of sexual difference could be interrogated more closely. I am 
unable to do justice to these discourses here. Second, I have my own reservations about advancing any 
one position as they are deeply embedded in one another and their proliferation appears to me 
emblematic of the ontological crisis that lies “beyond the phallus.” I myself am disinclined towards 
Lacan’s reading. However, I am reminded of Juliet Mitchell’s appraisal: “psychoanalysis is not a 
recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one” (Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism, p. xiii).  
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Lacan’s graph of sexuation outlines the asymmetry of phallic logic across an abyss 
of non-relation. In that phallic logic “reconciles” this asymmetry through fantasy and the 
workings of partial drives, it renders a (non-existant) sexual relation whereby woman 
supports the phallic fantasy through femininity as masquerade. Femininity thus goes 
from being a riddle to an impasse.51 According to Lacan, this is a “privileged” vantage 
point from which to perceive the emptiness of the phallus. Still, as Luce Irigaray points 
out, it is hardly enviable.   
Whereas the feminine side of the graph operates according to the logic of “not-all” 
[pas-tout], the masculine side claims access to the whole through the function of 
exception – the big Other or primal father who is not subject to castration. On the basis 
of this distinction, Lacan differentiates between a phallic jouissance and ‘Other’ 
jouissance, the former corresponding to the dissatisfaction, frustration, or failure of 
attaining the object of desire, and the latter to a beyond-phallic experience akin to 
mysticism. Situating this ‘Other’ jouissance on the feminine side of the graph, Lacan 
formulates mysticism as a mode of feminine jouissance exemplified, in his view, by Saint 
Teresa of Avila though other religious figures – Saint John of the Cross and Saint 
Sebastian, for instance – might well fall into this category. We will come back to the 
subject of mysticism shortly, specifically the manner in which mystical non-savior evades 
narrative (or theoretical) closure. But, since Lacan’s interpretation of mystical jouissance 
is so closely bound with his elaboration of femininity, let us return for a moment to the 
graph itself, specifically, the manner in which the difference between the masculine and 
feminine positions is proposed via misalignments to a transcendental but empty signifier 
– the phallus. “As the transcendental signifier,” Hollywood explains, “the phallus takes 
 
51 See Luce Irigaray, “Blind spot of an old dream of symmetry” in Speculum Of the other woman, Trans. 
Gillian Gill, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 11-112.  
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the place of God or truth, that which ensures that the reality signified by language and 
language itself coincide.”52 However, the result is a circular dependency – as indicated by 
the wayward arrows of graph – whereby the phallus does not actually define the subject 
but lends itself to a signifying chain that then retroactively gives “significance” to the 
lacking (i.e. speaking) subject. Configured according to this logic of misrecognition, 
sexual difference then operates through the perpetuation of its inconsistencies.  
We see in the graph that the masculine subject ($) relates only to the objet a – not 
woman herself – and this is emblematic of the lack of (sexual) relationship: masculinity 
asserts itself on the basis of the fantasied acquisition or possession of an impossible object 
(i.e. the “object” capable of restoring the lost phallus), and the relation to woman is 
conditioned by the view of her as one such object. In other words, a barred/castrated 
subject ($) relates to the phallus which he does not possess by reducing “the woman” to a 
phantasmatic function that supports the claim to phallic mastery and totality. Or, as Ellie 
Ragland-Sullivan writes, “woman is man’s symptom of a refusal to believe he is not 
whole”53 nor capable of relating to the phallus as one’s own. Furthermore, no object can 
compensate for this deficiency and so the subject’s desire (i.e. to “be all” or “be whole”) 
can never be fulfilled.54  
The subject designated “man,” caught up in the fantasy of totality conferred by the 
would-be phallus, confuses objet a with the Other (A) as the unknowable locus and source 
of signification. The subject designated “woman,” on the other hand, is barred and 
 
52 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 154.  
53 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, “Introduction” in Lacan and the Subject of Language, Ed. Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan and Mark Bracher, (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 1-17; p. 7.  
54 As considered in Chapter 2, the speaking subject is patronized both by a fantasy of fullness and the 
threat of a loss that has always already occurred. And as Hollywood notes: “[t]ogether this fantasy and 
threat give rise to the subject’s ceaseless desire for the objet a through which it believes that it can fill in 
the gap in its being” (p. 158).” This “original lost object” is what the subject believes it has lost, that which 
would complete the subject if such a unity could be attained. However, this perpetual lacking establishes 
the mobility of desire and its endless deferral through signification, and thus is the very condition on 
which speaking itself rests.  
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dispossessed of the phallus; she is partial and always lacking from the standpoint of an 
imaginary male totality. However, recognizing that the objet a is merely a metonymic 
fantasy of the desire for unification or totality, this subject has access to the kernel truth 
of its being: regardless of claims to the phallus, it is always already partial and divested of 
the object of desire. Thus, woman marks the gravitational center of psychoanalytic 
discourse and of the phallus itself as “the signifier for which there is no signified, and 
which, in relation to meaning, symbolizes its failing.”55  
Woman in this scheme is figured as the remainder of the phallic economy, her 
sexuality as the encore that exceeds the phallic term as an organizing principle. Whereas 
the masculine subject is supported and duplicated in the phallic economy, “woman” is 
characterized by an internal doubleness: the ability to relate to the phallus as well as to 
that which is “beyond the phallus” and cannot be accommodated within the phallic 
economy. This ‘supplementary’ jouissance reveals that economy to be a restricted one; 
the very principle that maintains the phallic economy on the basis of exclusion operates 
as a threat by calling attention to its inadequacy. Were it possible to stabilize this 
‘supplementary’ jouissance in the economy, it would cease to be the “beyond-phallic” 
jouissance that it is. Indeed, according to Lacan, this ‘feminine’ jouissance cannot be 
located and, consequently, cannot be constrained in (analytic) discourse: women 
experience it, but “know nothing about it.”56  
On the grounds of feminine lack, he aims to expose the fundamental 
méconnaissance of the masculine position. That is, if the Freudian subject can never be 
anything other than a mystery to itself, then the woman who “does not know,” in whom 
“there is always something […] which escapes discourse,”57 appears to be in a unique 
 
55 Lacan, Encore, p. 74.  
56 ibid, p. 71.  
57 ibid, p. 34.  
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position in regard to an understanding of subjectivity. However, as Juliet Mitchell and 
Jacqueline Rose observe, his formulation lapses into an essentialist mystification of 
woman that is not unlike the very fantasy he is trying to expose.58 Nevertheless, the idea 
of an ecstatic pleasure that comes from the refusal of the phallus in favor of a relation with 
the “not all” calls to mind Bataille’s self-defeating non-savior and the continuity he 
considers is realized in the encounter with one’s own contingency. As Hollywood explains, 
“[o]n the one hand, [Lacan] upholds a position of male psychoanalytic mastery, 
reinscribing the phallic father who is supposed to know against the claims of femininity; 
yet at the same time, this position of mastery claims its own emptiness, a self-subversion 
that Lacan reads in terms of femininity.”59   
 
 
Figure 2. Gian Lorenzo Bernini, The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa (1647-1652), 
Cornaro Chapel, Santa Maria della Vittoria, Rome. 
 
58 See Juliet Mitchell’s “Introduction – I” and Jacqueline Rose’s “Introduction – II” in Feminine 
Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudianne, Trans. Jacqueline Rose, Ed. Juliet Mitchell and 
Jacqueline Rose, (New York/London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982), pp. 6-9, 31-37.  
59 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p.160.  
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As an example of this less than/more than subject who both lacks yet exists in 
excess of any lack, Lacan considers Saint Teresa of Avila, further supporting the case for 
an associative link between the mystical experience and the instability underlying the 
psychoanalytic edifice. Hollywood considers the alliance between these discourses in 
detail, noting that “[t]he issue of the scientific status of psychoanalysis leads Lacan to 
Christianity and to the baroque (a return to the sources of Christianity, he says), for 
Christianity, like psychoanalysis, deals with that which cannot be fully known.”60 Both 
gravitate around the impossible desire of the subject, striving for an absolute other 
through which it might be fulfilled only to realize that “fulfillment” comes through a 
recognition/collapse of the subject’s own lack and the unattainability of this other within 
the logic of subjectivity. In other words, the ability to set totality as a goal comes at the 
cost of castration and, consequently, “satisfaction” takes the form of relinquishing the 
goal itself. Apophatic and paradoxical, this thinking bears the characteristics of what 
Certeau calls the mystic’s modus loquendi.61 Indeed, Lacan likens his own Ecrits to such 
“mystical ejaculations,” considering them “of the same order” – “in sum the best thing 
you can read.”62  
We see in The Triumph of Religion to what extent Lacan’s articulation of religious 
sentiment draws from an upbringing permeated with Catholicism; he himself 
acknowledges that he is “the product of priests.” However, unlike Freud’s “justified 
denial” of religious experience, which nevertheless leans on the Judeo-Christian 
mentality he eschews,63 Lacan elevates the Catholic imagination and its ability to saturate 
 
60 ibid, p. 162.  
61  Michel de Certeau, The Mystic fable, Vol. 1, Trans. Michael B. Smith, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), pp.113-56. Certeau also includes a brief section on the affinities between psychoanalysis and 
mystic speech, both of which he considers as disruptive to hierarchies of knowledge (p. 6-9).  
62 Lacan, Encore, p. 71.  
63 Lacan, The Triumph of Religion, Trans. Bruce Fink, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 26. 
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the unbearable Real with meaning. “The real we have thus far,” he writes, “is nothing 
compared to what we cannot even imagine, precisely because the defining characteristic 
of the real is that one cannot imagine it.”64 But whereas psychoanalysis, he claims, is itself 
a symptom of the dissatisfaction that results from this situation, “religion is invincible.”65 
Why? Because it does not seek to get “get to the bottom of [the Real]”66 but to fill this 
insistent, elusive aporia with significance. In Seminar XX, Lacan plays both sides with 
characteristic rhetorical arrogance, extolling the unreadability of a “feminine” mysticism 
while expounding its anomalous eloquence. Viewing Saint Teresa’s jouissance as 
something of a voyeur, of Bernini’s baroque sculpture of her moment of ecstasy (See 
Figure 2) he writes:  
There is a jouissance proper to her, to this “her” which does not exist and 
which signifies nothing. There is a jouissance proper to her and of which she 
herself may know nothing, except that she experiences it – that much she 
does know. She knows it of course when it happens. It does not happen to 
all of them.67  
In other words, “she” experiences a pleasure but is unable to either understand or 
articulate this pleasure. Constructed entirely in the negative terms of non-existence and 
non-signification, “she” is merely a channel for a jouissance that remains a mystery: “you 
only have to go and look at Bernini’s statue of Saint Teresa in Rome to understand 
immediately that she’s coming [jouit], there is no doubt about it. And what is her 
jouissance, her coming from? It is clear that they are experiencing it but know nothing 
about it.”68 Unlike “her” and “them,” Lacan assumes the position of the one who knows, 
the $ from whom something is being withheld and yet purports to know more, even if all 
 
64 ibid, p. 76.  
65 ibid, p. 64.  
66 ibid, p. 78. 
67 Lacan, Encore, p. 145.  
68 ibid, p. 70.  
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he knows is that “she” doesn’t.  
In her autobiographical writings, Saint Teresa, the unknowing subject, describes 
rather viscerally the jouissance eulogized by Bernini in marble and by Lacan in text:   
I saw an angel close by me, on my left side, in bodily form. […] I saw in his 
hand a long spear of gold, and at the iron's point there seemed to be a little 
fire. He appeared to me to be thrusting it at times into my heart, and to 
pierce my very entrails; when he drew it out, he seemed to draw them out 
also, and to leave me all on fire with a great love of God. The pain was so 
great, that it made me moan; and yet so surpassing was the sweetness of 
this excessive pain, that I could not wish to be rid of it. The soul is satisfied 
now with nothing less than God. The pain is not bodily, but spiritual; 
though the body has its share in it, even a large one.69   
We do not need to dig too deep in either the image or text to recognize the convulsions by 
which the mystic body becomes interpreted as a site of pleasure. The experience does of 
course resemble sexual agitation, but according to Bataille, the reduction of mysticism to 
“a neurotic state of exaltation” reflects a “superficial conclusion.”70 Rather, “the 
comparison implicit in the language of the mystics between the experience of divine love 
and that of sexuality, emphasizes the aptness of sexual union to symbolize a higher 
union.”71 Elaborating this subtlety, Bataille maintains that the connection between 
‘mystical’ and ‘sexual’ corresponds to “the gulfs of terrifying darkness that belong equally 
to both domains”72 – the act of dying to oneself whose after-taste is not unlike that of le 
petit mort.73 In Lacan, however, this mystical ecstasy is signified as a case of 
 
69 The Life of Saint Teresa of Jesus of The Order of Our Lady of Carmel (c. 1565), Trans. David Lewis 
(1904), chapter xxix, 16-17; my emphasis.   
70 Bataille, Erotism, p. 226. Bataille devotes an entire chapter to mysticism and sensuality, arguing that 
“nothing is further from [his] thought than a sexual interpretation of the mystic life such as Marie 
Bonaparte and James Leuba have insisted on,” (p. 224) as such a view reduces mystical experience to 
“nothing but transposed sexuality and hence neurotic behavior” (p. 225).   
71 ibid, p. 223.  
72 ibid, p. 222.  
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 233 
Other/feminine/supplementary jouissance  that emerges in and through the recognition 
of the emptiness of claims to the phallus: forgoing the masculine position and its claims 
to an always (at least in part) illusory power in favor of the “not all” of femininity marks 
an encounter with the Real.74 But what are we to make of the proliferation of signifiers 
around this jouissance? Is this a conflation of excess, Woman, and the Other or a 
confusion endemic to any attempt at beyond-phallic signification?  
Elizabeth Roudinesco suggests that Lacan’s notion of the Real, particularly in this 
late seminar, is endebted to Bataille and the notion of heterogeneity.75 Lacan, she argues, 
disarticulates heterogeneity from Bataille’s “general economy” and places it within 
psychoanalytic theory as the Real. Unfathomable, undifferentiated, and irreducible this 
becomes the decontextualized aim of analytic discourse, that which is inaccessible to 
thought because it fragments the subject and, simultaneously, reveals subjectivity as 
provisional on fragmentation.76 Lacan, like Bataille, associates this ineffability to mystical 
ecstasy. However, despite their personal proximity,77 in this context Lacan makes no 
explicit reference to the general economy or inner experience, both concepts elaborated 
by Bataille over the course of the 1940s.  
Despite Lacan’s passing mentions of “transgressive enjoyment” and Bataille’s more 
experimental works,78 Bataille is mentioned in the context of a “mystical experience” only 
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77 As both Roudinesco (1995) and Surya (2002) recount, in 1941 Lacan married Bataille’s former wife, 
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emphasis on the paternal function (and especially the Name-of-the-Father) as a reaction to these 
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78 At the end of Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan mentions Bataille’s critical reading of 
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(Seminar IX) and alludes to Story of the Eye in his discussion of the relationship between the objet a and 
the scopic field in ‘The sinthome’ (Seminar XIII).   
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in a footnote to the 1955 paper “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of 
Psychosis.” Here, Lacan revists Freud’s analysis of Daniel Schreber, a “case study” of 
psychosis – the threshold of psychoanalysis – as conducted on the basis of Schreber’s 
memoirs.79 Freud interprets Schreber’s delusion – namely that his “unmanning” was 
necessary in order that he may copulate with God and thus redeem the entire world – as 
a result of repressed homosexual desire. Lacan, returning to Freud, argues that it must be 
the failure of the paternal metaphor (i.e. the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father) that 
gives psychosis its structure. Elaborating psychosis as indicative of a particular 
relationship to the signifier, Lacan writes “nowhere is the symptom more clearly 
articulated in the structure itself, assuming one know how to read it.”80 The 
communication between Schreber and his divine interlocutor, he continues, appears to 
occur through “autonymous” messages whereby “the signifier itself (and not what it 
signifies) is the object of communication.”81  
Lacan concludes this paper with the association of Schreber’s psychotic episodes 
with “inner experience”82 and the insight that “God is a whore,” clarifying in the following 
note: “The inner experience I am speaking of here is a reference to Georges Bataille’s 
work. In Madame Edwarda, he describes the odd extremity of this experience.”83 To 
contextualize, Bataille’s story begins in a brothel, with Madame Edwarda revealing “the 
old rag and ruin”84 as she declares herself to be GOD – ostensibly supporting Lacan’s case 
for the overlapping of mystical and feminine jouissance. Later, when she and the arguably 
 
79 Freud (1911a), “Psycho-analytic notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia” in SE XII, 
pp. 9-84. Freud’s analysis is based on Daniel Schreber’s own account of his mental collapse as recounted 
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80 Lacan, “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” in Ecrits, pp. 531-584; p.537. 
81 ibid, p. 538. 
82 ibid, 582-3. 
83 ibid, p. 584, n. 36.  
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autobiographical narrator take to the streets, he perceives in her heightening sexual 
abandon something at once lifeless and convulsive, “distressing as an emptiness” in which 
meaning is both absent and overabundant: “I realized that she wasn’t frolicking, wasn’t 
joking, […] that She had not lied, that She was GOD.” 85 This apophatic realization paired 
with the proximity to such a “foreign existence”86 casts him out of himself in an experience 
of feverish vertigo, and yet at the same time fills him “with an exhausting impression of 
bearing witness to a miracle.”87 Her rapture reverberates in him as a crisis beyond 
legibility.88    
Lacan compares the revelation of Madame Edwarda with Bataille’s inner 
experience and stipulates that both are identical to Schreber’s psychotic break. According 
to Andrew Ryder, however, there are inconsistencies in the elision that Lacan effects here:  
Schreber’s consideration of otherness is a hollow one that relies on 
identification with himself with a sun that sheds light on everything and 
cannot contemplate darkness; his language is an eternal linking of self with 
other. […] Conversely, Bataille’s understanding of language insists on the 
reliance of life on death, knowledge on non-knowledge, identity on 
difference, and not through a monistic uniting of these opposites but rather 
an awareness of the gap between them and an openness to the outside. 89 
It is worth noting that, as a derealization of meaning that alters the relation to the external 
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87 ibid, 158. Bataille describes his experience of Edwarda’s abandonment as “the quick truth of an arrow: 
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89 Andrew Ryder, “Inner Experience is not Psychosis: Bataille’s Ethics and Lacanian Subjectivity” in 
Parrhesia, No. 9 (2010): 94-108; p. 99.   
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world, psychosis was etiologically the closest to mystical ecstasy that had thus far 
appeared psychoanalytic literature – both fundamentally other to diagnostic 
classification and thus beyond the possibility of psychoanalytic “cure.” Indeed, most 
‘classical’ readings of mystical experience tended to view it as a regressive flee from 
reality, much like schizophrenic delusion.90 And yet, for all of his skepticism about 
religiosity, Freud offers a compelling “conclusion” to the Schreber case: “[i]t remains for 
the future to decide whether there is more delusion in my theory than I would like to 
admit, or whether there is more truth in Schreber’s delusion than other people are as yet 
prepared to admit.”91 Lacan, in a sense, echoes this consideration, insisting that “we must 
listen to the speaker, when what is at stake is a message that does not come from a subject 
beyond language, but from speech beyond the subject.”92 Still, codified in the terms of 
oedipality and phallogocentrism, sensual experience with God (e.g. bliss, rapture, or 
Schreber’s “soul-voluptuousnsess”) is propped up by hermetic constructions of 
homosexuality and femininity.93  
Whereas in Bataille’s writing, inner experience corresponds to an encounter with 
the contingency of being, in Lacan this ecstatic jouissance is formulated as a procedure 
unavailable to phallic logic. The latter helps to (re)contextualize the impossible 
sovereignty implied by the former as a situation of discursive collapse brought on by an 
awareness of the emptiness of the anchoring signifier. That is, Lacan’s emphasis on the 
doubleness of signification, allows us to describe mysticism as a particular relation to 
language itself. Hollywood summarizes that relation as follows: “mysticism seeks the 
transcendental signifier but discovers the paradoxical play of presence and absence 
 
90 See W. W. Meissner’s “On Putting a Cloud in a Bottle: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Mysticism,” The 
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92 Lacan, “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” p. 574.  
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through which signification is made possible.”94 The result is a destabilization of 
signifying logic and subjective positioning, a situation which corresponds to Bataille’s 
notion of non-savior or, in Lacanian terms, an encounter with the Real. Lacan’s 
formulation, however, is complicated by the fact that he elides the mystical with the 
feminine on the basis of their unavailability to the masculine position. Despite the 
insistence against an anatomical reading, the phallus is not in the least arbitrary, and the 
understanding of “woman” as “not all” is at least metaphorically based on a supposed 
anatomical lack. This conflation creates a difficult and doubly-frustrating situation for the 
subject designated woman: as the always partial subject that “knows nothing,” the barred 
subject, blind to its own paucity, talks over her. But what is to suggest that “the woman” 
who “does not know” is unaware of her unknowing? 
For example, Saint Teresa of Avila outlines in her autobiographical work the 
procedures through which she comes to a union with the divine. However, in her ecstatic 
state she is absorbed into God, losing perception of her body and her senses: 
How what is called union takes place and what it is, I cannot tell. It is 
explained in mystical theology, but I cannot use the proper terms: I cannot 
understand what mind is, or how it differs from soul or spirit. They all seem 
one to me, though the soul sometimes leaps out of itself like a burning fire 
that has become one whole flame and increases with great focus. The flame 
leaps very high above the fire. Nevertheless it is not a different thing, but 
the same flame which is in the fire. You, sirs, with your learning will 
understand this. I cannot be more explicit.95  
She speaks in flames, but we can discern ‘oceanic’ ebbings in the interplay of non-
differentiation and particularity, the experience of Oneness erupting as an ontological 
 
94 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 149.  
95 Teresa of Avila, The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself, Trans. J. M. Cohen, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1957), chp. 18, p. 2.  
 238 
problem. Equally significant is the fact she knows that she does not know, indeed “cannot 
be more explicit” about it, consigning to her learned confessors the task of “coherently” 
articulating this experience. But as we saw in the previous chapter, unknowing itself is the 
feature of mysticism, both cause and effect of the self-shattering core of mystical 
jouissance. In that case, where are we to position Lacan’s claims?  
Lacan is certainly aware of the self-subversion he is executing in Encore. Still, does 
he effectively displace his own knowing, or does he replicate the very positioning for which 
he critiques Jean-Martin Charcot?  
Charcot and his circle attempted to reduce the mystical to questions of 
fucking. If you look carefully it’s not that at all. This jouissance that one 
experiences and about which one knows nothing, might this not be that 
which puts one on the path of ex-istence? And why not interpret one face of 
the Other, the God face, as supported by feminine jouissance?96  
Two discourses seem to emerge around ecstasy in psychoanalysis: pathologization or the 
translation of mystical non-savior in terms of sexual difference. The two overlapped in 
Charcot’s clinical theater (See Figure 3), wherein the provoked bodily contortions and 
“delirious fits” of hysteric patients were likened to the expressions of religious ecstasy and 
possession and, in turn, interpreted as indicators that mystics and demoniacs had in fact 
been suffering from hysteria.97 The result was a pictorial and highly eroticized 
representation of hysteria that doubled as “evidence” of the pathology behind ecstasy. 
Within Lacan’s notion of sexuation, this integration of hysteria, ecstasy, and illness seems 
indicative of the masculine fantasy, of the $ that turns into an object of inquiry that which 
seems to evade understanding and indeed only exists on, in, and as that condition.   
 
96 Lacan, Encore, p. 71.  
97 For more on the intersections of hysteria, religious experience, and dramatization in Charcot’s work at 
the Saltpêtriére, see Cristina Mazzoni’s Saint Hysteria: Neurosis, Mysticism, and Gender in European 
Culture, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), and Asti Hustvedt’s Medical Muses: Hysteria in 19th 
century Par, (London: Bloomsbury,  2011).  
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Figure 3. André Brouillet, A Clinical Lesson at the Salpêtrière (1887),  
Descartes University, Paris.  
 
In this vein, it is noteworthy that along with the depiction of Saint Teresa’s ecstasy, 
Bernini grouped sculpted busts of his patrons, the eight Cornaro men, in the side walls of 
the chapel. Leaning on the mantels, they seem to be poised to witness, mirroring the 
scopic order of the Saltpêtriére. Yet, most of the Cornaro busts are sculpted with their 
gaze looking elsewhere, either discussing with one another or reading. Only one of the 
busts is turned toward the sculpture of Saint Teresa, but by placing the sculpture in an 
edicule, Bernini has set her beyond their sight. The event of her vision occurs in a sphere 
of its own, removed from the eyes of the commissioning beholders. The chapel is thus 
converted into a theater for the vicissitudes of desire, the lack of (sexual) relationship. As 
is Lacan’s seminar: in reading the woman, Bernini’s Saint Teresa, as “a female orgasm 
constituted by the male gaze,”98 Lacan reproduces this scene. So, as Méira Cook asks, 
where do we position ourselves in these texts: as subject or as viewer, as the woman 
having an experience of God or as the spectator having a fantasy of the woman’s 
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experience?99 Reading from the phallic side of the graph, we are made aware of an ‘Other’ 
jouissance, but is there an ‘Other’ way to read?  
Beyond the plausibly sinthomatic attempts to force into signification and scientific 
discourse that which destabilizes both, the iconicity of ecstasy gestures towards the 
importance of the visual, specifically the representation of the body and its excesses: that 
which cannot be constrained to signification appears to be expressed through an aesthetic 
where the referent overflows the semblant. In mystic writing, “image-laden narrative,” 
interchangeable metaphors, and the impossibility of ontological positioning reflect in 
discourse what Cook describes as a body that “cannot be grasped except in effigy.”100 This 
raptured body cannot itself be reduced to a figure of speech as neither subjective 
experience nor signification can carry the ontological burden of its experiences. The 
unbridled, labored, and overwrought aesthetic of the baroque, however, seems disposed 
to such excesses. Like the sculpted folds of Saint Teresa’s gown which overtake her figure, 
the immoderate materiality of the baroque threatens to supersede signification and 
mimesis as the objectives of representation.  
Aligning all of this with Lacan’s seminar, Hollywood states: “Lacan’s allusions to 
mystical texts and the baroque, together with his account of the goal of psychoanalytic 
practice, suggest that in his work jouissance is elicited through the engulfing of 
representation by the materiality of the sign.”101 The baroque, she continues, as “an art of 
excess in which that represented is always in danger of being overwhelmed by 
ornamentation,”102 seems well-suited to this purpose:  
When the materiality of the sign (whether pictorial or linguistic) takes 
precedence over representation and signification, meaning is effaced, and 
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the subject, as a linguistic, meaning-communicating being, is shattered. The 
collapse of the distance between the sign and its referent, rather than 
effecting the unity or plenitude of being, effaces meaning, signification, and 
subjectivity.103 
As Bersani argues in his elaboration of a death-driven aesthetic, the means of expressing 
that which is in excess of the normal range of sensation appears to be through a sensuality 
that exceeds its own representation.  
 
 
Figure 4. Matti Preti, Saint Sebastian (1657), Museo di Capodimonte, Naples. In addition to his 
religious import as a Christian martyr, the languishing Saint Sebastian is also something of an 
erotic icon, arguably owing to the subtext of depictions such as these where baroque suffering is 
mixed with androgynous eroticism. See, for example, Derek Jarman’s 1976 film Sebastiane. 
 
Lacan’s seminar, in elaborating feminine jouissance as both within and beyond 
language, also suggests that another disposition or approach is possible, one “not all” 
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governed by the phallus and characterized by the immediacy and intimacy of its relation 
to the Real. Insofar as the other two registers are concerned, this “return to the body” is 
expressed through representations that renounce their own claims to meaning and which, 
in turn, expose the phantasmatic quality of appeals to unity or totality.104 But, by utilizing 
the language of castration and paternity to name this irreconcilable wound in subjectivity, 
Lacan continues to privilege the masculine position, thereby upholding the very fantasy 
he seeks to subvert. Positing “woman” as an emblem of some impossible “truth” or a 
means of refinding a lost plenitude, he reifies a situation of exclusion.   
For Bataille, however, the excluded element is that which always threatens to 
wreck the restricted economy which casts it out. Furthermore, in Bataille’s view, 
subjective integrity is foreclosed from the outset, giving way to an ethical situation 
whereby communication occurs through a recognition of mutual laceration rather than a 
fetishization of the other’s lack. Like Lacan’s ‘Other’ jouissance, Bataille’s inner 
experience is poised between masochism and the traumatic encounter with a radical 
otherness, both signaling the contingency which quakes the core of an always already 
precarious subjectivity. In turn, the representation of jouissance, like the textuality of 
inner experience, corresponds to a recognition of the hole or laceration in being which 
gives way to the ceaseless repetition of desire around that emptiness. This anguished 
ecstasy is immortalized in Bernini’s marble, where the confluence upturned eyes, an open 
mouth, and a menacing arrow dissolve the restricted dichotomies of pleasure and pain, 
sacred and profane: the experience never culminates, the viewer never quite knows now 
to signify it, and the Real emerges again and again in this interminable doubling.   
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THE EPHEMERAL SKIN  
Freud writes in The Ego and the Id, “[the ego] is not merely a surface entity, but is itself 
the projection of a surface.”105 The speculative inquiry regarding the integration of psyche 
and soma, however, appears in embryonic form as early as Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (1895). Therein Freud proposes the psychic apparatus – a collection of 
neuronal networks organized and operating together to bind the otherwise diffuse 
intensities of sensory experience. Though Freud would abandon this particular model, the 
idea that integration on the mental plane (or the difficulty thereof) has physiological 
causes and consequences remains a defining feature of the distinct materialism of the 
symptom. Specifically though, I would like to focus on the primary experience of 
corporeality as a template for the various binding principles at work in the psyche. 
Freud writes of a permeable contact-barrier that facilitates the regulation of 
energetic flux;106 of a protective shield which protects the organism from excessive 
excitations;107 and of a psychical envelope that sheathes the fluctuating sensations, 
functions, and structures that together comprise individual experience.108 All gesture 
towards a complex, dynamic boundary between “outside” and “inside.” Didier Anzieu 
argues that these operations have a bodily equivalent in the perceptive surface that 
stretches over the body and sutures together the otherwise diffuse sensations of a proto-
ego: the skin. This outermost membrane, he suggests, serves as “the backdrop against 
which psychical contents stand out as figures, or alternatively the containing envelope 
which makes it possible for the psychical apparatus to have contents.”109 Through a close 
consideration of the functions of containment, protection, and inscription, he 
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demonstrates how we might understand the skin as a surrogate for the ego. In this 
reading, the tactile envelope, in its “proper” functioning, connects a multitude of 
sensations and localized intensities which are in turn conceived of as operating on, in, or 
against a unified body. The result is a sense of subjective consolidation as well as 
spatiotemporal continuity – an entity held together by the sustained and boundaried 
experience of its sensations. A defect in this function, however, gives rise to the anxiety of 
the body being fragmented or dismantled – an anarchic independence of the various 
sense organs.  
If, following Freud’s elaboration, we consider ego feeling as the original narcissistic 
investment, then we are confronted with the fact that the self-preservative tendency has 
at first no object. We could turn here to Lacan and the (mis)identification with the spectral 
image encompassed in his theory of the mirror-stage, whereby the reflection serves an 
external counterpoint for the body image that can then be submitted to symbolization. 
But I wish to consider how the experience of skin itself operates as an intermediary 
between the nascent ego and its figurative representations. This is not to say that one 
interpretation is more or less alienating than the other, but rather to highlight that the 
skin too is a reflexive surface, one which corresponds not only to a visible index of 
intactness but also to a corporeal experience which may vacillate between unified and 
highly fragmented.  
For Anzieu, the initial narcissistic investment appears to be contingent upon a 
mental representation of the body elaborated by the ego at an early stage in order to 
construct itself as a container capable of holding psychic contents.110 “[B]ody image [thus] 
belongs to the order of phantasy and secondary development; it is a representation 
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acting on the body.”111 Propped up by the visible surface onto which in turn it is projected, 
this proxy is designated by Anzieu as the skin ego.  
From this perspective, the mirror simply reflects back to the individual the 
functions of his own skin. However, as Anzieu notes, this is not without complications:    
…the skin appears in numerous ways to function in a paradoxical manner, 
to such a degree indeed that we may ask whether the paradoxicality of the 
mind is not to some extent grounded in that of the skin. The skin shields the 
equilibrium of our internal functioning from exogenous disruptions, but in 
its form, texture, coloring, and scars it preserves the marks of those 
disruptions. And through it a great deal is in fact revealed to the outside 
world about that inner state which it is supposed to protect… The skin is 
both permeable and impermeable, superficial and profound, truthful and 
misleading…112  
Skin, it appears, possesses a structural primacy over the other senses: it covers the entire 
body, is capable of registering different sensations (i.e. pressure, contact, heat, pain, etc.), 
and as Freud also remarked, it is the only sense which possesses a reflexive structure.113 
It is seen like any other object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one 
“active” and one “passive.” Capable of this reflexivity as well as both internal and external 
perception, skin operates as a seam between differentiation and integration, between 
sensory experience and representation. It is the effort on behalf of an open system to self-
regulate: a mode of containment but also of communication, a barrier but also an 
interface. In short, skin is many things but rarely is it just skin.  
The same might be said of the skin ego, which Anzieu describes as “a reality of the 
order of phantasy.”114 As an intermediate structure demanded by the psyche for its 
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functioning, it is always-already distorted by that demand. We see this in cutaneous 
fantasies which mobilize the body’s surface, contributing to ego structuring but also 
capable of reflecting the failure of that structuring. For instance, the narcissistic tendency 
finds in the skin a confirmation of the integrity it anticipates, whereas a masochistic 
tendency seeks through this surface a representation or recognition of lack of integrity. In 
each of these configurations, the skin functions symbolically, either assuaging inner 
conflict vis-à-vis the unified image or rendering that conflict on the surface of the body 
such that the condition of the body image corresponds with its uneasy content. Continuity 
of self appears to rely upon a complementarity of “shell” and “kernel.”  
According to Anzieu then, the skin ego functions simultaneously as a sac, a sieve, 
and a screen. But what about an anti-function? If threat to form corresponds to threat to 
content, it would follow that trauma to the bodily envelope presents a challenge to the 
boundedness that the individual otherwise presumes on the basis of the body and its 
image.  
Freud explains in Project, that intense and lasting pain disorganizes the psychical 
apparatus, threatens the psyche’s integration with the body, affects the capacity to desire, 
and disturbs thinking. As noted by Anzieu, if pleasure is the experience of “the 
complementarity of differences,” then “pain is the ordeal of de-differentiation”: it bursts 
through contact barriers, short-circuits the distinction between quality and quantity, and 
produces a topographical disturbance, “obliterat[ing] the founding and structuring 
distinctions between the bodily and psychical ego.115 While this is an account of physical 
pain, given the transposition of the bodily surface onto the psychical plane I believe we 
might effect a reversal here. After all, if the skin ego suffers a damage or the failure of its 
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containing function, what becomes of the psychical contents it holds together? According 
to Anzieu, the result might be one of two forms of anxiety:  
An instinctual excitation that is diffuse, constant, scattered, non-localizable, 
non-identifiable, unquenchable, results when the psychical topography 
consists of a kernel without a shell; the individual seeks a substitute shell in 
physical pain or psychical anxiety; he wraps himself in suffering. In the 
second case, the envelope exists but its continuity is broken into by holes. 
This skin ego is a colander: thoughts and memories are only with difficulty 
retained; they leak away…116  
In either case we are faced with the crisis of a containing materiality that cannot stabilize 
its immaterial contents.  
 
 
Figure 5. Juan Valverde, “Male Figure with Skin Removed” from 
Historia de la composicion del cuerpo humano (1560).  
 
 
116 ibid, p. 102.  
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Accepting that psychical integrity corresponds to a degree of intactness or 
continuity as conveyed by the body’s surface, what is conveyed by the bodily envelope in 
its tenuousness? If the former corresponds to the binding principles of self-preservative 
instinct, then the latter disrupts the logic of self-representation and, in turn, subjectivity. 
Or, to juxtapose the ego and its surrogate, we could say that the torn or wounded skin 
evokes a crucial detail of Freud’s second topography: the aperture in its depth indicating 
that the ego cannot be posited as a closed system, that its boundaries cannot be sealed 
because it is always subject to the influence of drive. Perhaps then it is not only the intact 
body which satisfies a psychic demand…  
 
 
Figure 6. Marco d’Agrate, Saint Bartholomew Flayed (1562), Duomo, Milan.  
 
From this perspective there is something to be said about violent, grotesque, and 
formless imaginings of the body as representations of an underlying uneasiness. These, I 
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argue, are visual strategies corresponding less to the character of the image itself and 
more so to the difficult sense-impressions elicited: representations of the body in its raw 
corporeality reconfigure the body not as an external static representation but as a unit 
prone to breakdown and fragmentation, dismemberment and dissolution. “Skin,” Anzieu 
reminds us, “peels away as easy as paper.”117  
 
 
Figure 7. Michelangelo, detail from The Last Judgement (1536-1541), 
Sistine Chapel, Vatican City. 
 
We find phantasies of mutilation expressed in Western painting since the 15th 
century, appearing largely under the guise of anatomical art. Juan Valverde’s Historia de 
la composición del cuerpo humano, first published in Rome in 1556, contains 42 
copperplate illustrations of the human body in various states of dissection. While many 
 
117 ibid, p. 20.  
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are based on Andreas Vesalius’ Fabrica (published in 1543), one of the most striking 
original plates in this compendium is that of a muscle figure holding his own skin in one 
hand and a knife in the other (See Figure 5). This depiction is often likened to the 
martyrdom of Saint Bartholomew, who according to popular hagiography was skinned 
alive and beheaded.118 The symbol most associated with the martyr is his own skin – 
removed but curiously intact – which he usually holds or wears draped around his body, 
as in Michelango’s The Last Judgement (See Figure 7) or Marco d’Agrate’s (1562) highly-
detailed scuplture of the flayed saint (See Figure 6). Agrate’s gruesomely realistic statue 
of the apostle renders every muscle, vein, and tendon clearly visible – a haunting 
anatomical depiction of the human body without its flesh. And yet, for all its detail, the 
graphic display still evokes a divine incomprehension. We could attribute this to the 
sculpture’s saintly reference, but I believe the same is true of the engravings of anonymous 
models that we find also in Govert Bildoo and Gerard de Lairesse’s Anatomia Humani 
Corporis (1685) or of Clemente Susini’s “Anatomical Venus” (1782), a life-size, dissectible 
wax woman suggestively posed and primed to be dissembled into seven anatomically 
correct layers (See Figure 8).   
 
 
118 Though it clearly resonates with Bataille’s acephalous prospectives, I have not touched upon the topic 
of beheading, in part for economy of language, but also because I believe this imagery to be more 
pronounced: the severing of the head – according to Freud, an “imperfect” substitution for castration (see 
“Medusa’s Head” in SE XVIII, pp. 273-4) – severs the body from the seat of rationality and bisects any 
possible “idenification.” For a historiographical interpretation of the signficance of the head, execution-
by-decapitation, their respective “ideologies,” see Regina Janes’ essay “Beheadings” in Death and 
Representation, Ed. Sarah Webster Goodwin and Elisabeth Bronfen, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), pp. 242-262. And for an “intellectual history” of beheadings as a form of 
revolutionary sacrifice – which includes an analysis of Bataille’s “headless” intellectual agenda – see Jesse 
Goldhammer’s The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005).  
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 Figure 8. Clemente Susini, Medici Venus (1780-1782), La Specola, Florence. Image 
© Johanna Ebenstein, The Anatomical Venus, London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2016.   
 
All, as it were, introduce the viewer to the unseeable and unimaginable: mortality 
of course, but also the organic apparatus of the body in all of its materiality. The overlap 
of the two suggests an interiority that can only be revealed through invasion, 
fragmentation, and the utter ruination of the body’s containing functions – the enigma of 
ephemerality so other to individual subjectivity. As Joanna Ebenstein writes, we can 
perceive in these aestheticized raw anatomies “a lost attitude to life: one that unifies 
rather than divides and allows for mystery and incomprehension.”119 Or, we might say, 
that they reflect a means of contemplating death as the place where the “base 
materialism” of the body meets the divine. And is this not precisely what Bataille seeks in 
his image of the Dionysus chinois, in the ruined and ruinous figure Sontag gives the name 
of the mythologically flayed Marsyas?  
 
119 Joanna Ebenstein, The Anatomical Venus: Wax, God, Death, and the Ecstatic, London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2016, p. 19.  
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Figure 9. Jusepe de Ribera, The Flaying of Marsays (1637), Museo di Capodimonte, Naples. 
Ribera’s work expresses extremes of physical suffering not only in the gruesome depiction of 
this mythological scene (i.e. Apollo flaying Marsyas), but also in a series of paintings which 
show the progression of the martyrdom of Saint Bartholomew. As in the paintings of Saint 
Bartholomew, here Ribera compels not only with violence and horror, but also with the 
provocative gaze of the flayed that fixes on the viewer to convey the full agony of the scene. 
 
In presenting the skin as the body’s own clothing, such representations are, in a 
word, uncanny. Likewise, we could interpret the hyper-reality of these bodies through 
Kristeva’s notion of the abject, that broad category of non-objects characterized by their 
threatening ambiguity: the leaking orifices of the body where the vulnerable coincides 
with the erotogenic; the bodily wastes that remind us of the animality and inevitable decay 
concealed in the ideational affair of subjectivity; the corpse that is neither human nor non-
human, or a body turned inside-out revealing the meat that it is. The abject, in other 
words, is the attempt to conceptualize a “new significance” that is in effect the dispersal 
of significance resulting from the deterioration or decay of otherwise containing 
functions. Or, as Lechte explains: “if the object is the mediating thing through which the 
subject can gauge itself in the world, abjection evokes an immediate force that fragments 
the embryonic ego/subject.”120 The result is “an immersion in meaninglessness, 
 
120 Lechte, “Abjection, art and bare life” in Abject Visions, p. 14. 
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repugnance, and incoherence – everything, in effect, that subjectivity will strive to keep 
at bay in its ego life within the borders of sociality.”121  
According to this particular semiotic approach, the perpetual need to rid ourselves 
of corporeal traces is part of the unspoken agreement made upon entering the symbolic. 
To an extent, we see this as well in the notion of skin ego, which effectively distills from 
the corporeal a defense against psychical disintegration. Indeed, though Anzieu originally 
posits a destructive “anti-function” of the skin ego, he would later reconsider, eliminating 
such a function as a manifestation of the death drive rather than an attribute of the skin 
ego as such. But as Elizabeth Grosz reminds us: if “[t]he subject must disavow part of itself 
in order to gain a stable self, […] this form of refusal marks whatever identity it acquires 
as provisional and open to breakdown and instability.”122 Thus, aesthetic practices that 
foreground the lack of bodily integrity or unity reintroduce into representation its own 
excesses or inadequacies, destabilizing the objectifying transformations which 
representation undertakes and facilitates.123 The uncomfortable image, therefore, does 
not present a crisis. It simply reveals the crisis in which the subject always-already is: a 
topography which cannot be sealed, an integrity bolstered and cursed by the vicissitudes 
of the flesh, a vast Moebian skin constricted into a communicable trace.124  
In other words, extremely exposed anatomies fracture, corrupt, and reimagine the 
coherent form, revealing what it means to be a body rather than to have a body. By 
representing the insufficiency of the outermost defense they also reflect an affirmation of 
the excess, fragmentation, and impermanence otherwise masked by the gestalted “I.” If 
 
121 ibid.  
122 Elizabeth Grosz, “The Body of Significance” in Abjection, Melancholia, and Love, Ed. John Fletcher 
and Andrew Benjamin, (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 80-103; p. 89.  
123 See Ernst van Alphen’s “Skin, body, self: the question of the abject in the work of Francis Bacon” in 
Abject Visions, pp. 119-129.  
124 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univerity Press, 1993), p. 25.  
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so, they conjure up the “revolution of the whole body”125 called for by Antonin Artaud, a 
return to a ‘pre-inscripted’ body in a state prior to the symbolic – fragmented, without 
organs or limbs, eternally incomplete but, as a result, in constant metamorphosis.126 Here 
the mirror image is dissolved into a Real and resistant aesthetic of open-endedness and 
incompletion that shatters the anthropomorphic image. Incidentally – but not arbitrarily 
– the vast band of indissociable and ebbing intensities that might allow us to think beyond 
the confines of individual subjectivity is termed by Lyotard as “the great ephemeral 
skin.”127  
 
FORMLESSNESS AND ‘OTHER’ BLINDING VISIONS 
Continuing to peel away the material layers of subjectivity, here I propose that we 
consider the figural reversal of the gestalted form through highly-charged fragments of 
the body that are taken out of context and (re)presented in uncanny ways. While the 
imagery of the fragmented body may be designated to certain aesthetic categories (e.g. 
grotesque, abject, etc.), both referent and semblant correspond to structural instabilities 
and violently ambivalent sense-impressions that are fundamentally resistant to 
nominalization. But, whereas ‘uncanny’ and ‘abject’ might be deployed as adjectives 
describing a quality of a threatening (non-)object, Bataille’s performative conveyance of 
 
125 Antonin Artaud, ‘Theatre and Science’ in Anthology, Trans. Jack Hirschman (San Francisco: City 
Lights Books, 1965), p. 173. For a thorough yet poetic comparison of the visions of Bataille and Artaud as 
read through a very different lens than that of this investigation – namely that of contemporary Japanese 
dance-performance – see Catherine Curtin’s “Recovering the Body and Expanding the Boundaries of Self 
in Japanese Butoh” in Contemporary Theatre Review, Vol. 20, 1(2010): 56–67.  
126 Artaud, ‘Description of a Physical State’ in Anthology, pp. 28-9. Here Artaud describes the unreality 
(and painful fatigue) of physical intactness, narrating an experience of breakdown that renders the limbs 
“distant and dislocated” – a “disembodiment of reality” corresponding to a form of “self-multiplication.”   
127 Mentioned throughout Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (and especially salient in pages pp. 241-7), “The 
Great Ephemeral Skin” is defined in “Glossary” as “the connivance of the figural and the libidinal” by 
which unconscious intensity “invades” the realm of the conceptual and produces material effects (pp. xii-
xiii). The libidinal materialism suggested by the “ephemeral skin” is a means of positing this situation not 
as one of opposition or negation, but rather in terms of a polymorphous plasticity that dissolves difference 
while intensifying the potential of matter itself.  
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the informe emphasizes the uncontainable alternation of affects that causes the absence 
(or excess) of discernable forms to spill out of the object itself and flood the entire scene. 
By this reading, the presentation of de- or re-contextualized body-objects is capable of a 
transformative event, signaling an experience of “blindness” evoked through subjective 
rupture rather than exposure to a particular category of the visual. Indeed, the 
indistinguishability of discrete forms corresponds to manner of (non-)seeing, a 
“blindness” which emerges alongside sacrificial violence as another recurring trope in 
Batialle’s life and work.  
These pages intend to expose the informe as the destination where the concepts 
explored thus far might lead, were they capable of moving beyond the situation of 
restlessness which by structural necessity defines them. If the subject is caught between 
the insufficiency (or fragmentation) that narcissism conceals and death as that which 
affirms the underlying ipse as unthinkable, what renders these principles paradoxical is 
none other than the subject who attempts to mediate them. In the ambiguity and violent 
ambivalence of jouissance, masochism, and abjection these distinctions are destabilized 
in what might be considered the subject’s play with its own disappearance, both feared 
and desired. These “auto-mutilating” functions operate like the fort/da game, the game 
of disappearance and return inbuilt with its own reversal so that it can perpetuate itself 
through (compulsive) repetition. In that sense, we can discern therein the traces of the 
death drive. But what of the remainder that cannot be assimilated by these movements? 
We have called this remainder by many names: the excessive, impossible, and 
unrepresentable; death and ‘oceanic’ unboundedness. Having considered thus far the 
convulsive operations over which this deathly remainder looms, here I attempt to convey 
its formless heterogeneity. Or, rather, I mean for that heterogeneity to convey for itself 
why it remains elusive to even the most insistent inquiries.  
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Bataille’s early writings invoke the informe as a third term that disrupts the 
relationship between form and content. Introduced in the 1920s with other experimental 
explorations of heterogeneity, “Formless” appears in both Documents and Critical 
Dictionary, both of which compile “anti-structural” ethnographies of cultural and 
historical artifacts at their most miscellaneous and diffuse.128 Man, abattoir, and eye are 
but a few of the terms that Bataille “defines” unconventionally, calling attention to their 
extraordinariness when taken out of their designated contexts and viewed in unfamiliar 
ways. Also gathered under Visions of Excess – a title that seems especially apt in the 
present asthetico-theoretical framework – writings such as “Mouth” and “The Big Toe” 
dismember the body into its component pieces, foregrounding the independence of 
certain organs and orifices when severed from the intact body, a “sacrificial” 
fragmentation that speaks to the heterogeneity of bodily experience as opposed to the 
homogeneity supposed by the gestalted form.  
Disgust, Winfried Menninghaus’s encyclopedic text on the objects, aesthetics, and 
philosophies of revulsion, presents a structurally similar (albeit more historical) 
treatment of the “strong sensation” aroused by base matter and its representation. 
Therein, he suggests the informe signals an “anti-aesthetic,” even more so than the abject, 
in that it does not merely seek the “monsterous antithesis” of appealing forms but rather 
the outright refusal of any definition that might sustain these as contraries.129 “In the 
articles from Documents,” Menninghaus writes, “all mere signified of disgust are always 
simultaneously signifiers, or agents performing an active representational function. They 
are not (only) objects of artistic representation, but always – and above all – the formal 
 
128 Rina Arya, Abjection and Representation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 121.   
129 Winfried Menninghaus, Disgust: Theory and History of a Strong Sensation, Trans. Howard Eiland 
and Joel Golb, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), p. 345.  
 257 
element of the operations comprising art itself.”130 In other words, much like the textual 
instantiations of impossibility considered in the previous chapter, the informe represents 
a disturbance in signifying logic through referents that convey not their signification but 
their very woundedness.   
Turning to Bataille’s own words, his brief but forceful essay on the informe reads 
as follows:  
A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their 
tasks. Thus formless is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a 
term that serves to bring things down in the world, generally requiring that 
each thing have its form. What it designates has no rights in any sense and 
gets itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm. In fact, for 
academic men to be happy, the universe would have to take shape. All of 
philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock coat to what is, 
a mathematical frock coat. On the other hand, affirming that the universe 
resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe 
is something like a spider or spit.131 
Thus, as a signifier, “formless” is its own signified: the active representation of a 
decomposition which “gets itself squashed everywhere,” undoing notions of perceived 
unities in the disorder of declassification.  
With L’informe: Mode d’emploi, a 1996 exhibit at the Centre Georges Pompidou 
predicated on the undoing of form, Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss express the 
difficulty of staying true to Bataille’s heterology. The exhibit itself reflects a declassifying 
over two hundred pieces of work through the sabotaging of the usual curatorial principles 
of period, style, or subject matter. With a few exceptions, most of the artworks range from 
the 1920s to the 1970s, however, as Bois and Krauss explain, they were organized neither 
 
130 ibid.  
131 Bataille, “Formless” in Visions of Excess, p. 31.  
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thematically nor chronologically: a 1930s sand-relief by Picasso hangs beside one of 
Robert Rauschenberg’s black monochromes (1951) and one of Edward Ruscha’s “liquid 
words” (1969) speaks to Andy Warhol’s “Oxidation” (1978) within range of a Marcel 
Duchamp’s “3 Standard Stoppages” (1913-4), a work which reveals the metric system as a 
construct rather than universal.132 In the theoretical catalogue which accompanied the 
exhibit, Bois and Krauss clarify that their “organizing principles” are the permutations 
and degradations that lead to increasing disorder and non-differentiation.  
We could treat the inform as a pure object of historical research … But such 
an approach would run the risk of transforming the formless into a figure, 
of stabilizing it. That risk perhaps is unavoidable, but, in putting the 
formless to work in areas far from its place of origin, in displacing it in order 
to shift modernist production by means of its sieve, we wanted to start it 
shaking...133  
And that they do. Like the exhibit, the catalogue also privileges the porousness of the 
informe over “modernism’s formal certainties.”134 As an amalgamation of intellectual 
biography, aesthetic interpretation, and psychoanalytic speculation which, in some 
ways, replicates Bataille’s Critical Dictionary, Formless: A User’s Guide places 
emphasis not on an overarching theme but on the “alterations” (and alternations) by 
which heterogeneous events, encounters, and artifacts become informally linked. An 
(anti-)systematic exploration of Bataille’s concepts and his fraught relationship with the 
Surrealists is contextualized through base or abstracted matter and unstable 
psychoanalytic concepts such as narcissism, castration anxiety, and the uncanny. But 
perhaps the most relevant to this present investigation is Krauss’s exploration of the 
linguistic principles of the death drive, which appears under the heading “Yo-yo” and 
 
132 Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss, Formless: A User’s Guide, (New York: Zone Books, 1997), p. 24.  
133 ibid, p. 40.  
134 ibid, p. 16.  
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considers the fort/da game in light of the rhythm it suggests between representation 
and negation.135 According to Krauss, rhythm still lends itself to form and the operation 
of the pleasure principle, to negativity as a compositional resource. The informe, on the 
other hand, has no such cadence. Rather, it pulses violently, indicating “a repetition 
always undergirded by the rupture of total extinction.”136 However, as we have already 
considered in preceding chapters, beneath the skin of its signifiers Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle does indeed pulse, its ontological vacillations signaling the impossible, 
arguably informe, thought operation at its restless center.   
The question, then, is do Bois and Krauss “start it shaking” or is it that the informe 
conveys itself as the trembling of representation? As Rina Arya expresses, given that its 
operational principle is to “disrupt and derange,”137 formlessness can only be itself as the 
antithesis of its own purpose, as the communication of its own “anarchic sense.”138 It 
seems evident that this violent, self-mutilating decomposition shares (anti-)structural 
and (anti-)aesthetic similarities with the abject. However, as Krauss and numerous others 
suggest, the informe reflects a more subversive strategy in that it describes a process 
driven by structural impossibility.139 That is, whereas the abject disrupts boundaries, the 
informe “brings down” the very structures of signification that render those boundaries: 
the informe does not return to the referents it seeks to subvert but disrupts the very task 
of interpretation which is never able to assimilate its own dissolution. Noys expresses a 
similar persuasion, describing the informe as “a more radical and disorienting freedom 
 
135 ibid, pp. 220-1. 
136 ibid, p. 223.  
137 Arya, Abjection and Representation, p. 122.  
138 ibid, p. 124.  
139 See Krauss’ conclusion in Formless (pp. 251-252), as well as Arya (2014), Foster (1996) and Lotringer 
(1999).  
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which inscribes instability into all discourses,”140 as does Hal Foster, who maintains that 
amid the unruly and uncontained content of the infome it is the gaze itself, not the object, 
which is rendered dysmorphic, “presented as if there were no scene to stage it, no frame 
of representation to contain it, no screen.”141 Emphasizing formlessness as an unstable, 
unthinkable situation of non-differentiation, such considerations lead us back to 
questions concerning the unavailability of death to thought, not as a situation of outright 
negation but of dispersal or dissolution, a teeming heterogeneity that leaves us without 
recourse to the structures of meaning. Here we begin to see how the wounding of form 
(and, by association, its function) erupts in something of an ‘oceanic’ experience wherein, 
or perhaps whereby, boundaries are blurred or distorted.  
Bois and Kraus consider the failure of the frame in relation to abstract 
expressionism and post-modernism, but of course the informe is not confined to any 
particular cultural epoch. In fact, it seems that the informe operates alongside the modes 
of sublimation as the dialectical desire for transgression: “[i]t is the force invested in 
desublimation.”142 We see this in Lascaux or the Birth of Art, wherein Bataille argues that, 
as evidenced by the distorted figures painted in the Paleolithic caves of the Vézère Valley, 
the pulsing principle of art is not the law of gestalt but the desire to interfere with form, 
to distort and disfigure.143 In that sense, its operation is not unlike that of the death drive 
which, by Freud’s approximation, emerges alongside life as the wish to return to a prior 
condition; like the emergence of life which precipitates the desire to return to the inertia 
that precedes it, the congealing of forms renders as a byproduct the “destructive” 
 
140 Benjamin Noys, “Georges Bataille's base materialism” in Cultural Values, Vol. 2, 4 (1998): 499-517; p. 
499.  
141 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: the Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1996), p. 149.  
142 Bois and Krauss, Formless, p. 244.  
143 See Foster et al, Art Since 1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism, (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2011), p. 262-4.  
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tendency to de-form. We might, therefore, contemplate base materialism as an 
articulation or, better yet, disarticulation of the (impossible) aim of the death drive.  
Jeremy Biles considers Lascaux in another light – in terms of its “coincidencia 
oppositorum,” the coincidence of opposites.144 In order to “capture” the images, the dark, 
underground world had to be brightly illuminated. The fact that this work was done in the 
hours of darkness, loosely recalls the Nietzschean axiom that propels Bataille’s Inner 
Experience – “Night is also a sun.” Still, the “anamorphic splendor”145 of the cave 
paintings “literally def[ies] the camera.”146 According to Albert Skira, the editor of the 
“Great Centuries of Painting” series in which Lascaux is published, the figures depicted 
in the Lascaux caves “mysteriously shift and change […] almost beyond recognition.”147 
Biles reads this as an “anti-Platonic” allegory: “men did not emerge from a cave to be 
enlightened, but descended into its bowels to inscribe the walls with visions of animality, 
monstrosity, and death.”148 Further, Biles emphasizes the manner in which the 
contemplation of these “visions” is invariably obstructed as the labyrinthine structure of 
the cave only offers oblique points of view. Are the animal and human figures deformed, 
then, or is it the lack of an “adequate” vantage point which distorts them? The 
juxtaposition of these interpretations – the coincidence of opposites and the tendency of 
certain content to exceed its available forms – helps to clarify the interpretation of the 
death drive as a barely legible palimpsest. As an experience of disorienting dissolution 
resulting from the loss of stable referents, death can only be “represented” as a crisis of 
 
144 Jeremy Biles, Ecce Monstrum: Georges Bataille and the Sacrifice of Form, (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2007), p. 73.   
145 ibid, p. 74.  
146 Albert Skira, “Preface” to Bataille’s Lascaux, or The Birth of Art, Lausanne: Skira Color Studio, 1955.  
147 Ibid. Skira elaborates: “A bull looks squat and hunk-necked; shift your position and the same animal 
acquires an elongated body and the head of a giraffe. What is the ideal point of vantage? […] often, where 
the greatest depth of field is wanted, the photographer, as he backs away, is brought up short by the other 
side of the narrow corridor.” 
148 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, p. 74. 
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perspective. Aesthetically, this crisis seems to find expression in and as endless 
transfigurations, formlessness, and the impossibility of a suitable viewing angle, all of 
which break down both scene and stage.  
Menninghaus too brings death and desublimation together under the heading of 
the formless, insinuating that all three correspond to the “never fully tamed nature of 
human instincts.”149 As he explains:   
a threefold ‘return to reality’ hovers on the horizon of the informe: 
aesthetically, a desublimation of beautiful forms moving to the point of 
‘base materialism’; psychologically, a ‘liberation’ of violent sexuality; 
historically, a reactivation of archaic practices for generating and affirming 
societal life through feelings of repulsion and acts of sacrifice.150 
There are echoes here of both Freud and Nietzsche, but Menninghaus argues that the 
informe goes beyond the moderating principles of Eros and the Apollonian, re-
envisioning these “controls” as resources that exist in service of their own terminal 
subversion in death and the Dionysian. But he stresses that Bataille goes further still, 
arguing these “gestures of revolt” are an affirmation of the violent, compulsive core of 
human nature, and as such the very motor of existence.151 Whereas Freud, for instance, 
considers destructiveness as a protestation of the demands of civilization, for Bataille the 
desire for “perversity,” violence, and the return to the raw materiality of death marks “the 
first and positive constituent of social life.”152 The informe, by this understanding, 
corresponds to a principle of return. Or as Biles artfully expresses, the formless testifies 
that “man is not himself until he has mutilated himself, revealed in himself the 
contradiction of life and death that simultaneously animates and annihilates him.”153  
 
149 Menninghaus, Disgust, p. 346.  
150 ibid.  
151 ibid.  
152 ibid, p. 350.  
153 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, pp. 82-3.  
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Having thus far surveyed the heterology and loss of perspective associated with the 
informe, let us return to the disarticulation of the body-as-gestalt to consider what might 
be suggested by the convergence of these features under the heading of formlessness. In 
the “Sacrifical Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh,” Bataille considers 
(auto-)mutilations as linked to a “spirit of sacrifice” in that they reflect the “necessity of 
throwing oneself or something of oneself out of oneself.”154 As elsewhere, he stipulates 
that, much like mystical ecstasy, the sacrifice of bodily integrity – either of the self or of 
the other – gives way to standing outside of oneself in which self-presence is rendered 
impossible. “Such an action,” he writes, “would be characterized by the fact that it would 
have the power to liberate heterogeneous elements.”155 However, interventions in the 
“habitual homogeneity”156 – Bataille’s examples include “the victim struck down in a pool 
of blood, the severed finger or eye, the torn-out eye”157 – invariably break with the 
“homogenizing” discourses of utility or identification. Instead, as an encounter with the 
precariousness, contingency, and “constitutive improbability” of the “I,” they signal a 
“liberation of existence from the forms of appearance,” revealing those forms as operative 
illusions corresponding to “the extreme demands of life.”158 Thus, as relates to the “aim” 
of sacrifice, such acts cannot be purely concerned with appeasement or expiation. In fact, 
Bataille writes, these intentions “would be seen as secondary, and one would only retain 
the elementary fact of the radical alteration.”159  
But this fact of alteration, which Bois and Krauss suggest as indicative of the 
 
154 Bataille, “Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh” in Visions of Excess, pp. 61-
72; p. 67.  
155 ibid, p. 70.  
156 ibid.  
157 ibid.  
158 Bataille, “Sacrifices” in Visions of Excess, pp. 130-136; p. 131.  
159 Bataille, “Sacrifical Mutilation,” p. 70.  
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formless,160 corresponds to a difficulty (or impossibility) of positioning that fractures the 
discourse of identification. Describing the de-differentiation that occurs through the 
violation of individualized forms, Bataille writes: “sometimes the man sacrifices the 
animal, sometimes the animal sacrifices the man, but each time it is a case of auto-
mutilation because the animal and the man form but a single being.”161 By all means, this 
auto-mutilation also extends to Bataille’s relation to the image of the tortured Dionysus 
chinois. In his contemplation of this maimed figure, “hideous, haggard, striped with 
blood, beautiful as a wasp,” Bataille too seeks dismemberment, expressing a desire to 
“ruin in [himself] that which is opposed to ruin.”162 The object, he writes, “incapable of 
liberating itself except outside of itself, demands [the limit of death] in order to let out the 
scream of lacerated existence.”163 But being beside or beyond oneself constitutes 
experience as one of breakdown or vertigo, wherein thought coincides with its own 
annihilation or dispersal: such an experience “has not only catastrophe as its object; its 
very structure is catastrophe.”164 It might do well to mention here that Dionysus is not 
only the “dismembered God” but also the “the god of disturbed reason”…165 
In many ways, these lacerated figures resonate with Deleuze and Guattari’s body 
without organs (BwO) as a means of imagining difference or heterogeneity “outside the 
dominance or regime of the one, the self-same, the imaginary play of mirrors and doubles, 
the structure of duplication presumed by notions of signification and subjectification.”166  
 
 
160 Bois and Krauss, Formless, p. 50.  
161 Bataille, “Sacrifical Mutilation,” p. 70. 
162 Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 119.  
163 Bataille, “Sacrifices,” p. 134.  
164 ibid.  
165 Bataille’s “La Mère-Tragedie” (in Oeuvres complétes, Ed. Michel Foucault, Paris: Gallimard, 1987) as 
quoted in Biles, p. 55.  
166 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), p. 164.  
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Figure 10. Notable relics, clockwise from top-left: Saint Catherine of Siena’s “uncorrupted” 
– but severed – head (Basilica San Domenico, Siena); the bejeweled hand of discalced 
Carmelite Saint Teresa of Avila (Iglesia de Nuestra Señora de la Merced, Ronda); Padre 
Pio’s heart touring the world (shown here in Manila Cathedral, Philippines); and the 
miracle of San Gennaro’s “liquefying” blood (Duomo, Naples). Relics such as these 
underscore the material aspects of religious practice, embodying the contradiction of a 
transcendence that is deeply bound to materiality.167 If relics are indeterminate matter 
imbued with religious significance, do we read practices of relic-worship as a fetishization 
of death and the dead body or as an index of the “sacred materialism” of base matter? 
 
Suggestive of the disarticulated sense of matter in its unbound potential, the BwO, like 
the vast majority of Bataille’s key concepts, breaks from synthesis as the organizing 
principle of philosophy.168 In challenging the perception of the body as a totality, Grosz 
explains, the BwO rejects, displaces, and moves beyond  “the four great ‘illusions’ of 
representation: identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance.”169 This refusal to 
subordinate the body to a homogeneity based on biological organization foregrounds an 
 
167 Patricia Cox Miller, “Relics, Rhetoric, and Mental Spectacles in Late Ancient Christianity” in Seeing the 
Invisible in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Ed. Giselle de Nie, Karl Frederick Morrison, and 
Marco Mostert, (Utrecht: Turnhout, 2005), pp. 25-52.  
168 Arya, Abjection and Representation, p. 122.  
169 ibid.  
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imperative of metamorphosis and experimentation, a deregulated approach that 
transforms “functional units” into nomadic fragments capable of potentially infinite 
assembling and dissembling. 
Bataille writes that “[t]he filthy aspects of the torn apart body guarantee the totality 
of disgust where life subsides,”170 and we find similar (though far less morbid) undertones 
in Deleuze and Guattari. As they note, “[t]he body without organs is not a dead body but 
a living body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its 
organization.”171 In other words, the BwO is not “lacking” its organs. Rather it is a “body” 
which, through the anarchic independence of its shifting, transmuting parts, behaves in 
excess of any possible organization or stabilization. Conceived of in pieces, the BwO calls 
attention to the effervescence of its peices, which belong to no particular body but rather 
are in a perpetual state of becoming. As discussed in relation to the libidinal materialism 
under which Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic writings might fall, here too we see 
intensity and contingency replacing the “meaningful, organized, transcendent totalities 
constituting the unity of the subject and signification.”172  
Grosz describes this approach as “an acidic dissolution of the body and the subject 
along with it.”173 However, she also addresses the paradoxical concerns that have been 
driving this investigation: “[t]here must, it seems, be a minimal level of cohesion and 
integration in the BwO in order to prevent its obliteration; there must be small pockets of 
subjectivity and signification left on order for the BwOs to survive.”174 That is, as concepts 
 
170 Bataille, “Sacrifices,” p. 132.  
171 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 30. 
172 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 170.  
173 ibid, p. 179.  
174 ibid, p. 171. Grosz offers a similar critique of the abject in “The Body of Significance,” where she argues 
that in emphasizing the desire to return to a pre-oedipal state of non-differentiation, Kristeva’s 
elaboration of abjection cannot accommodate sexual difference or feminine autonomy. Kristeva, as Grosz 
maintains, presents maternity as process without a subject, thus foregrounding the semiotics of the body 
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which destroy the integrity and intelligence of containing bodies, the BwO and the 
informe cannot be defined, only performed and even so, without the possibility of closure 
– similar to the aim-inhibited formulation of the death drive. Thus, these abstract and 
abstracting concepts speak less to a terminal situation of dissolution and more so to the 
“play of man and his own decomposition”175 – a dynamic expressed as the subversion of 
signifying conventions or the lacerating of forms, experienced as a crisis of (self-) 
positioning for a subject whose viability relies on the reification of the narcissistic fantasy 
of intactness. For Bataille, this crisis, simultaneously ecstatic and horrifying, is the feature 
of the sacred as the domain wherein the loss of self is experienced. In Deleuze and 
Guattari, however, the mutually constitutive nature of assemblages and “desiring 
machines” does not convey the same sense of loss: horror is subsumed in a de-
anthropomorphized complexity that fails to take into account what is at stake for the auto-
mutilating subject. As a result, nor can it account for the anguished bliss that such a 
subject experiences in its ruination. Nevertheless, the BwO is germane to the informe in 
that it experiments with metaphor of the body, giving prominence to its unbound 
potential when considered in a state of fragmentation as opposed to a perceived or desired 
integrity.  
Arya and Foster, both contemporary theorists of aesthetics, explore other such 
“experiments” in the field of the visual, both citing Hans Bellmer as a key example.176 Both 
classify Bellmer’s work under “abject art” – a category in which we might also place the 
“liquefied” forms of Francis Bacon.177 However, as the considerations above indicate, 
 
underlying the signifying process. However, in the field of non-differentiation, this body loses its sexual 
specificity. 
175 Bataille, “Sacrificial Mutilation,” p. 70.  
176 See Foster, “High/Low Art: Art and Mass Culture” in October, 56 (1991): 64-97, p. 87. Arya elaborates 
Foster’s argument in her discussion of Bellmer in Abjection and Representation, pp. 90-94.  
177 Michel Leiris uses the liquefaction to describe the debilitating turbulence by which the body overspills 
its boundaries. See Leiris, Francis Bacon: Full Face and in Profile, Trans. John Weightman, (London: 
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perhaps this classification minimizes the effect of his “fetishistically” informe dolls and 
drawings. Comprised of doubled and re-doubled life-sized parts that could be assembled, 
disassembled, and reassembled, Bellmer’s Die Puppe is quite literally a body-in-pieces. 
Simultaneously “womanly” and pubescent, seductive and disturbing, Bellmer’s doll is 
ineradicably uncanny, at times as an “intact” body posed to unsettle the distinction 
between animate and inanimate and others as “monstrous” composite of limbs arranged 
around a central joint. Either way, Die Puppe provokes penetrating questions about 
identity, representation, and the susceptibility of both to destabilization: at the sight of 
this disarticulated double, revulsion coincides with an “identification” of sorts, a strange 
sympathy that reveals the viewer’s own doubleness.  
 
 
Figure 11. Hans Bellmer, gelatin silver print of Die Puppe (1936) “dissembled.”  
 
By Foster’s interpretation, Bellmer’s doll recreates “a pre-Oedipal moment,” 
gesturing towards a pre-ambivalent fullness through the pairing of “irrational desires” 
 
Thames and Hudson, 1988), p. 13. See also Arya’s Francis Bacon: Painting in a Godless World, 
(Farnham: Lund Humphries, 2012).  
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and an “aberrant and corrupt materiality.”178 Indeed, the doll was notoriously created by 
Bellmer to indulge his own uncanny desires.179 However, though generally posed 
suggestively, Biles argues that its “perverse” appeal is not as a sexual object, but rather as 
a fragmented body that acts as a transgressive sacrifice of form.180 Establishing an affinity 
between Bellmer’s artistic works and Bataille’s texts, Biles argues that both reach beyond 
impulse to sexual excess, representing instead a “confusion of senses and organs” that 
“insist[s] that the viewer/reader experience the contradiction they seek to portray.”181 If 
we accept that the paroxysmal alteration of affects reflects the unstable configuration of 
the death drive, that it corresponds to a traumatic encounter with a non-symbolizable 
Real, then the “lived realization of contradiction,” as Biles emphasizes, “shows what 
cannot be seen in any literal sense.”182 In the informe, the psyche pursues its morbid 
pleasures, perhaps even momentarily assuages the first and final drive.  
It is worth noting here that Bellmer also provided the illustrations for two of 
Bataille’s pornographic novellas, Story of the Eye and Madame Edwarda. Depicting 
sexually-explicit figures in what seem to be a states of dizzying metamorphosis, Bellmer 
renders the spirit of Bataille’s texts more so than their distinct scenes, providing the visual 
equivalent of a “degenerate” sexuality that strives to deform and decompose its 
participants.183 However, as Biles notes, the continuity of their textual and aesthetic 
 
178 See Foster (1991), p. 87.  
179 See Therese Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), p.64-67. Here Lichtenstein considers Die Puppe as inspired by Olympia, the life-
sized doll/double that is animated and later dissembled in E. T. A Hoffman’s tale “The Sandman.” The 
uncanniness of this text is analyzed by Freud (1919b) as owing to a confusion between familiar and 
unfamiliar, animate or inanimate, that “robs the eyes” – just like Coppelius (or the Sandman) does in 
Hoffman’s tale.  
180 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, pp. 135-7.  
181 ibid, p.147.  
182 ibid.  
183 See Elliott Vanskike, “Pornography as Paradox: The Joint Project of Hans Bellmer and Georges 
Bataille” in Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal, Vol. 31, 4 (1998): 41-60. Here Vanskike 
considers how, precisely by not adhering to the Bataille’s story, Bellmer captures the r/Real sense of the 
text as a transgressive play of metonymy and metaphor that collapses “stable” dialectics.  
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inclinations suggests that the affinity between the two goes beyond mere collaboration:   
they share a religious sensibility.184 Searching for the sacred in the contemporary world, 
both seem to find its residues in the always-already (auto-)mutilating laceration of form, 
Bellmer drawing inspiration from Mattias Grünewald’s depiction of the crucifixion in the 
Isenheim Alterpiece as Bataille does in the photograph of the Dionysis chinois.185 
Like Bataille’s writing, Bellmer’s aesthetic conjures a state of intoxication and 
frenzy, a destruction of the self-contained body, and a devolution of the anthropomorphic 
form into a contorted, writhing mass: the decentralized self is swallowed up in a 
primordial rabble of extremities (See Figure 12). Doubled limbs and fractal lines create 
an optic ambiguity that gives the impression of animation, of the convulsive shudder 
symptomatic of the sacred. The anatomies themselves are fleshy and unmistakably erotic, 
but their graphic contortions exceed the body proper, suggesting the destruction of the 
closed and individual form which, by Bataille’s understanding, restores an impersonal 
continuity. Horror, eroticism, and the sacred reverberate together in an aesthetic of de-
differentiation that strips the viewer of the ability to discern discrete entities. But given 
that subjectivity itself relies on othering and objectifying transformations, the inability to 
posit separateness is a critical inability to (discursively or representationally) posit 
anything at all. Unable to convey this terminal situation as such, the strategies of 
liquefaction, laceration, and “Dionysian expression” reflect an attempt to restore the 
sacred through the evocation of a pre-discursive chaos, a loss of distinction which recalls 
the unboundedness of the ‘oceanic.’  
 
 
184 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, pp. 126-128.  
185 ibid, p. 124-6.   
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Figure 12. Hans Bellmer, illustration 1/6 in the a re-publication  
(Paris: K, 1947) of Bataille’s 1928 novella Histoire de l'oeil. 
 
Evidently, this “religious sensibility” differs wildly from analytical attempts to 
arrive  at the sacred through intelligibility. This was explored in the previous chapter in 
relation to mystical texts which convey the paradoxical nature of sacred experience 
through subversions of convention and the disruption of syntactical meaning. And, prior 
to that, we considered how theoretical speculations beyond the limits of subjectivity 
render a “thesis” which is its own absence, failure, or mutilation. Visually, however, 
apotheosis appears to find expression as a breakdown of stable forms and their containing 
functions, an ‘oceanic’ or exorbitant formlessness that liquefies the boundaries between 
discontinuous beings. Across Bataille’s oeuvre though, we also see the experience of God 
and/or indeterminacy of distinction conveyed in another, albeit similar way – as an 
experience of blind vision. Considering the etymology of “mysticism” – a derivative of the 
verb µυέω (myéō) which means “to close [the eyes]”186 – Bataille’s emphasis on blindness 
 
186 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 146.  
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is doubly suggestive: some mysteries appear only to be “revealed” precisely as they hide 
from view.  
 
 
Figure 13. Domenico Beccafumi, Saint Lucy (1521), Pinacoteca Nazionale, Siena. 
 
Bataille’s Critical Dictionary decomposes the body into sovereign parts with 
destructive tasks rather than meanings, but among these parts the eye has a pivotal 
position. “Oedipal enucleation,” he writes, is “the most horrifying form of sacrifice.”187 It 
is also the trope to which he returns compulsively. In his texts, the eyes are wounded, 
gauged out, proliferated, made to “see” from other vantage points. In “Eye,” for instance, 
Bataille considers the “seductiveness” of the eye as lying “at the boundary of horror.” The 
essay functions like the visual artifacts it discusses, simultaneously as the razor that Dali 
and Buñuel take to a woman’s eye in the short film Un Chien Andalou (See Figure 14), 
and as the persecuting and devouring eyes of J. J. Grandville’s illustration, following a 
criminal through the sky and ultimately taking the form of a fish that eats him as he 
 
187 Bataille, “Sacrifical Mutilation,” p. 67. 
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reaches for salvation (See Figure 15). “Innumerable eyes,” as Bataille describes, “multiply 
under the waves,”188 and the result is not a lack of vision but the consequence of its excess, 
vision to the point of its own ecstatic extinction: a “blindness that results from seeing too 
much, from exceeding what our eyes find tolerable,”189 not unlike what drives Oedipus to 
mutilate his own eyes.   
 
 
Figure 14. Salvador Dali and Luis Buñuel, still from the short 1928 film Un Chien Andalou. Of 
this film and its surreal sequences, Bataille writes, “how then can one not see to what extent 
horror becomes fascinating, and how it alone is brutal enough to break everything that stifles?” 
 
The torn-out eyes transmute the scopic field, implying a perception without an 
active viewer and displacing the I as the egoic center of the visible world. For Bataille, 
therein lies the disturbing nature of the eye out of its context. If, as he writes in Story of 
Eye, “decent people have gelded eyes,”190 then the immersion in base materialism that 
follows from transgression “opens” them.191 And is the uncanniness of this desublimating 
 
188 See “Eye” in Visions of Excess, pp. 17-9.  
189 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, p. 158. 
190 Bataille, Story of the Eye, Trans. Joachim Neugroschal, (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 42.  
191 For more on the blindness as theoretical metaphor, see Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration 
of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).  
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experience not akin to the primal dread epitomized by E. T. A. Hoffman’s “The Sandman,” 
the mysterious figure who also “robs the eyes” in Freud’s 1919 paper on the Unheimlich?   
 
 
Figure 15. J. J. Grandville, “First Dream: Crime and Expiation” (1847),  
Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris. 
 
In Story of the Eye, the “blind vision” of desublimation coincides with eroticism. 
Perhaps Bataille’s best-known work, I am reluctant to summarize it as the plot is 
somewhat secondary to the experimentation with the metonymy of base materialism that 
makes the reading of this text a descent into the informe. Nevertheless, the novella follows 
the sexual discovery, insatiable arousal, and dissolute obsessions of a nameless narrator 
and his companion in debauchery, Simone. The typology of their desire is transgressive: 
they engage in erotic acts involving globular objects, torrents of bodily fluids, the 
desecration of corpses, and most generally, a remorseless violence towards the 
expectations of morality and decency. However, as Susan Sontag suggests in “The 
Pornographic Imagination,” Story of the Eye is not merely a scandalous or scandalizing 
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text but pornography-as-literature-as-art;192 it doesn’t seem to aim at sexual arousal or 
self-gratification per se but rather, as Sontag argues, “at disorientation, at psychic 
dislocation,” at the incarnation of “extreme forms of human consciousness.”193 In 
Bataille’s cosmology, these aims are not that different, both corresponding to, in Sontag’s 
words, “the voluptuous yearning for the extinction of one’s consciousness, for death 
itself.”194  
Indicative of what Sontag describes as an “immense spiritual risk,”195 Story of the 
Eye is a potent literary exploration of the proximity of sex and death where transgression 
is transformed into an expression of violent desire and likewise into delirium as a 
contestation of ennui or malaise. Blood, filth, and crime are linked to deep erotic 
experience by a subterranean connection – a craving for upheaval, for the effervescence 
of death:   
And it struck me that death was the sole outcome of my erection, and if 
Simone and I were killed, then the universe of our unbearable vision was 
certain to be replaced by the pure stars, fully unrelated to any external gaze 
and realizing in a cold state, without human delays or detours, something 
that strikes me as the goal of my sexual licentiousness: a geometric 
incandescence (among other things, the coinciding point of life and death, 
being and nothingness), perfectly fulgurating.196  
That is, Bataille’s “aesthetic of evil” does not glorify suffering, depravity, or vice for its 
own sake. Rather, it seeks to shatter moral dichotomy – perhaps even all dichotomy – 
through a disruptive and exuberant violence that violates the boundaried conception of 
 
192 Susan Sontag, “The Pornographic Imagination” in A Susan Sontag Reader, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1983), pp. 205-233; p. 205. Among other pornographic texts such as Jean de Berg’s The Image and 
Pauline Réage’s Story of O – both written under pseudonyms – Sontag describes Story of the Eye as “a 
body of work belonging to literature considered as an art.” 
193 ibid, pp. 213-4.  
194 ibid, p. 222.  
195 ibid, p. 213.  
196 Bataille, Story of the Eye, p. 30; my italics.  
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the individual. Affirming the (too-)bright, overwhelming flash where life and death 
mutilate one another, he attempts to evoke in the reader the concomitance of terror and 
desire that drives his characters (and arguably himself) towards blindness: “…the 
contradictory impulses overtaking us in this circumstance neutralized one another, 
leaving us blind and, as it were, very remote from anything we touched, in a world where 
gestures have no carrying power, like voices in a space that is absolutely soundless.”197 
Fulfillment comes in the “form” of fulgurating extinguishment.  
 An epilogue titled “Coincidences” offers what reads as Bataille’s self-analysis, 
tracing the traumatic imagery of the text back to a dysmorphic oedipal situation: his 
father, blinded by syphilis, urinating at the armchair to which his paralysis had confined 
him. Recalling this scene, Bataille describes his father’s white upturned eyes as “a 
completely stupefying expression of abandon and aberration in a world that he alone 
could see.”198 Given the psychobiographical contextualization that Bataille himself 
provides, we might read Story of the Eye through the failure of the paternal metaphor 
that disrupts both law and symbolic logic. Indeed, this is the pervasive interpretation 
encapsulated by Arya: “[t]he novel is an overhaul of the Symbolic order that is represented 
by the parental authority, the law, morality, and religion, and each episode involves 
transgressive at least one of these structures.”199 In the collapse of patriarchal order, she 
continues, “abjection and nihilism reign.”200 Moreover, in light of the unconventional 
“primal scene” Bataille recounts, the failure of the paternal function appears to be both 
expressed and (partially) compensated for by the substitution of the phallus as signifying 
organ. It is replaced with the eye(s), which in Bataille’s texts are gouged out or subjected 
 
197 ibid, p. 44.  
198 ibid, p. 72.  
199 Arya, Abjection and Representation, p. 178.  
200 ibid.  
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to mutilations that, by this interpretation, evince a sort of castration. However, for Bataille 
the resulting blindness is not a feared punishment but a means of restoring a lost vision, 
a desublimation that empties reality of its “transcendental pretensions.”201  
According to Arya, Bataille’s novella is propelled (or possessed) by a post-moral 
impulse to “embrace ignoble materiality”202 and to be swept “into cycles of destruction 
and anarchy,” an impulse which she traces back to abjection, to formlessness, and even 
to the sacred on the basis of the “momentary fusion” effected in the return to base 
materialism.203 It is here that I wish to take a step further, suggesting that these 
movements are analogous as configurations of the death drive. If woundedness reveals a 
truth of being – the emptiness of the transcendental and the insufficiency of 
discontinuous being – then its evocation in disturbed textuality or formless imagery is a 
means of acceding to and communicating the continuity that is inaccessible, indeed 
unthinkable, to the individualized subject. Death, in other words, is made manifest as an 
experience of de-differentiation that restores a lost unity at the cost of the perceived 
integrity of the self. But formlessness is by its “definition” unconfined: it dissolves the 
perception of separations that sustain and are sustained by the “I” which it tears apart. 
In Story of the Eye, Bataille conveys this through the convergence of somatic and 
figural transgressions which deliquesce the text’s referents. He writes: “[m]y kind of 
debauchery soils not only my body and my thoughts, but also anything I conceive in its 
course, that is to say the vast starry universe, which merely serves as a backdrop.”204 The 
transgressive movement beyond the acceptable range of pleasure or the tolerable range 
of sensation, it appears, contaminates not only the partaking individual but the notion of 
 
201 ibid, p. 120.  
202 ibid. 
203 ibid, p. 167. 
204 Bataille, Story of the Eye, p. 42.  
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decency itself. Through heightening transgressions, Bataille paints the formless image of 
a “dirty” and disintegrating world, turning the “vast starry universe” into “astral sperm” 
and “heavenly urine.”205 Roland Barthes evocatively explores this peculiarity in “The 
Metaphor of the Eye,” tracing the bizarre signifying chains of objects and liquid flows that 
form the perplexing net of text. The first chain is comprised of globular objects – eggs, 
eyes, and testicles – and the second of “streaming” liquids such as milk, urine, and semen. 
But the liquids do not seem to correspond to their objects, and the objects of themselves 
are presented out of place: eggs bob in a toilet, eyes dangle out of sockets, and testicles 
are served on a dish, peeled and bloodshot recalling the other bodiless globules. As he 
writes of Simone, Bataille “play[s] gaily with words, speaking about broken eggs, and then 
broken eyes, and [the] arguments become more and more unreasonable.”206  
According to Barthes, the novella is a metaphorical composition in a process of 
liquifaction. Of the two signifying chains, he writes, “each term is never anything but the 
significant of the next term;” neither can be ascribed a “bottom” or a “beginning” – “the 
paradigm begins nowhere.”207 And where does such a paradigm culminate? By 
substituting the usual contiguities of objects with the exchanges of meaning between 
them, Barthes argues that the text reflects “the violation of a limit to the signifying space,” 
an act of transgression “that is eroticism itself.”208 Through this “metonymic eroticism” 
we find ourselves in a situation of tremulous indeterminacy: “the world becomes blurred; 
properties are no longer separate; spilling, sobbing, urinating, ejaculating form a wavy 
meaning...”209 Or, as Arya writes:  
the momentum of the novel is sustained by a wet and protean flow of 
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objects, like a semiotic chora that sweeps away syntactical sense. The novel 
is propelled by the unyielding libidinal energy of the characters and their 
fetishized objects and this continues in an endless cycle of motion ad 
infinitum.210 
Bataille evokes the formless through the contingent compositions that proceed from the 
doubleness of objects, and through those compositions the informe appears as the 
heterogeneous “blind spot” that violates signifying practice itself.   
In the climatic scene, we find the erotic, murderous, and sacred all submerged in 
their own excessive fluidity. The Eucharistic body and blood of Christ are substituted with 
semen and urine as a young priest is forced to participate in an orgy and then “martyred” 
like “a pig being slaughtered.”211 And the eye that views the brutal scene and truly sees it 
is the enucleated eye of the dead priest, staring not out of the head, the seat of rationality, 
but out of an unlikely, erogenous socket itself flooded with fluid. This base re-positioning 
of the eye transmutes the scopic field into a “blind universe” where meaning and sense 
are submerged in “liquid sensation.”212 In this situation, Arya writes, “the reader cannot 
hold on to certainty and all former points of reference are brought into question.”213 
Opposed to the consolidation of forms or the structure of signifying chains, the anarchism 
and excess of the body in its base materialism gives way to the intractable chaos of 
contingency in which neither self-positioning nor seeing are possible. In the blinding light 
(or darkness) of death-as-impossibility, these beyond-discursive configurations permit a 
re-visioning of the death drive whereby its inhibited aim is not an all-negating 
destruction, but a dissolution into protean heterogeneity – an ‘oceanic’ feeling.
 
210 Arya, Abjection and Representation, p. 179. 
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POSTSCRIPT  
 
 
 
 
A persistent thought is completely beyond the reach of its conditions.  
— Maurice Blanchot, The Death Sentence 
 
 
 
 
“WE ARE FEROCIOUSLY RELIGIOUS,” Bataille writes in The Sacred Conspiracy, 
declaring war against the servitude to meaning and utility that drains from life of the 
courage to confront decomposition. 1 In these pages, I have aimed to express this religious 
sensibility as the osmotic turbulence of the ‘oceanic,’ to justify the ferocity of this 
sensibility as the necessary violence it enacts against the forms and structures which 
sustain the subjective gaze and the separations it perceives. By this reading, the 
“destructiveness” of the death drive reflects a desire to rupture the structures of 
recognition, to affirm a primordial experience of fragmentation through the exorbitant 
expenditure of self-possession, to abdicate discursivity in favor of the wordless 
transmission that occurs through an undifferentiated medium. But how to write of this 
 
1 Bataille, “The Sacred Conspiracy,” in Visions of Excess, p. 179.    
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pre- or post-discursive anarchy without abating it, without enacting a betrayal? As 
Derrida asks, how to find a speech which maintains silence?2  
The application of a Batallian “reasoning” to Freudian metapsychology does not 
answer these questions; to claim that it does would be a deception. I believe that it does, 
however, sustain these questions, anticipating that which is otherwise excluded, 
excessive, or impossible as modes of transgression and, via the ontological crisis conjured 
by transgression, means of speculating the radical otherness that lies beyond. Approached 
as neither an object nor an abstract negation, death resists closure or synthesis in 
discontinuous thought, and through the heterogeneity of his writings, Bataille too resists, 
emphasizing or, rather, performing the liminality of death at its moment of occurrence3 
rather than reducing it to a thing of conjecture. This liminality jeopardizes the integrity of 
the limit, rendering it porous in such a way that life and death seep into one another, the 
former at its most effervescent and the latter at its most “thinkable.”  
Arguably this is how the death drive operates, both in the economy of psychic life 
that it propels as well as in the economy of psychoanalytic theory that it so deeply 
destabilizes. Inhibited by the structural impossibility of its aim, the death drive does 
indeed appear to operate as a principle of return, not only in its compulsive striving for a 
pre-egoic entropy but also in the backwards motions that restore that which it dissolves, 
presumably so that dissolution can be experienced once more, again and again. Viewed 
through the peculiar prism of Bataille’s “anti-philosophy,” this restlessness is as telling as 
it is dizzying: the notion of life as a linear movement towards death-as-finality is displaced 
by the processes of alternation and alteration by which the subject engages with its own 
unthinkable disappearance. We have considered at length why as terminal situations 
 
2 Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, p. 262.  
3 Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, pp. 471-72.  
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neither death nor disappearance are available to thought. But, in taking up the latter as 
both as an experience “at the level of death” and an operation characterized by and 
accessed precisely as impossibility, Bataille reminds us that the force of auto-mutilating 
concepts lies none other than in the fact of mutilation: they lead us where we as such 
cannot advance, into a labyrinth of contradictions in which we lose ourselves or, 
otherwise, to the violent sacrifice of subjectivity itself. 
 
Figure 16. André Masson, Acéphale (1936), drawn for public review  
(and para-religious society) of the same name, founded by Bataille and 
operational until 1939. © ADACP, Paris, 1985. 
 
We began with one Dionysus, and I propose here we end with another – the 
headless emblem of Acéphale drawn by André Masson, and of whom Bataille writes:   
He reunites in the same eruption Birth and Death. He is not a man. He is 
not a god either. He is not me, but he is more than me: his stomach is the 
labyrinth in which he has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I 
discover myself as him, in other words as a monster.4   
 
4 Bataille, “The Sacred Conspiracy” in Visions of Excess, p. 181.  
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Without a head to establish the dominance of reason over base matter, his is the 
experience of disarticulated being: “[h]e can set aside the thought that it is he or God 
who keeps the rest of things from being absurd.”5 A labyrinth twists in the emptiness of 
his abdomen, suggestive of the vicissitudes of the narcissistic illusion whereby 
contradictions are sustained by their own endless doublings and reversals. His hand 
holds a dagger with which to lacerate himself, and where a phallus might be, we find a 
memento mori instead – a reminder of death as the enigmatic underbelly of (auto-) 
erotic union. In this confluence of horror, ecstasy, and sovereignty, the figure proclaims 
the self-mutilating violence of unconscious forces. A distortion of the ideal architecture 
of the human form and its “proper” proportions as sketched by Leonardo Da Vinci, is he 
perhaps the Vitruvian man of the death drive? If so, he gives us the sense of another 
aspiration, not of harmonious symmetry but of the riotous chaos that follows from a 
“logic of destruction.” Similar to what the fragmented body reflects back to subjectivity 
and poetry to language, the “content” of this logic is precisely what the disarticulated 
image or text uncontains: a referent that exceeds the assumptions of representation is 
sovereign in that it breaks from symbolic constraints, but informe and “impossible” for 
that same reason.  
Incidentally, these features – excessiveness, formlessness, impossibility – also 
belong to a vision of the sacred which is morbid and dangerous, a “religious sensibility” 
which, like the fact of death or disappearance, requires that the subject abandon all 
anchoring points of reference in discourse and subjectivity. Indeed, it is none other than 
this risk which constitutes the sacred as a religious experience occurring at the level of 
death, as “that which, being only beyond meaning, is more than meaning.”6 With its 
 
5 ibid, p. 180.  
6 Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 20.  
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emphasis on perishability, laceration, and the agitations of deep contradiction, Biles 
describes this as hyperchristianity. And “[t]he truth of hyperchristianity,” he writes, “is 
that death is at the heart of life, it is the mortal seed within life, and that the encounter 
with God is an experience of death within life, an impossible experience of ‘being 
dead.’”7 Here the sacred appears through the rejection of transcendent and salvific 
narratives in favor of the convulsiveness of apotheosis and base materialism, the result 
of which is an experience of being outside of oneself – ex stasis.  
Thus, decay and decomposition confront us with the horror of death but, as 
Menninghaus writes, “[o]n the other hand, the same disgust grants us a sense of the shift 
of rotten matter into new, rampant life.”8 Beyond the separateness of “autonomous” 
individual beings, this teeming superfluidity of life is a oneness without homogeneity – 
undifferentiated but not without particularity – wherein the contingency and 
precariousness of existence both annihilates and animates.  
In “The Pornographic Imagination,” Sontag writes: “He who transgresses not only 
breaks a rule. He goes somewhere that the others are not; and he knows something the 
others don’t know.”9 What I have tried to express is that what he “knows” is something 
that he cannot know; where he goes, even he no longer is… But as Blanchot “concludes” 
The Instant of My Death, “[w]hat does it matter. All that remains is the feeling of lightness 
that is death itself or, to put it more precisely, the instant of my death always in 
abeyance.”10   
The death drive, bound as it is with life, allows for death – the “lost object” – to 
exist in the psyche as the unnamable aim of wish and fantasy. It is the engagement of the 
 
7 Biles, Ecce Monstrum, p. 102.  
8 Menninghaus, Disgust, p. 354. 
9 Sontag, “The Pornographic Imagination,’ p. 232.  
10 Blanchot, The Instant of My Death and Demeure (J. Derrida), Trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000; p. 11.  
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subject with his/her own disappearance, that which allows for the enjoyment of an 
experience “on the level of death” yet, through its overflowing dialectic with life, pulls the 
subject back to himself like a reel on a string. Beyond the drive, there is only formlessness. 
A situation without referents. A situation that exceeds us, or rather, by which we exceed 
our limited selves. An encounter with the all, mediated by nothing.  
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